TITLE

OF AN

USURPER

AFTER A

THOROUGH SETTLEMENT

EXAMINED;

In Answer to Dr. *SHERLOCK's*

Case of the Allegiance

DUE TO

SOVEREIGN POWERS, &c.

LONDON:

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PREFACE.

PART of the following Papers were written before Dr. Sherlock's Book was publiſhed, without any deſign of Printing them: But I was much more confirmed in my Opinion, when all that the Dr. had ſaid was very far from giving me any Satisfaction. And as I was engaged in this Subject before, ſo I have kept cloſe to it, not concerning my ſelf with any thing elſe that the Dr. has ſaid in his Book: And I have been ſo far from Prejudice and Partiality, that I muſt confeſs, before I had fully conſidered it, I could not but think much the better of Dr. Sherlock's Notion becauſe it is his; and I am not ſenſible that I have been wanting in any reſpect, which is due to the Dr's Learning and Worth.

And this is all that needed to have been ſaid by way of Preface, if a Weekly Retailer of Politicks and falſe Hiſtory, after a very certain and poſitive Account, out of Manuſcript (as he told us) and Original Papers, given by him of that Convocation; the Acts and Canons whereof gave occaſion to the preſent Controverſy, had not at laſt produced Letter pretended to have been written by King James I. to a Member of the Convocation; which contradicts what I have ſaid in relation to it, and which ſome perhaps may give Credit to, if it be not ſhewn that it deſerves none.

But this Letter is a Contradiction to all that he had ſaid before of the Convocation, and ſerves only to expoſe the Vanity of this Pretender to ſecret Hiſtory. For before he informed us from his MSS. that the King was not inclined to favour the Dutch, but the Clergy were for it; and in this Letter the King is reſolved to eſpouſe their Cauſe, but the Clergy are under mighty

Scruples about it. This Obſervator *is wont to leave his other Rarities with his Bookſeller to be viewed and examined; but we are only told that he had this Letter no body knows from whom, and that it was written no body knows when, nor to whom: It is to* Good Dr. Abbot, *but who this Dr.* Abbot *was is uncertain, and he tells us it has no Date, tho in his Contents he ſets it down as written in the year* 1604. *What! had he forgot himſelf? or was he not yet reſolved, whether he ſhould date it or not?* A Letter of King *James* to Archbiſhop *Abbot* concerning the Convocation, 1604. *How comes he to be here ſo poſitive, that it was written to Archbiſhop* Abbot, *when he afterwards confeſſes it is only his Conjecture? But the Convocation was in* 1604. *True, for it began in* 1603. *and was continued by Adjournments and Prorogations till* 1610. *But Biſhop* Overall's *Convocation-Book bears Date only from* 1606. *But it was written partly by a Secretary, as he imagines, and partly by the King himſelf; by ſome* Scotch *Secretary, I ſuppoſe; but King* James's *hand is too well known, to truſt* the Learned World (*in his Cant*) *with a ſight of it, for fear of ſome Diſcovery.*

In this Letter King James *blames the Convocation for aſſerting that all Kings, if they be but in Poſſeſſion, are inveſted with Gods Authority; and then* he *ſays,* But you know all of you, as I think, that the Reaſon of calling you together was to give your Judgment, how far a Chriſtian and a Proteſtant King may concur to aſſiſt his Neighbours to ſhake off their Obedience to their own Sovereign, upon the account of Oppreſſion, Tyranny, or what elſe you like to name it. In the late Queens time this Kingdom was very free in aſſiſting the *Hollanders* both with Arms and Advice; and none of your Coat ever told me that any ſcrupled about it in her Reign. Upon my coming to *England* you may know, that it came from ſome of your ſelves to raiſe Scruples about this matter. And albeit I have often told my mind concerning *Jus Regium in ſubditos*, as in *May* laſt in the Star-Chamber upon the occaſion of *Hale's* Pamphlet; yet I never took any notice of theſe Scruples, till the Affairs of *Spain*; *Holland* forced me to it; all my Neighbours call on me to concur in the Treaty between *Holland* and

and *Spain*; and the Honour of the Nation will not ſuffer the Hollanders to be abandoned, eſpecially after ſo much Money and Men ſpent in their Quarrel. Therefore I was of the mind to call my Clergy together, to ſatisfie not ſo much me, as the World about us, of the Juſtneſs of my owning the *Hollanders* at this time: This I needed not have done, and you have forced me to ſay, I wiſh I had not.

Here we are told that the Clergy at the beginning of King James I. *his Reign* 1603. *were poſſeſſed with ſtrange Scruples, which they had never had before, concerning the* Dutch *Affairs; tho the ſame ſcrupulous Clergy at the ſame time maintained, that bare Poſſeſſion gives a Title to Uſurpers in any Government: and from the year* 1581. *the united Provinces by virtue of expreſs Privileges and Proviſions in that behalf had renounced all Obedience to the King of* Spain, *and had been treated with as free Eſtates by the neighbouring Princes. Now tho Scruples are ſometimes very unaccountable things, yet theſe are ſuch Scruples as I think have been ſeldom heard of, that Poſſeſſion ſhould give a Right, and yet not give the* Dutch *a Right, who had ſo many other Pleas beſides from expreſs Laws in their favour. But only ſome of the Clergy were ſcrupulous:* Some! *Who were theſe* Some? *They muſt be of the moſt conſiderable and eminent, and their Number muſt be conſiderable too; or elſe the King had taken no notice of it, at leaſt, he had never called a Convocation to decide the Controverſie. But the Convocation was called* to ſatisfie not ſo much the King *nor the Clergy*, as the World about us of the Juſtneſs of his owning the *Hollanders* at this time, *that is, about Two or Three and Twenty years after the World had* owned *them, and when* all the King's Neighbours called on him to concur in the Treaty between *Holland* and *Spain*; *the Convocation is aſſembled to determine that for the Satisfaction of the World, which the World had been ſatisfied in ſo long before, and now called upon the King for his Concurrence in that very thing, about which all this Scruple was raiſed.*

But becauſe all men are fallible, and may change their minds, we know, ſometimes on the ſudden; let us examin how this Letter agrees with the Hiſtory of that time. How did King James

help

help the Hollanders *to ſhake off the* Spaniſh *Yoak? Or what Occaſion could there be of Scruple in the Clergy at the beginning of his Reign, tho they had neither held that Poſſeſſion gives a Right, nor that the* Dutch *had any better Claim? The King at his coming to the Crown refuſed to concern himſelf in the War between* Holland *and* Spain, *and would by no means be perſuaded to ſend the States any aſſiſtance of Forces,* (a) *but all that went into thoſe Wars, went only by his Permiſſion and Connivance, not by his Command; and all the Supply of Mony that I can find he furniſhed them with, was only thus; that after the earneſt Sollicitation and Importunity not only of the States themſelves, but of the King of* France *in their behalf, he conſented that a third part of the Money, which the* French *lent them, ſhould be upon the King of* England's *account, ſo as to diſcharge a Debt, which was then owing to* England *from* France; *and ſoon after he gave inſtructions concerning what Money was due to* England *from the United Provinces.*

In the ſecond Year of his Reign he entred into a League with Spain, (b) *one Article of which was, that he ſhould not aſſiſt the* Dutch, *and he kept himſelf all along in a ſtate* (c) *of Neutrality, and acted no otherwiſe than by way of Mediation to accommodate Affairs between them and the* Spaniards; *and he muſt have been far enough from any Intention or Inclination to take up Arms, to force a Peace; when, as* Grotius (d) *obſerves, he could not but ſee how much it was for his Intereſt, that the War ſhould continue; for by this means* Spain *was diverted, and taken off from giving him any diſturbance in* Ireland, *or in any other part of his Dominions.*

(a) *Scotorum* quoque nova cohors, *Baclavio* Tribuno, & *Anglorum* Supplementa, Permiſſu Regis, non ut ante, imperio. *Grot.* Hiſt. lib. 13. An. 1604.

(b) Ad *Batavos* hæc pertinebant, Hoſtes, Rebelleſq; alterius alter ne juvaret, neu juvari à ſuis pateretur. ib. lib. 1604.

(c) Quippe ſedere Britannum tanti Belli otioſum ſpectatorem. ib. lib. 16. An. 1607.

(d) Satis hic (*Jacobus*) intelligebat *Batavorum* Armis ſuam quietem ac maximè *Hiberniam* defendi. Sed haud minùs videbat, quàm non idoneus eſſet Belli ſuaſor, qui pecuniam, cujus id Bellum maximè egebat, nec contulerat antehac, nec habebat undè conferret. ib. An. 1607.

In the year 1607. *the United Provinces were treated with as Free Eſtates both by the Arch-Dukes,* Albertus *and* Iſabella, *and by the King of* Spain *himſelf. The Arch-Dukes declare,* * that they are content to treat with the General Eſtates of the United Provinces in quality, and holding them for free Countries, Provinces and States, whereunto they pretend not any Title. *And the King of* Spain *in his Ratification ſays, that* he upon due deliberation and advice of his own certain knowledg, and abſolute Kingly Power and Authority——— had made unto the ſaid Eſtates, and by theſe preſents did make the like Declaration, which the Arch-Dukes had formerly made, as much as in him lay, and that he declared himſelf to be content, that in his name and in his behalf, the ſaid Eſtates ſhould be treated withal in quality, and as holding them at this preſent for free Countries, Provinces and Eſtates, to whom he pretended no Title at all.

* *Grimeſtone's* Hiſt. of the Netherlands, *l.* 16. *An.* 1607.

This was at the firſt entrance upon a Treaty in Order either to a Peace or a Truce, and afterwards I think, there could be no cauſe of Scruple, tho the King had never ſo openly and vigorouſly eſpouſed their Intereſt at the Treaty; as he did indeed the year following appear with more Zeal and Reſolution in their behalf, than before he had done. But what happened not till 1608. *could not occaſion the Scruples mentioned in the Letter to have been in the beginning of his Reign, and the laſt Book of the Convocation had paſſed the Lower Houſe April* 16. 1606. *as it bears date.*

What Scruple then could the Clergy raiſe to themſelves in this Caſe? Did K. James *by his ſtanding Neuter, or by his League with* Spain *engage himſelf in the War with the* Dutch *againſt* Spain? *or could the moſt Scrupulous men think it unlawful for him to promote the Peace as a Friend and Allie to both Nations? or rather muſt we not contradict all the Hiſtories of that time, if we will believe this to be a true Letter?*

We know by our Eccleſiaſtical Conſtitutions and Canons, *that the Convocation had other Buſineſs before them, than the Conſideration of the* Dutch *affairs; and few men are ſo little acquainted with the State of Affairs in* England *at the beginning of King* James

James *the first's Reign, but they knew that there was too great occasion (and I doubt there will always be) for the Clergy to declare and explain the Doctrin of the Church concerning the Authority of Kings, and the Allegiance of Subjects.*

The Books of Parsons, *and* Buchanan *and several others had fill'd mens minds with such Principles, as the Orthodox Clergy neither of that, nor of succeeding Reigns have been yet able to dispel. The Kings Prerogative both in Spiritual and Temporal Affairs was the subject of the most and the Principal Books written at that time, as well as of the Convocation; and we always have had too great cause at home, to need to go so far as the* Low-Countries *for an occasion to treat of Allegiance. But then more especially when there was such an* attempt *by Gunpowder,* and *fire* from *Hell* to blow up and destroy their Sovereign, and the whole State of the Country *&c. as they mention. lib. 2. can.* 1.

But indeed if there were nothing else to prove this Letter forg'd, what it contains about the Convocation would be a sufficient Proof of it; for I think nothing can be more plain to an unprejudiced Reader, than that, in the Sense of the Convocation, an Usurper is then only Throughly Settled, *when the People have submitted to him, and when there is no other Prince, who has a better Claim.*

The

The TITLE of an USURPER after a *Thorough Settlement* examined, in Answer to Dr. *SHERLOCK*'s *Case of the Allegiance due to Sovereign Powers*, &c.

TO avoid all Ambiguity and Dispute about Words, and to bring the Matter in debate to as narrow a Compass as I can; I shall reduce it to this Question:

Whether the Thorough Settlement of an Usurper doth entitle him to the Allegiance of the Subjects, over whom his Usurpation is throughly setled, tho the Rightful King who is out of Possession be still living, and demand their Allegiance?

The Resolution of this Question in our present Case depends first, upon the Authority of Bp. *Overall*'s Convocation-Book; secondly, upon the Reason of the thing it self.

First, the Convocation expressly determins, that there is some kind of *Thorough Settlement*, which is sufficient to give a Title, and whether it be the Thorough Settlement now described, is the Thing to be examined. And for the better understanding the Sense of the Convocation, it will be convenient to give a brief Account of the first Book, so as to collect all together that concerns this matter; that at one view a more clear and distinct Notion may be had of it.

Ch. 1. Can. 1. They declare their *Chief Purpose to be to imitate the Scriptures in setting out, and describing the Deity and Dignity of our Saviour Christ, by his Almighty Power and Universal Government of all the World, as Heir of all things and Head of his Church.* And therefore they first affirm, that he created the World, and gave the supreme Authority to *Adam for his time, and to the rest of the Patriarchs and chief Fathers successively, before the Flood; ordaining, by the very Law of Nature, that their Children and Off-Spring should fear, reverence, honour and obey them.* After the Flood it was committed to *Noah*; who, by virtue of this Authority *given unto him by Almighty God, and also warranted by the Laws of Nature and Reason*, distributed the whole World among his three Sons, and they again divided it among their Sons. But *Nimrod* descended of *Cham, not contenting himself with the Patriarchal or Regal mild Government, ordained of God by the Laws of Reason and Nature, became a Tyrant and Lord of Confusion.* And within few Ages after the Death of *Noah*'s Sons, their Posterity becoming dissolute, barbarous and ungovernable, cast off that Government which God had ordained, and set up new Forms of divers kinds, after their own Humours and Inventions. Whereupon, it is determined by the Convocation; *If any one shall affirm, that the said Posterity*

Ch. 2. Can. 2.

Ch. 6. Can. 6.

Ch. 8. Can. 8.

of Noah's *Children did well, in altering either the Manner or Form of Civil Government which God had appointed; by bringing in of Tyranny or factious Popularity — or that it was lawful for such as then served God, upon any Pretence to have imitated their Examples: He doth greatly err.*

Ch. 8, 9, 10. Can. 10. *Abraham* with his Family being by God called out from among the wicked and idolatrous People of *Chaldea*, that Supremacy of Power, which he had over his own Family, was continued down to *Jacob*: And tho afterwards this Authority was much weakened and diminished, during the abode of the Children of *Israel* in *Egypt*; yet in Process of time, according to *Jacob*'s Prophecy, the Scepter was bestowed on *Judah*. In the mean time, they were first governed by *Moses*, and then by *Joshua* after a mild and temperate manner. Ch. 11. Can. 11. After the Death of *Joshua*, they had no constant Succession of Princes, but God raised up Judges from time to time, as Occasion required, to deliver and to govern them: But upon the Peoples impatience and importunity, God appointed *Saul* for their King; and lastly the Scepter came Ch. 14. Can. 14. to the Tribe of *Judah* by *David*'s advancement to the Throne, to which *he was as truly called by God himself, as* Aaron *was to the Priesthood: And* David's *Posterity had by God's Ordinance as Rightful an Interest to succeed him in his said Kingdom, as* it *or* Aaron's *Sons had to succeed him in the Priesthood; or* Moses, Joshua *and the rest of the Judges, notwithstanding that God himself did chuse and named them particularly, had in their Governments.*

Ch. 15. Can. 15. But after the Kingdom was thus become Hereditary, the Kings were as much obliged, as ever, to the Observation of those Laws, which God had prescribed for them to govern by; and that they might do this the better, they had their Judges and Inferiour Magistrates; which was no diminution of their Power, but they *thereby adorned their Kingdoms with such a temperate and fatherly Moderation; as was most agreeable for the Government of God's People.*

Then the Convocation shews by a brief recapitulation of the Particulars from the beginning of the World, that *Kings* by God's Institution have a Paternal Authority, and that Subjects owe them the Obedience of Children to their Parents: And whether the Kings or supreme Governours were nominated and appointed immediately by God himself, or succeeded by an Hereditary Right, as in the Kingdom of *Judah*, neither the Priests nor People had any share in conferring upon them their Regal Authority, but this was immediately and solely from God. The following Chapters and Canons to the 23d. are spent in shewing and explaining the Authority of the Kings and supreme Governors among the *Jews* in Ecclesiastical Affairs and the Subjection and Duty of the Priests to them, by which they were bound not to depose or rise up against them upon any account whatsoever. And then by way of Objection against this Doctrin is brought the Example of *Jehoiada*'s deposing *Athaliah*; in answer to which it is said, that the Right of Succession according to Gods own appointment was in *Joash*, and that therefore *Athaliah*, though she had sate six years on the Throne, might lawfully be deposed, as being still but an Usurper; but that this ought not to be drawn into Example against a lawful King. Ch. 16. Can. 16. Ch. 17, 18, 19. Can. 17, 18, 19.

To obviate another Objection they observe, that the Prophets under the Old Testament did often severely rebuke their Kings, and sometimes anointed one King before the decease of another. Thus *David* was anointed by *Samuel*, in *Saul*'s life-time, to succeed him; and *Jehu* was put into actual possession of the Kingdom of Ch 25. Can. 25.

Israel

Israel by *Elisha*, and as God had commanded by the said Prophet, *he killed Joram before that time his Sovereign, but then his Subject.* But these things were done by a direct and express Message from God, and therefore were to be no Precedent to the *Jews* themselves, (much less to others) unless God sent a Prophet with the same Order and Commission.

Another Objection is wont to be made against the Authority of Kings from *Jer.* 1. 10. which is likewise answered. Ch. 26. Can. 26.

A fourth Objection might be raised from the Example of *Othoniel*, and more especially from the Example of *Ahud*, who slew *Eglon* King of the *Moabites*, to whom the *Israelites* had been Eighteen years in Subjection: But these are shewn to be as extraordinary Cases as that of *Jehu* was. Ch. 27. Can. 27.

But still another Difficulty arises; for the Monarchical Government spoken of hitherto among God's own People, was *mild and temperate*, but in other parts of the World, *the temperate and fatherly Government, which Noah had prescribed unto his Off-Spring, and which God himself established afterwards amongst his own People*, was soon degenerated into Tyranny, as we see by what the Scripture relates of *Nimrod*; or into Republicks, as amongst the *Romans*, who rebell'd against their Kings, and quite cast off Kingly Government; and in like manner several Forms of Government were introduced in several other Nations. In this Case the Convocation determins; that tho it be sinful in them, who by Invasion or Rebellion invert the Order of the World, and set up *degenerate Forms of Government* instead of that *temperate and fatherly Government*, which God has ordained; yet when these Forms are thoroughly settled, as that Tyrannical Government of *Nimrod* and the Republick of the *Romans* in Process of time were; they must then be submitted to: For tho they were at first introduced by very wicked Practices, yet God having vouchsafed to establish them, and to invest them with his own Authority, they must be obeyed as his Ordinance. Ch. 28. Can. 28.

These things thus stated and cleared, the Convocation proceeds to the remaining course of the *Jewish* History, and shews that the *Jews* owed Allegiance to the Kings of *Persia* after their return from *Babylon*, who still *continued by God's Appointment a supreme Authority over them*: And accordingly *Jaddus* the High Priest, when *Alexander* required him to assist him in his Wars and become Tributary to him, returned this Answer; *that he had taken an Oath for his true Allegiance to* Darius, *which he might not lawfully violate whilst* Darius *liv'd. But when* Alexander's *Authority was settled amongst them*, the Case was altered, and they then owed him the same Subjection, that before they had owed *Darius*. Ch. 29. Can. 29. Ch. 30. Can. 30. Ch. 31. Can. 31.

After *Alexander's* Death the *Jews* became again a free People, he leaving behind him no Successor; but they were miserably oppressed by the bordering *Kings* of *Egypt* and *Syria*, especially by *Antiochus Epiphanes*, whose *Invasion and Government was most unjust and Tyrannical; until* Mattathias *moved with the monstrous Cruelty and Tyranny of the said* Antiochus, *made open Resistance, the Government of that Tyrant being not then either generally received by Submission, or settled by Continuance.* The great disorders amongst the Priests brought many and grievous Afflictions upon the *Jews*, both under the Government of the *Grecians*, and of the *Maccabees*; till at last *Pompey* took *Jerusalem* by the Assistance of *Hircanus*, who had been displaced from the High Priesthood, his younger Brother *Aristobulus* getting into his room: And tho *Hircanus* did very wickedly in taking this occasion to revenge himself of Ch. 32, 33, 34. Can. 32, 33, 34.

his Brother, by enſlaving his Country; yet when the *Jews* had ſubmitted to the *Romans*, and had yielded themſelves up to their Government, they were utterly inexcuſable in thoſe Rebellions which they afterwards raiſed, and which ended in their own Deſtruction.

Having thus far ſpoken of that *mild and moderate Form of Civil Government* which God at firſt eſtabliſht throughout the World, and afterwards preſerved (in ſome meaſure) amongſt the *Jews*, till they by their perverſeneſs and Rebellions brought utter ruin upon themſelves; they ſay laſtly, that Chriſt is the univerſal Lord and Governor of the whole Earth, and the orders of the ſeveral particular Kingdoms and Governments of it, as it may beſt conduce to the deſigns of his Wiſdom and Goodneſs in the Government of the whole World, which is but one univerſal Kingdom under him.

Ch. 35. Can. 35.

The Subſtance then of what the Convocation ſays is this; Firſt, Chriſt as Creator and Governor of the World eſtabliſhed a *mild and temperate and fatherly Government*, which was to continue throughout all Ages in all Parts of the World, but the Wickedneſs of men ſoon introduced other *degenerate Forms* either Tyrannical or Popular, and theſe of ſeveral Sorts and Denominations, *Democratical, Ariſtocratical*, &c.

2. God calling *Abraham* out of *Chaldea* into *Canaan*, and chooſing his Poſterity for his peculiar People, continued this *mild and Paternal Government* amongſt them, and upon all Occaſions did himſelf appoint their chief Governors, till at laſt he ordained that the Government ſhould be Hereditary, and entailed it upon *David*'s Poſterity; ſo that the *Jews* were governed all along after that original Form of Paternal Government, which God inſtituted at the firſt Creation of Mankind, and then again confirm'd after the Flood; though this Form of Government was much defaced and diminiſhed among the *Jews* in ſucceeding times, by the great Abuſes that crept in among them. And in this *Government*, Firſt, the Power was ſolely from God, not depending upon the conſent either of the Prieſts or People, nor deriving any Authority from any Act of theirs. Secondly, their *Kings* had ſupreme Authority over all Perſons and in all Cauſes, as well Eccleſiaſtical as Civil. Thirdly, their Power was Irreſiſtable, and they were accountable to God only for it. But againſt this ſeveral things might be objected from Examples among the *Jews*; which they anſwer by ſhewing that in thoſe inſtances, God's particular Warrant and Commiſſion had been revealed, as in the Caſe of *Abud* and *Jehu*; or that his Will and Command was fulfilled in their maintaining that Hereditary Succeſſion which he had appointed, by depoſing an Uſurper, and ſetting up the Rightful Heir; and this was what *Jehoiada* did.

3. As for other *degenerate* ſorts of Government, though they ought not to have been introduced, yet when by never ſo ſinful Arts and Practices, by Uſurpations from abroad, or by Factions and Rebellions at home, they had any where been throughly ſetled, as the Governments of *Babylon* and *Egypt* and *Rome* were, they muſt be ſubmitted to; becauſe where the Original, Paternal Government was *extinct*, the Authority thereby devolved upon the Poſſeſſors of the ſupreme Power in theſe *degenerate Forms*, whether they were Tyrannical or Republican; becauſe the ſupreme Governour of the World would not ſuffer ſo great a Part of Mankind to be without any rightful Government for ſo long a time, and yet ſo they muſt be, unleſs he either authorize theſe *degenerate Forms* upon the Extinction of the Paternal Original Government, or reſtore it by an overruling Providence.

4. When

4. When the *Jews* themselves were, by God's Judgment upon them for their Sins, placed under such *degenerate* kinds of Government, they were to pay the same Submission to those Governors, that they did to their own Kings; they might not depart out of *Egypt* without *Pharaoh's* leave first obtained, unless God would have warranted them to do it by his express Direction and Command; they must not submit to *Alexander*, whilst *Darius* lived; and no Oppression of the *Romans* was a sufficient excuse for their rebelling against them.

This being the Sense of the Convocation, it will not be difficult to understand, what they mean by a *thorough Settlement*.

Their Words are these:

Ch. 28. "And when, having attained their "ungodly Desires, (whether ambitious Kings by bringing any Country into their Subjection, or disloyal Subjects by their Rebellious rising against their natural Sovereigns) they have established any of the said *degenerate Forms* of *Government* amongst their People; the Authority either so unjustly gotten, or wrung by Force from the True and Lawful Possessor, being always God's Authority, (and therefore receiving no Impeachment by the Wickedness of those that have it) is ever (when any such Alterations are throughly settled) to be reverenced and obeyed, *&c.*

These Words being an inference from the Particulars before related in this Chapter, we must judg of them from the occasion and design of the whole Chapter, and from the particular Instances alledged in it. First, the design of the Chapter is to shew what Obedience is due to *Kings* or other supreme Magistrates, where that *mild and temperate Government*, which has been the Subject of the foregoing Chapters, was not retained, but other Forms set up in its room. For, *as the rebellious Humours of the People, declining from their Obedience, did in many Countries alter that temperate and fatherly Government which Noah had prescribed unto his Offspring, and which God himself established afterwards among his own People: So did the ambitious and insatiable Dispositions of sundry no less elsewhere impeach the same, as by the Beginning and Progress of the Four Monarchies it is most apparent.* And therefore they now declare, what is to be thought of all these *Aberrations from the said mild and temperate Government before specified*: And they determine, That *Almighty God, (who for the sins of any Nation or Country alters the their Governments and Governors, transferrith, setteth up, and bestowith Kingdoms as it seemeth best to his Heavenly Wisdom)* having in his Wisdom suffered wicked men to introduce and establish these *new Forms*, we are to look upon them as his Ordinance, and therefore to pay them all that Obedience which is due to the Paternal Government of his own Institution. Secondly, we may learn what is meant by a *Thorough Settlement* from the particular Instances here mentioned; and these are the *Assyrian* Monarchy, the *Roman* Commonwealth, the Kingdom of *Egypt*, and all the Four Monarchies: When therefore any *degenerate Forms* of Government, or *Aberrations from the mild and temperate Government before specified*, are so settled, as these were, we must in Conscience yield all Obedience to them, and not think that they have no sufficient Authority, because they deviate from the first Pattern of Government prescribed by God himself, and preserved amongst his own People.

It

It is indeed said, that *the Authority unjustly gotten, or wrung by force from the true and lawful Possessor, is God's Authority and therefore receives no Impeachment from the Wickedness of those that have it.* Which seems to suppose, that *the true and Lawful Possessor* may be still living, and may still claim the Allegiance of his Subjects, and that the Invader or Usurper keeps Possession *as wickedly*, that is, as much against all Human Law and Right as the first got into it: But if we observe the instances immediately added, it will appear that no such thing can be concluded from this Passage. For they Instance in the *Kings* of *Egypt*, who oppressed the *Israelites* after *Joseph's* Death, and in the *Kings* of *Babylon*, when they had brought the *Jews* into Subjection, and had carried away the whole Nation into Captivity: But the *Kings* of *Egypt* after *Joseph's* Death had undoubtedly as good a Right as they had before it, and the *Kings* of *Babylon* had such a Right to the Allegiance of the *Jews*, as no other Princes could pretend to, when the whole *Jewish* Nation were brought under Subjection to them, and their *Kings* themselves had made a Covenant with them, and taken an Oath to them, *Ezek.* 17. 16. and were strictly commanded by God himself to serve the King of *Babylon*, *Jer.* 27. Yet these are the only Instances brought to shew that *God's Authority receiveth no Impeachment by the Wickedness of those that have it*, that is, as no wicked means in the acquiring of Power can hinder, but that after a long and uninterrupted continuance (as in the Four Monarchies) these *Forms* of Government are confirmed by God's Authority, so neither can the abuse of this Authority, by Oppression and Tyranny, when any such Alterations are throughly setled, invalidate the Authority itself, but it is *always God's Authority*, and is still to be reverenced, and obeyed as such. And therefore all the Severities and Intolerable Burthens which the *Jews* endured in *Egypt* and in *Babylon*, could not warrant their taking up Arms against those *Kings*; so that the *Jews* themselves, when brought under these *new Forms* of Government were obliged to submit to them, and not by any Insurrections or Violence endeavour to restore themselves to that Primary Institution of Government, which God had appointed, these having his Authority as much as that itself, when they are throughly setled, and when there is no other Objection to be made to them, but that they are irregular and corrupt in their Constitution, or had an ill beginning, or are oppressive and Tyrannical in their Management and Administration: If all who had any Right or Interest in the former Government have submitted to the new one, and are under the Obligation of Engagements and Oaths to it, (which was the Case of the *Jews*) they must be obedient to it, however different from the former, or how much worse soever it may be.

But the Convocation acknowledge no other settlment, tho never so full to have been sufficient to debar the *Jews* from entring into Arms against an Usurper. For they justifie *Mattathias* and his Sons in *their open Resistance*, they made against *Antiochus Epiphanes*, because *his Government was neither generally received by Submission, nor settled by continuance.* Now *Antiochus* was called in by a prevalent Faction, and had two years peaceable Possession of *Jerusalem*; for so long it was, before *Mattathias* took up Arms against him, that *Antiochus* han entred into *Jerusalem* by the Treachery of that Faction, without any opposition; and it was three years longer, before it was recovered out of his Hands by *Judas Maccabeus*, so that he held

1. Mac. c. 1, 2, 3. *Joseph.* Antiqu. l. 12. c. 7, 8, 9. 11.

held it in all five years; yet because that Faction only that invited him in had submitted to him, and the contrary Party, who had the Right on their side, were not subdued nor brought to a Compliance by this continuance of his Government, it was not such a Continuance as is required to that thorough Settlement, which the Convocation mention: But tho he had for so long time been in full Possession of *Jerusalem*, and of their whole Country, and had, as the Convocation observe, spoiled the Temple, and profaned it with his Idols, and exercised all the cruel and wicked Acts of the most absolute and tyrannical Conqueror, he had notwithstanding no better Right still, than at his first Usurpation. So that the Convocation cannot mean a bare Possession, though it be never so full, by a *Thorough Settlement*, but such a Settlement only, as both supposes *Submission* or *Continuance*, and no Claim of Right in any other Person.

And that the meaning of the Convocation could not be, that an Usurper by being got into full Possession, may have any Right or just Title against the true Heir, appears from what they determine about the Deposing of *Athaliah* after six years Possession: For the Reason they give to justifie the Proceedings of *Jehoiada* therein is, that *Joash their late King's Son was then their only Natural Lord and Sovereign, although* Athaliah *kept him for six years from the Possession of his Kingdom*. It may here be objected that this is a peculiar case, and that this Reason would hold good only in the Kingdom of *Judah*, where God himself had appointed and settled the Succession of their *Kings* in the line of *David*, and that therefore *Jehoiada* said to the Congregation, *Behold, the King's Son shall Reign, as the Lord hath said of the Sons of David*, 2. Chr. 23, 2. and the Convocation observes that he acquainted them, that *it was the Lord's will that he should reign over them*, and that *God himself had required all that they did at their Hands*. For when God has given his Promise, we must interpret no occurrences of Providence, in contradiction to it, and therefore we see that when the Kingdom was taken from *David's* Posterity, it was not done without an express Revelation: But where God has made no Promise to a King and his Successors that they shall enjoy the Kingdom, he may by his Providence take it away from them.

Ch. 23.

Yet this I answer, That the whole design of the Convocation is, as I have shown, to explain the Duty of Subjects by the example of God's own People, and therefore if in this place they suppose, something so peculiar in the Constitution of their Government, that it could be no precedent to other Kingdoms this must be a manifest contradiction to their whole design: They tell us that Government in its Original, and by its first Institution was immediately from God, and was the same throughout the World, and tho it were corrupted in other Nations, God preserved it amongst his own People; and yet still the same Obedience was due under those *alterations from the said mild and temperate Government*, at first instituted, that was to be paid under this itself, and by consequence there must be the same obligation to the Right Heir in all other Hereditary Monarchies; and therefore they call *Joash* here *the true and natural apparent Heir to the Crown and their only natural Lord and Sovereign*, which would be very unfit expressions, if they did not think, that he had an unalterable Right by the Law of Nature as well as by God's Promise. It was enough indeed that *Jehoiada* should remind the People of God's own choice of *Davids* Posterity to rule over them, and nothing more needed

to

to be said by him; and it was very fit, that this should not be omitted by the Convocation: But if this were the only Title which *Joash* had, it would have been improper to call him a Natural Heir, a *Natural Lord and Sovereign*, and it would have overthrown all their Arguments from the Practice of the Jews, if they had said that *Joash* ought to be plac'd upon the Throne of his Ancestors, after that six years interval, only by vertue of a Divine Promise: For a Divine command concerning any of their Kings or Judges for the time of their Lives, is equivalent to a Divine Promise concerning *David* and his Posterity, and so it might be said by parity of Reason, that the Duty which they owed their *Kings* was due by vertue of a revealed command from God, and could not be the same in other Nations, where there is no such revealed Command. Thus *David* would not stretch forth his Hand against *Saul*, for this Reason, because he was *the Lords anointed*, that is, he was so chosen and appointed by God himself, as no *King* now can pretend to be: And so in all other instances, if we must argue from no example, where Gods command or promise intervenes, in vain does the Convocation explain the Duty of Subjects from the sacred History; and yet we must argue from no such examples, if Gods revealed will alters the case, and makes it different from Cases of the same Nature, which fall out in other Governments concerning which God has not revealed any thing.

It is true indeed when God so interposes as to invert the ordinary course of Government, as in the case of *Ahud* and *Jehu*, this can be no Precedent for any to imitate, without the same command to authorise them, that they had, but then it was no more a Precedent to the *Jews* themselves, than to any other Nation. But when God only regulates the *Jewish* Government according to the first Institution at the Creation, and settles it upon the Right of Succession, which is common to that with all other Hereditary Monarchies, and makes choice of the Person, to whom and to his Posterity he grants a Donation of the Kingdom; or when he reforms abuses, and puts things into their due course and order again, and enjoyns nothing but what without a Divine warrant, is of itself lawful to be done, we may conclude that all these things are written for our instruction, and must be a Rule to all other Nations in the like Cases.

The Convocation therefore proceeds all along upon this Principle, that from the first Institution of Government there is both a Natural and a Divine Right in all Sovereigns; which is Natural as it is founded on the Laws of Nature, and Divine because Government is Gods Ordinance, and owes its Original Form and Constitution to Gods own immediate appointment, and therefore that when God by his express direction and command afterwards settled that sort of Government, which he at first instituted to all the World, among his own People, he did not thereby make any alteration in the Duty of Subjects, or Rights of Kings, but did only oblige both to perform their several Duties in that way and manner which he had enjoyn'd them. The Children of *Israel* asked a *King to judge them like all the Nations*, 1 Sam. 8. 5. 20. And God chose *Saul* to be their King, but what ever variations there might be in some circumstantials of Government, they owed just the same Duty and Subjection to him, which was due to *Adam* and *Noah*, &c. And according to the Convocation, every other Sovereign Prince has the very same Right that he had neither, they in asking, nor God in giving them a King made any distinction between the Authority of

Ch. 2. 6.
Can. 2. 6.

of their King and the Kings of other Nations; but the *manner* or Royal Power of their King is described to be just the same with that of the Kings round about them. God entailed the Kingdom of *Judah* upon *David* and his Seed, but the Right of Succession was still the same in that, which it is in all other Hereditary Kingdoms, only they had a Secondary Obligation to the performance of their Duty from an Immediate and positive Command, whereas others are oblig'd to the same Duties, but by Virtue only of the Law of Nature, and of the first Institution of Government. The *Jews* then were bound to set up *Joash* in that Kingdom upon two accounts, that is, both as he was their Natural Sovereign, and as he descended from *David*, to whom God had made a peculiar Promise, and had given the Kingdom to him and to his Posterity: but the first obligation had been of itself sufficient, and those Kings who hold by no Divine Promise, but only by Right of Inheritance, have the same Right which he had, who held by a Twofold Title, because either of them had been alone sufficient: For a single Title is enough to convey a Right, and an Additional one can only confirm and strengthen it.

Indeed when there are two Titles, one may sometimes hold good, when the other fails: But then this must be, when the Titles are wholly distinct and independent one upon another, as they are not in the present Case. For God bestowed the Kingdom upon *David* for him and his Heirs after him to hold by Succession, that is, to hold by the same Right that other Hereditary Monarchs hold by; so that if he by his Providence had disposed of the Hereditary Right, and caused it to fail, his Promise which was grounded upon this Hereditary Right, or rather did suppose it, as its Object, or the Thing Promised, could now no longer give him a Title to the Kingdom: For God by his Promise did not bar himself from disposing of the Kingdom of *Judah* in the same manner, as he disposeth of all other Hereditary Kingdoms, but he promised *David*, that he should Rule that Kingdom by an Hereditary Right, just in the same manner and by the same Tenure from himself, that other Hereditary Kings hold by. God had promised to protect the Kings of *Judah*, and to continue the Kingdom to them, and that a peculiar Providence should watch over them, but never that his Providence should not have the same Power over them, that it had over all other Kings; and therefore we find that the Kingdom of *Judah* did not always continue without Interruption even in *David*'s Line, which yet it must have done, if God's Promise had been so to be understood, as that it was not to be subject to the Contingencies that other Hereditary Kingdoms are liable to. And upon this Account the Convocation proposes the Kingdom of *Judah* as a Pattern to other Kingdoms, because the Jews had God's Warrant and Direction in such Cases as happen in other Kingdoms, whereas if their Proceedings were to be no example to others, the Convocation had argued from a wrong Principle, and their whole first Book had been to very little purpose.

But granting that the Kingdom of *Judah* was by the Entail upon *David's* Line exempted from the ordinary Laws of Providence, yet I shall shew, First, that it was not so exempted in the time of *Joash*. Secondly, that when God by his revealed Will deposed the Kings of *Judah*, he so ordered it, that the Allegiance of the Subjects would have been transferred by human Laws and Justice, without a Revelation.

First, Tho the Kingdom of *Judah*

had been at first exempted from the common Laws of Providence, yet it could not be so exempted in the time of *Joash*. For the Promise to *Davids* House was conditional, and upon supposition, that his Children kept Gods *Covenant and Testimony* Ps. 132. 12. And when the Kings of *Judah* had by their Transgressions forfeited all that Right, which God had made over to them by Promise, they could no longer have any pretence to that exemption, but there is no Reason to think, but that his Posterity might have fall'n from their Right by any way, which other Kings may. For the promise being conditional, if God by his Providence conveys away the Right to other Kingdoms, and invests all those with his Authority, who are possessed of the Sovereign Power in other Nations, the *Jews* must have concluded in the Case of *Joash* and *Athaliah*, that since the House of *David* had not performed the Conditions expresly annexed to the Promise, God had taken the forfeiture of the Kingdom of *Judah*, and had by his Providence disposed of it so as to set up another in the Room of the Right Heir. For a conditional Promise can oblige no longer, than the Conditions are performed by them, to whom it is made, and therefore there could be no need of a new Revelation to take away the Kingdom from *David's* Line, since the Conditions upon which the Kingdom was entailed, were notoriously violated by so many of the Kings of *Judah*, particularly by *Solomon* the first Successor, who, tho God had repeated to him the conditions of his Promise made to his Father *David*, provoked God to that Degree that Ten Tribes were taken away from his Son, and Separated from the Kingdom of *Judah*; and by *Abaziah* the Father of *Joash*, who *walked in the way of the House of* Ahab. The Kings of *Judah* therefore not observing the Terms, which were enjoyned them at the making the entail, but transgressing that *Covenant* which God made with *David*, upon which the *Throne of his Kingdom* was *established*, 2 Chron. 7. 17, 18. God could be no longer bound to continue the entail in Performance of his Promise or Covenant, but that Kingdom must be afterwards in the same State, with all other Kingdoms, and there could be no Reason why God should not dispose of it, in the same manner, that he disposes of any other.

1 Kings. 9. 4, 5.

2 Kings. 8. 27.

Secondly, When God by his revealed Will deposed the Kings of *Judah* he so ordered it, that the Allegiance of the Subjects would have been transferred by Human Law and Justice without any Revelation. For at last when the Scepter departed from *David*, tho not from *Judah*, tho the Kingdom was not taken from the House of *David* but by Revelation, yet it was taken away in such a manner, as to make no breach upon the Rights of Kings over their Subjects, but to transfer their Allegiance according to the ways of Right and Justice amongst men, for God had commanded the Kings of *Judah* to submit themselves to *Nebuchadnezzar*, and accordingly *Jehoiakim became his Servant three years*. and afterwards when he came against the City, *Jehoiakim went out* to him, *He and his Mother, and his Servants and his Princes, and his Officers*, 2 Kings, 24, 12. and submitted to him in the most solemn manner imaginable, and therefore the Subjects Case was just the same, that it is, when there is no Revelation, but only the Providence of God to transfer Allegiance: For if a King become Servant to the Conquerour, if he and his Servants, and his Princes, and his Officers, all that have Right or Authority in the Government are carried away Captive, and submit and bind themselves by Oaths to

to the Conquerour, as the Kings of *Judah* did *Ezek.* 17. 16. there is no doubt but the Subjects may follow their Kings Example, and become Subjects to the Conquerour, as well as he, and cannot be obliged to reserve their Allegiance to him, by vertue of that Right, which he has now resigned: For when a King has resigned his Crown, whether it be by God's Appointment, or upon some other Account, he has resigned his Right to the Subjects Allegiance, and they are then at liberty to submit to another Prince. And it is a good Evidence, that the Allegiance of Subjects is not transferr'd by Providence without the Resignation or Death of the Rightful King, because it was not otherwise transferred by Revelation.

Obj. *The* Israelites *had been* 18 *years in subjection to the* Moabites, *as they had been a little before* 8 *years to the* Aramites, *and they knew that it was not lawful for them of themselves to take Arms against the Kings whose Subjects they were, tho indeed they were Tyrants: And therefore they cryed unto the Lord for Succour.* Yet both these Nations could have no other Authority over them, but what was obtained by Conquest and a thorough Settlement. Ch. 27.

I answer first, the Scripture says, *the Anger of the Lord was hot against* Israel, *and he sold them into the hand of* Chushan-rishathaim, *Judg.* 3. 8. *and v.* 12. *The Children of* Israel *did evil again in the sight of the Lord: and the Lord strengthned* Eglon *the King of* Moab *against* Israel. From whence it is probable, that God who governed the *Israelites* by a more than ordinary Providence, and made frequent Declarations of his Will to them, especially in denouncing his *Judgements*, before any remarkable Punishment was inflicted upon the whole Nation, to give them time for Repentance; did now discover to them, that the *Aramites* and *Moabites* were sent by him to subdue them. *For the Anger of the Lord was hot against* Israel; *and he sold them into the hand of* Chushan-rishathaim, *and he strengthened* Eglon *the King of* Moab *against* Israel: But if this Judgment were not particularly foretold and denounced; yet this they knew in general, that *these Nations the Lord left to prove* Israel *by them, to know whether they would hearken to the Commandments of the Lord, which he commanded their Fathers by the hand of* Moses v. 1. and 4. And therefore when they were vanquished and were forced to seek their Preservation by subjecting themselves to their Enemies, they well knew that they had no Power nor Authority to oppose such *Kings*, whom God for their sins, as he had before threatned, had set over them, but they cryed unto the Lord, and he raised up a Deliverer for them. Secondly, the whole Nation was in subjection 18 years to the *Moabites* and 8 years to the *Aramites*, and when they had once yielded themselves up, and were become their Subjects, no Right which any other Person had over them being prejudiced thereby, they were obliged to keep their Oaths or other Engagements of Obedience to them, and were bound to pay all Duties of Allegiance to these *Kings* after they had owned them for their *Kings*, tho they were Tyrants, that is, tho they governed them in a rigorous and tyrannical manner. For the consent of a Nation may be the means of conveying a Right to a Prince in such a Case, where no other has any precedent Right to their Allegiance, tho there be no express Warrant from God for their so doing: so that there being at this time *no King in Israel*, there was no injury done to any man, if the whole Nation submitted to the Conqueror.

Can. 31. *Obj.* "But the *Jews* generally "both Priests and People were the "Subjects of *Alexander* after his Au- "thority was setled amongst them, as "they had been before the Subjects "of the *Kings* of *Babylon* and *Persia*: Tho it appears from History, that *Darius* was alive when *Jaddus* made a surrender of *Jerusalem* to *Alexander*, or, if he had been dead, yet he left Heirs behind him.

Answ. First, the Convocation observes, that when *Alexander* sent to *Jaddus* to require him to submit to him; and send him Assistance in his Wars; *Jaddus* answered, *that he might not yield thereunto, be-*
Ch. 30. *cause he had taken an Oath for his true Allegiance to* Darius, *which he might not lawfully violate whilst* Darius *lived.* And when *Jaddus* afterwards submitted to him, it was by reason of a Command, which he had received by Revelation from God: For
Joseph. Antiqu. l. 11. c. 8. as *Josephus* relates, in the place referred to by the Convocation, *Jaddus* had appointed Publick Prayers and Sacrifices upon this account, and it was revealed to him in a Dream, That the People, in white, and the Priests and *Jaddus* himself, in their Holy Garments, should go out to meet *Alexander*, and make their Submission to him, who no sooner saw *Jaddus*, but he fell down and worshipped God, whose name he saw written on his Mitre; and when his Followers were all amazed at it, and *Parmnio* asked him the Reason of that strange Action, he answered, that before his Expedition he saw in a Vision one attired as *Jaddus* was, who encouraged him to undertake it, and promised him success in it; and that it was not the Priest, but that God whom he served, that he worshipped. Secondly in Chap. 30. the Answer of *Jaddus* to *Alexander*, that he was bound by his Oath of Allegiance to *Darius* during his Life is mentioned and approved of by the Convocation, but neither in the following Chapter nor Canon is any mention made of *Jaddus*, only it is said in the Canon, *that both Priests and People were the Subjects of* Alexander *after his Authority was setled among them, &c.* Which might be true, tho *Jaddus* had been faulty in submitting to *Alexander*, whilst *Darius* was alive. Thirdly, *Jaddus* went out to meet *Alexander*, and made his Submission to him at his first Approach to *Jerusalem*; so that if his Example be to be followed, a City ought to surrender before it be besieged, or so much as a Sword be drawn against it: And the first sight and appearance of an Enemy is a different thing from that *Thorough Settlment* which the Convocation requires, whatsoever we understand by it. The Convocation therefore could not propose the Example of *Jaddus* in all Circumstances for our imitation: for either he had a Divine Warrant for what he did, or according to their Principle he must be highly blameable, because he did not stay till there was a *Thorough Settlment*, nor indeed till there was any Settlement at all, before he submitted to *Alexander*. But after the Death of *Darius*, his Authority was *throughly setled*; for *Darius* just before he expired sent such a Message to him, with his thanks for his great Courtesie and Civility to his Mother and to his Wife and Children, as can amount to no less than a bequeathing to him his Kingdom, and *Alexander* taking one of his Daughters in Marriage, no Pretensions were made afterwards against his Right to the Kingdom of *Persia*.

Obj. "But God is the universal "Lord and Ruler over all the World, "and the whole World is his univer- "sal Kingdom; in the Government "whereof he ever used the Ministry "of Civil Magistrates, as well in

"other

"other Countries as amongst his "own peculiar People of *Israel*, with- "out any desert of them, but as in "his heavenly Providence he thought "it most convenient. I have made (saith he) *the Earth, the Man and*
Jer. 27. 5. "*the Beasts that are upon the Ground,* "*and have given it to whom it pleaseth* "*me:* And again, the Prophet *Daniel*
Dan. 4. 14. "telleth us that *God changeth the times*
12. 17. 32. "*and seasons, that he hath Power and* "*beareth Rule over the Kingdoms of* "*men; that he taketh away Kings and* "*setteth up Kings;* and that *it was* "*the God of Heaven, who gave unto*
Dan. 2. 37. "Nebuchadnezzar *so great a King-*
5. 8. "*dom, Power, Strength and Glory, as* "*then he had to rule, with Majesty* "*and Honour a very great Empire.*

Answ. First, The Design of the Convocation here is to set forth Christ's Universal Empire over all the World, and to shew that, *for all their Dignity and Greatness, he did not leave Kings at liberty to do what they list, but held himself the Helm of every Government, and ruled their Subjects in such sort, as, were they good or bad and their Designment holy or wicked, he ever made them the Executioners of his own just Judgments, will and good Pleasure; according as he was minded either to bless or punish any Kingdom, People or Country:* all which will be never the less true, tho God should not dispose of Kingdoms merely by the events and Success of things, without any regard had to Humane Law and Rights.

Secondly, The Chapters here quoted by them are all concerning *Nebuchadnezzar.* In the first, *Jeremiah* prophesieth of his Victories over the Neighbour-Kings, and commands them in Gods Name to submit to him. And the two latter Chapters contain *Nebuchadnezzar*'s Dreams and *Daniel*'s Interpretation of them. In his second Chapter *Daniel* tells him, *Thou, O King, art a King of Kings, for the God of Heaven hath given thee a Kingdom, Power, and Strength, and Glory,* v. 37. and then proceeds to declare, that by his Dream was signified the State of the four Monarchies. In the fourth Chapter of *Daniel* is related that Judgment which from God befel *Nebuchadnezzar*; and his Dream whereby it was foretold to him; *The intent of which was, that the living might know that the most high ruleth in the Kingdom of Men, and giveth it to whomsoever he will, and setteth up over it the basest of men.*

First then, as to the four Monarchies; we have here no intimation that God did raise up the first Founders of them, or did approve of the *Settlement* they made: The *Assyrian* Monarchy, the Convocation takes notice of, began in *Nimrod*, contrary to Gods express Institution, he having no Authority from God, as afterwards *Nebuchadnezzar* had, to enlarge his Dominions and make War against the bordering Princes. *Cyrus* we know indeed was Gods *Anointed*, and was Prophesied of by name long before his Birth, and alledg'd his Commission and Charge from God in the Proclamation which he put forth in the first year of his Reign, 2. *Chron.* 36. 22. 23. *Ezr.* 1. 1, 2. God had declared of him, *I have raised him up in Righteousness, and I will direct all his ways,* Isai. 45. 13. or as our Translators have noted in the Margin, *I will make streight* all his ways, and the Septuagint renders it, Ἐγὼ ἤγειρα αὐτὸν ἐν δικαιοσύνῃ βασιλέα, καὶ πάσας αἱ ὁδοὶ αὐτοῦ εὐθεῖαι. And *Alexander*, if we believe *Josephus*, was encouraged by Revelation to undertake his Expedition: But the *Roman* Empire had only Gods Permission as far as we know, and at its rise had no further Authority than the Justice of their Arms could give them: So that this Prediction is no Evidence, whether the first Erection and Settlement of these Monarchies were approved of by God or not;

if

if they were erected by his Command and Appointment, or by a juſt Title, they were approved of by him; if by Injuſtice and Violence they were only made uſe of by him, as all other Wickedneſs is, to bring about by an over-ruling Providence his own juſt and righteous Decrees.

Secondly, as to what concerns *Nebuchadnezzar* himſelf; Firſt, all thoſe Expreſſions have an immediate relation to an extraordinary Caſe, wherein God had revealed his poſitive Will, commanding the ſeveral *Kings* mentioned by the Prophet *Jeremiah* to *ſerve* Nebuchadnezzar, *and to put their Necks under his Yoak*, and threatning them with the ſevereſt Puniſhments, if they would not do it, *with the Sword, and with the Peſtilence, and with the Famine, untill he had conſumed them by* Nebuchadnezzar's *Hand*, Jer. 27, v. 8. and afterwards in the Book of *Daniel*, God takes away all his Power and Greatneſs to bring him to a ſenſe of his perpetual dependence upon God, and to an awe and reverence of the Divine Majeſty. Secondly, God had declared by his Prophet that he had given all the Neighbouring Kingdoms *into the hand of* Nebuchadnezzar *the King of* Babylon *his ſervant*, and his Commands were in a publick and ſolemn manner given out and ſent to all the Kings round about to charge 'em that they ſhould without any Reſiſtance or Oppoſition reſign up themſelves and their Kingdoms in ſubjection to him. And this being ſome years beforehand with ſuch Zeal and Earneſtneſs publickly and ſolemnly declared by *Jeremiah*, and ſo notoriouſly known in all the adjacent Countries, *Nebuchadnezzar* himſelf could not be ignorant of it; for which reaſon he gave ſuch ſtrict Charge concerning *Jeremiah*, that he ſhould be uſed with all manner of kindneſs and reſpect, *Jer.* 39. 11. Afterwards *Daniel* in expounding his firſt Dream had plainly told him, that *the God of Heaven had made him a King of Kings, and had given him a Kingdom, Power, and Strength, and Glory.* Yet *Nebuchadnezzar* aſcribes all to himſelf, and therefore this Judgment was inflicted on him to make him ſenſible that all his boaſted Greatneſs was owing to God alone, who has abſolute Authority over the greateſt of Kings, and can advance to the height of Empire the *baſeſt of Men*; *and thoſe that walk in Pride he is able to abaſe.*

Beſides what relates perſonally to *Nebuchadnezzar*, there is a further intention in the words, which reſpects all Princes in all Ages of the World. For *Nebuchadnezzar* is ſet as an Example of Gods Almighty Power, and of the frailty of all Human Greatneſs, to let the mighty Potentates of the Earth know, that all their Power is from God, and that he can deprive them of it, whenever he pleaſes.

But Thirdly, This does not prove that God will give or take away the Power of other Princes, in the ſame extraordinary manner, that he both raiſed and debaſed *Nebuchadnezzar*. For as in ancient times there were Prophets and Workers of Miracles, ſo theſe Prophets were ſometimes ſent by God himſelf to declare, in his name, that he had beſtowed Kingdoms or Empires upon certain perſons, as upon *Nebuchadnezzar*, *Cyrus*, &c. And then theſe were no Uſurpers, becauſe they acted by Gods Appointment, and had a right precedent to any Conqueſt or *Thorough Settlement*. But there were in all Ages many Uſurpers too, and they had no Authority from God, nor were the People obliged to obey them, having no Command from him to do it. And as an Uſurper can have no Authority for his Uſurpations (for if he had they would be no Uſurpations nor he an Uſurper); ſo the continuance of his Uſurpations cannot make him theleſs an Uſurper, but the greater and the more injurious Uſurper.

Uſurper. *Nebuchadnezzar* was no Uſurper from the beginning, becauſe he acted by Authority from God, and if concerning any Prince can be ſhewn ſuch a Commiſſion now, he is not an Uſurper but a Rightful King, and we muſt forthwith acknowledge his Authority, without ſtaying for a thorough ſetlement, but if he be at firſt an Uſurper, he muſt always be ſo, unleſs he acquires a Right by ſome other means, than a ſetled and habitual Injuſtice. The Scripture no where informs us that God authoriſes Uſurpers, after a *thorough Settlement*, but on the contrary that thoſe are no Uſurpers concerning whom God by his Prophets has given aſſurance to the People, that himſelf had raiſed them up to the Throne.

Fourthly, All are now to be lookt upon as Uſurpers, who invade the Rights of their Neighbour Princes, for the ſame Reaſon that we eſteem all pretenders to Miracles and Prophecys no better than Cheats and Impoſtors. For *Nebuchadnezzar* had Prophecys delivered concerning him which entitled him to the Kingdoms he poſſeſſed: For tho he ſin'd in invading the Dominions of other Princes, if he did not believe the Prophet or knew not of his own Title granted him by God himſelf to them, yet he did them no injury, becauſe their Right was already transferred to him and therefore his Sin was only that of a Man, who robs another of that which is his own not knowing it to be ſo. But now Prophecys are ceaſed, as well as Miracles, and God acts by the ordinary courſe of his Providence as well as by the ordinary courſe of Nature. Miracles were neceſſary to awaken Mens attention, and put them upon a ſerious conſideration of Religion, and bring them to an acknowledgment of the Truth of it: and ſo were ſuch Revelations needful to manifeſt Gods infinite Power and Majeſty, and to make the greateſt Princes ſtand in awe of him; but when once theſe ends are ſerved, we are left to the Moral and Divine Laws of Reaſon and of Scripture for our Direction in the performance of our Duty, as we are to the Phyſical Laws of Nature in the Proviſions of Health and Life: and ſo conclude that every Conqueror has the ſame Right to our Obedience that *Nebuchadnezzar* had to be obeyed by the Nations, whom he had ſubdued, is as groundleſs as to think that any man, who comes with lying Wonders and confident Stories, has a Power of Miracles and a Gift of Prophecys. God many times by a wonderful Providence caſts down Uſurpers, when they are moſt ſetled and ſecure in their unjuſt Poſſeſſions, and it is the Glory of his Infinite Wiſdom that when he ſuffers the World to go on in one conſtant Tenour, and does not interrupt wicked men in their enterpriſes and practices, yet the ſtill *holds the Helm of Government*, and the moſt laſting and ſetled Uſurpations cannot in the leaſt prejudice the execution and accompliſhment of his juſt and Holy Decrees: And in this he exerciſes his Dominion over Mankind, as he ſhews his Dominion over Nature by a ſteddy and conſtant concourſe with natural Agents, notwithſtanding the many ſeeming Irregularities that appear in the World; and we ought no more to imagine his Authority in any Uſurpers from whom we promiſe our ſelves Protection, then we may ſuppoſe a Miraculous Power in thoſe Charms, which ſometimes cure Diſeaſes.

The Earth is the Lords and all that dwell in it, and it cannot be denied but God might if he had pleaſed, frequently raiſe up Princes as he did *Nebuchadnezzar*, but then he would ſend his Prophets to give notice of it: For we muſt conclude in this caſe, as the Convocation does in the caſe of *Jehu*, that it is unlawful to follow ſuch extraordinary examples, *except*

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Can. 25. *firſt that it might plainly appear that there are now any ſuch Prophets ſent extraordinarily from God himſelf, with ſufficient and ſpecial Authority in that behalf; and that we might be aſſured of* every ſuch Prince as is by Uſurpation ſetled in anothers Dominions, *that God himſelf had in expreſs words required and commanded us* to ſubmit to him *by Name*; as he commanded the Nations whom *Nebuchadnezzar* conquered, *to ſerve him*, declaring that *he had given all thoſe Lands into the Hand of* Nebuchadnezzar *the King of* Babylon *his Servant*, Jer. 27, 6. But we may obſerve that as *Nebuchadnezzar* was raiſed up by God himſelf, ſo the Kings of thoſe Nations were commanded to ſubmit to him as well as their People, and did ſubmit, or were ſubdued by him, ſo that the Peoples part in that Revolution was no more than what Subjects may do now, if ſuch a thing ſhould be brought about by Providence; for when the King has ſubmitted himſelf, there is no Queſtion to be made, but that the Subjects may do ſo too.

II. Having conſidered the Arguments from the Authority of the Convocation, I now proceed to the Arguments from the Reaſon of the Thing itſelf.

By an Uſurper in this Queſtion is plainly meant one who is in Poſſeſſion of the Kingdom contrary to the Laws and Conſtitution of the Realm, and without any Title but that of Poſſeſſion; and an Uſurper in Poſſeſſion is oppoſed to a Rightful King out of Poſſeſſion, whether he be either firſt, actually diſpoſſeſſed and driven out of his Kingdom; or ſecondly, have an undoubted Right to it, but has been always kept out of Poſſeſſion and could never come to the enjoyment of it. But it's granted that

Firſt, If the Title be doubtful, the Subjects are at liberty to ſubmit to the Poſſeſſor, and ought not to embroil the Nation with Wars, and ſacrifice the Peace and Happineſs of it for an Uncertainty: And in this caſe the Subjects are oblig'd to ſtand by him, to whom they have ſworn Allegiance, till a clear Title be made out againſt him, upon defect whereof the Oath was taken, upon ſuppoſition that there was no precedent Obligation to another Prince, and therefore muſt oblige till it appears that his Competitor claims by an Hereditary or other antecedent Right.

Secondly, If in an Hereditary Monarchy, after the thorough Settlement of an Uſurper, it ſhould ſo happen that the Royal Line had failed, and the Right of Succeſſion were extinct, the People might be oblig'd for their own, and for their Country's ſake to ſubmit to the Uſurper and after their Submiſſion he would become their lawful King. For tho he could have deriv'd no Authority from his *Thorough Settlement*, (notwithſtanding there were none ſurviving of the Royal Line,) and the Subjects might have yielded themſelves up to the Obedience of any other Perſon, if they had had a convenient opportunity, ſo as to have done it without bringing damage and miſchief to the Publick by it, yet they might be obliged to ſubmit to him, to prevent that Slaughter and confuſion, which elſe would enſue, and if they ſhould have refuſed to do it, they would have ſinned againſt God, in neglecting the ſafety of themſelves and of their Country, ſuppoſing nevertheleſs that no Injuſtice would have been done to the Uſurper thereby, and that he could have had no Right before their Submiſſion.

The Queſtion therefore is, Whether an Uſurper who has no claim to the Crown but that of Poſſeſſion, tho he be never ſo long and throughly ſetled in the Throne, can have a Right to the Allegiance of the Subjects, whilſt their Rightful King, who has

has an Hereditary, or whatsoever other undoubted Title by the Constitution of the Kingdom is alive, and requires them to bear Faith and Allegiance to him?

The Sum of what can be said in the Affirmative seems to be this; That as it is shewn at large in the Convocation Book, *Christ has reserved the Government of the World and the disposal of Kingdoms entirely to himself and can make or dispose Kings as he pleaseth, notwithstanding any Claim, Right, Title or Interest, which they can challenge to their Kingdoms, and as he first ruled the World by frequent Revelations and Prophecies, so since these are ceased he doth it by his Providence only for he always retains the same immediate Inspection with human affairs, but now manifests his Pleasure and gives out his Commands as Governor of the world by the Declarations of his Providence, that is, by the Success and Event of things; for he could not govern the World as supreme Lord and King of it, or which is all one, he could not require our Obedience in Compliance to his disposal of Kingdoms if his will were not some way or other discovered to us, and this being now the only way whereby he discovers it, we must acquiesce in the Events of his Providence, so as to obey Christ the Supreme Governor of the World in the Person of him, whosoever he be, whom he has set over us, making no enquiry into the Justice of the Cause, or into the means by which the Person now fully possessed of another Princes Power and Dominions, came so possessed of them. For God can take away and transfer any Right or Title as he pleaseth, and the Conduct of his Providence in a Thorough Settlement of the Government, is a sufficient evidence that he has transferred it, because it is the only evidence we now can have. And therefore we ought to look upon the Person thus setled, as invested with God's Authority, and to pay him a full and entire Allegiance, as his Vicegerent with the same Submission, and upon the same Reasons, as if he had commanded us to do it by an express and immediate Revelation; since his Providence is now the only Revelation, or Manifestation of his will, that we can expect, and it must be instead of all other Revelations to us.*

This seems to be the full of what can be fairly offered in the Affirmative, and it is liable to the following Difficulties.

I. By Gods Providence must be understood either his Permission in concurring with Natural Causes to produce their Effects; or his Appointment.

First, If he only suffer or permit a thing to be done, without denying his Concourse, or interposing his Almighty Power to prevent it, this by no means proves his Approbation of the Event or Success of it. For he permits all the Wickedness, that is committed in the World, and suffers the worst men to prosper many times in their evil Courses.

Secondly, If by Gods Providence be meant his Appointment, this may signifie, First, that he from all Eternity decreed to permit the Event, and designed and ordained it to advance his own Glory, and to bring about some good to Mankind by it: And so the Treachery of *Judas* was appointed (Act. 1, 23.) that is, God had decreed to suffer it to come to pass, and had ordained it, when come to pass, for the Salvation of Mankind. And there can be no doubt, but the final Issue, and ultimate event of all the worst Actions is ordained of God, and approved of by him; but the Case before us is of an Intermediate and subordinate End, which must be judged of, whether it be good or bad, by the Nature of the thing, and not by any success or event. That all will at last conclude in some good End in the long Series and Chain of Causes and Events, which are ordained by God's Decree is most certain, but then this doth

not prove that the Intermediate Cauſes and Events are approved of by him, but we muſt enquire into the Juſtice of the Cauſe, whereby we can only know, whether the Event be pleaſing to him or not. Secondly, By Gods Providence as it ſignifies his Appointment may be meant his Will or Command: And this Will or Command is either for the doing of a thing, or for our Submiſſion and acquieſcence in it, after it is done. His command for the doing of a thing, cannot be known before the Event, but by the Juſtice of the Action, or by Revelation; to neither of which the Doctor pretends. And the Event cannot diſcover to us God's command to do a thing, which is already done and paſt, and I have in part ſhewn and ſhall more fully ſhew afterwards, that it can as little diſcover to us his Approbation of the thing done, or that it is his Will that we ſhould acquieſce and ſubmit to it.

II. Whereas it is ſaid, that, ſince God now governs the World only by his Providence, we muſt of Neceſſity acquieſce in the Event of things, or elſe we ſhould diſobey him in not ſubmitting to his diſpoſal of the Governments of the World. Firſt, God governs the World ſo as to require no Duty or Act of Obedience now of us, but what the Laws of Nature or of Scripture enjoyn: And becauſe Revelations are ceaſed, it ſeems requiſite, that he ſhould have revealed it in the Scriptures, if he had required us to acquieſce in the Events of things, and to look upon the moſt unjuſt Uſurper as inveſted with his own Authority, when he is once gotten into Poſſeſſion of the Throne: I ſay this ſeems neceſſary to have been revealed, ſince Natural Reaſon cannot dictate it to us for in Gods permiſſion of all otherſort of Injuſtice in the World, we never imagine that any Right can accrue to the Injuring Perſon by it. Secondly, God by his Power and Wiſdom ſo orders things, as to make the moſt unjuſt actions ſubſervient to the Ends of Juſtice and Righteouſneſs, but not to reward Uſurpation with the Inveſtiture of his own Authority, or to turn wrong into right. And all that we learn from Scripture concerning God's Providence is, that we muſt rely upon it for Protection in the performance of our known Duty, and by conſequence that we are to regard the Juſtice only of a Cauſe, not the Succeſs of it.

III. This would make it unlawful for any Prince who is diſpoſſeſſed, or excluded from the Throne, to wage War againſt the Uſurper in defence of his own Right. For he is ſuppoſed to have no longer any Right, after the Uſurper is in full Poſſeſſion; becauſe that Right which God gives to the Uſurper, the Lawful King muſt be diveſted of, unleſs there can be two oppoſite Sovereign Authorities at the ſame time, and both from God, who ſeverally retain the whole and entire Right at once to the ſame Kingdom. But we read that *David* waged War againſt *Ish-boſheth* who was poſſeſſed of the Kingdom of all *Iſrael* for two years, and againſt the *Jebuſites*, who were in poſſeſſion of *Jeru'ſalem*, and he was in continual Wars, before he was fully poſſeſſed of his Kingdom, for above ſeven years together. And there never was any diſpoſſeſt Prince, but he endeavoured to regain his Throne if he could, and never any Prince was blamed for it.

IV. This Argument would hold as well in private as in publick Affairs, ſince both are alike in God's diſpoſal, and it would be as unjuſt for a man injuriouſly diſpoſſeſt of his Eſtate, to endeavour the recovery of it by due courſe of Law, as it would be for a King by waging War to endeavour the Recovery of his Kingdoms For in both Caſes it may with equal Reaſon be ſaid, that the Title is

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loſt, and the Right tranſferred by God himſelf. And the Example of God's commanding the Children of *Iſrael* to *ſpoil the Egyptians* may ſeem as well to juſtifie the one Caſe, as his beſtowing Kingdoms in the Old Teſtament to juſtifie the other.

If it be ſaid that there is a more peculiar and extraordinary Providence, which rules and diſpoſes of Publick States and Kingdoms. Firſt, if by a peculiar and extraordinary Providence be meant, that God is wont more immediately ſo to interpoſe, as to change the ordinary courſe of Juſtice, and to tranſfer Rights, and diſplace, and diſpoſſeſs Rightful *Kings* more than he does Rightful Owners of private Eſtates, this ſeems to be groundleſs and diſagreeable to the Methods of his Juſtice and to thoſe Rules which the Scripture preſcribes to us, which are the ſame in our Duties towards *Kings*, as in thoſe towards other men; and it beſides lays upon us greater Obligations to obſerve them: We muſt render to all their Dues, and particularly Tribute to whom Tribute is due, *&c.* Rom. 13. 7. But we have no where the leaſt intimation, that the Rights of *Kings* ceaſe any other way than other Mens do, *viz.* by Death, Reſignation, *&c.* not by a foreign Invaſion, or the Rebellion of Subjects, or by the interpoſition of Providence in a concurrence of unfortunate Accidents. And thoſe Texts which ſeem moſt to favour this ſuppoſition have been already conſidered, and if they prove any thing to this purpoſe, they muſt conclude as well concerning the Properties of Subjects, as concerning the Prerogatives of Princes, for it is as *eaſie a thing with the Lord, to make a poor man rich*, as it can be *to ſet up over Kingdoms the baſeſt of Men*. and the Providence of God is alike concerned in both Caſes; for as *he leadeth Princes away ſpoiled, and overthroweth the mighty*; ſo *the Tabernacles of Robbers proſper, and they that provoke God are ſecure, into whoſe hand God bringeth abundantly*, Job. 12. 6. 19. And thus we find *Job* aſcribes all his Loſſes and Calamities to Gods afflicting hand upon him; for God having all things in his Power and at his Command, is often ſaid to do what he does not hinder. Secondly, If by a peculiar and extraordinary Providence be meant ſuch a Care as is anſwerable to the great Importance of Publick Affairs and the Government of Kingdoms, this will imply no more than that Gods Care is more concerned and more imployed about things of greater importance, than in things of leſs moment, that is, it manifeſts it ſelf in a greater number and variety of Exigencies, and is applyed to more Circumſtances of Affairs: Yet, his Providence extends itſelf to the Hairs of our Heads, and to the falling of a Sparrow to the Ground, and is as watchful over the moſt inconſiderable and minute things in proportion to their Nature, as over the greateſt matters. His Providence, his Juſtice, and Goodneſs is over all his Works, and he may as well be ſuppoſed to convey Private Eſtates to the unjuſt Poſſeſſors of them, as to diſpoſe of Kingdoms to Uſurpers; his Providence, which permits both, gives one no better Title than the other.

Kings, 'tis true, receive their Power from God and are his Vicegerents, and therefore are accountable to none but him, and can be depoſed by none elſe; but God inveſts them with his Authority, by the intervention of ſubordinate means, and by the Obſervation of the ſame Laws of Juſtice, which ought to be obſerved in the Rights and Poſſeſſions of Subjects. Thus in the Elective Monarchies, there is the ſame Juſtice to be obſerved in the Election of the *King*, that there is to be obſerved in the Election of inferiour Magiſtrates,

tho, after Election, the *King* is accountable to none but God, and the inferiour Magiſtrates are accountable to the *King*: And in an Hereditary Kingdom there is the ſame Right of Inheritance, (in reſpect of the Nature of Right or Juſtice,) that there is in Private Eſtates, tho the Inheritance of Kingdoms be forfeitable to God only. For as God now makes no Kings by his expreſs Command and immediate Deſignation, but according to the Methods of Law and Right amongſt men, ſo he depoſes and deveſts them of their Power in ſuch a manner as does not interfere with the ordinary courſe of juſtice, *The Lord ſhall ſmite them, or their day ſhall come to die, or they ſhall deſcend into Battel and periſh*, 1. Sam. 26. 10.

V. Tho by the Law of Nations Foreign Princes may tranſact with any Conquerour as Rightful King; Yet by the Law of Nature Conqueſt can give no juſt Title, unleſs the Claim before Conqueſt were juſt; that is, indeed it gives no Title at all, but only recovers what before there was a juſt Title to. For even a juſt cauſe of War will not juſtifie a Conqueſt, unleſs there be a precedent Right to the Dominions of the conquered Prince; as a Debt of 5 *l.* tho it will juſtifie a Suit at Law yet gives no Title to a mans whole Eſtate. And if *a Thorough Settlement* can give the Conquerour any Right, which he had not at firſt, it can be no leſs than ſuch a Settlement as the Laws and Cuſtoms of Nations allow, which is an undiſturbed and uncontested Poſſeſſion for a term of years exceeding the Memory of man. *Joptha* alledged againſt the King of the *Ammonites* the Preſcription of 300 years, *Judg.* 11. 26. and the time for Preſcription to Kingdoms is generally ſet at 100 years: *Duck de uſu & Autorit. Jur. Civil.* l. 1. c. 1. S. 19. and yet the Civilians generally maintain that the longeſt Preſcription can give a right to none, but to thoſe who are *Poſſeſſores bonæ fidei*; not to thoſe who came in by Fraud or Violence; but who thought they had a juſt Title, or knew of no better Claim. And if it ſhould be granted neceſſary for the Peace of the World, that ſome certain time be fixt, when, after a quiet and unmoleſted Poſſeſſion, all Pretenſions ſhould expire: Yet men muſt not be allowed to judg every thing ſetled that is uppermoſt, or that can brave it for a while, for this would in reality let nothing be ſetled, but would open a Gap to perpetual Diſturbances and Confuſions. For every thing that can be called a Government is ſetled or may appear to be ſo to Private Men, till it is overpowered. Thus, *David* fled from *Jeruſalem*, and went *whither he might*, uncertain whither to go, and almoſt deſpairing of his Return; *Abſalom* poſſeſſed himſelf of the City and *David* was ſo forlorn and deſpicable, that *Shimei* curſed him to his face, and threw ſtones at him, and told him withal, that Gods juſt Judgment was fain upon him in revenge of the Blood which he had ſhed of the Houſe of *Saul*, and that *the Lord had delivered the Kingdom into the hand of* Abſalom *his Son*, 2. Sam. 16. 8. And this ſeems to have been the general Opinion of all that followed *Abſalom* in his Rebellion; and therefore *Huſhai* choſe it as the fatreſt Pretence to recommend himſelf to him, and make him believe that he was firm to his Intereſt; *nay but whom the Lord and this People and all the men of* Iſrael *chuſe his will I be, and to him will I belong*, v. 28. So that the Man after Gods own heart, and of his own deſignation to the Kingdom, could not be ſecure againſt this Principle; and it can hardly prove of better conſequence to other *Kings*, if they muſt be looked upon as abandoned and dethroned by God himſelf, whenever they are forced to withdraw, and by a ſtrong hand are kept out of their Dominions

And

And it ought to be conſidered, how King *Charles* II. could retain any Right to his Kingdoms upon this ſuppoſition; and yet he had an indiſputable Right, during his long Abſence, in the Judgment not only of all the Loyal Nobility and Clergy and Gentry of that time, but of our Parliaments and of the whole Nation ever ſince his Return.

VI We find in Scripture that when God himſelf does diſpoſſeſs *Kings* of their *Kingdoms*, he doth not always deveſt them of their Right but reſerves it for them, and reſtores them to the Poſſeſſion of it again upon their Repentance. Thus it was in the Caſe of *Nebuchadnezzar*, and *Manaſſes*, and it is very reaſonable to believe that God doth often puniſh *Kings* and Subjects too, by ſucceſsful Rebellions, and by Uſurpations upon the Regal Rights and Prerogatives, without any intention to releaſe them from the mutual Obligations of their reſpective Duties to one another. And if this has been the Caſe as the Scripture informs us it has; if Reaſon tells us, that ſuch Caſes may be again, ſince they are very agreeable to Gods Juſtice, and Wiſdom, and Goodneſs in governing the World; then all that the Dr. hath ſaid for transferring the Allegiance of Subjects, from the diſpoſſeſſed King *by Law* to the Poſſeſſor of his Throne *by Providence*, falls to the ground.

Dan. 4. 26. 2. *Chron.* 33. 13.

And yet we ought to be very ſure before we venture to act upon ſuch a Principle. For it would be a mighty Temptation and Encouragement to ambitious men, to be always making dangerous Attempts upon the Rights and Dominions of Princes, if they could be aſſured, that if once their Uſurpation proved ſo proſperous as to put them into a full Poſſeſſion, they ſhould then be ſecured in it by a Divine Right, and would be ſo far from any Obligations to make Reſtitution, that they would be bound to ſtand by it, and all the Subjects would be obliged to maintain and defend them with their Lives and Fortunes againſt the diſpoſſeſſed Prince. Nor is it not to be imagined what confuſion it would breed in the World, if no reſtitution were to be made of what is gotten by Fraud and Rapine out of Private Eſtates, but all were a Mans own that he could purge and keep. Men would eaſily flatter themſelves, that they might ſin firſt, and then repent at their leiſure; if this mortifying part of Repentance were but remitted; but when they muſt reſtore all again or be damned, they may perhaps think fit to ſit down contented at firſt. And this Doctrine would be ſo much the more dangerous to Kingdoms, as they are greater Baits, and the Injuſtice is greater, and the Miſchiefs more grievous.

But it may be ſaid, that tho this Argument from ſucceſs and a Thorough Settlement ſhould not hold good in all Caſes, yet ſuch peculiar Circumſtances may ſometimes fall out, as plainly ſhew it to be God's doing, and command our Submiſſion and Obedience. Suppoſe a Prince by a Series of fatal Miſcarriages, and by a ſtrong Infatuation as it were from God upon all his Counſels, undermines his own Throne, and in a ſhort Reign loſes the Hearts of a Nation at firſt wholly devoted to his ſervice; ſuppoſe he alienates the affections of his greateſt Dependents and Favorites, and that the Body of his People revolt from him, and that all Orders and Degrees of men conſpire to renounce him, and without War or Bloodſhed ſet up another in his room, in whom all their remaining hopes are placed, and whoſe Arms are attended by a favourable and wonderful Providence; ſuppoſe that there is no Human Proſpect of the former King's return at all, and that if he do return it muſt be to the ruin of the Kingdom and the

the overthrow of the true Religion; is not this a Settlement ſo throughly eſtabliſhed that we muſt needs be obliged to ſtand up in defence of it, and have we not in this caſe all the Aſſurance that can poſſibly be, without an expreſs Revelation that our Allegiance is transferred?

This, I think, is the higheſt that the Caſe can be put. In anſwer to which, Firſt, It muſt be granted that all this cannot prove more effectually, that our Allegiance is transferred now it is brought about by his Providence, than if it had come to paſs by an expreſs Revelation, or than if God had denounced this as a Judgment upon the Prince whom it is ſuppoſed to have befallen. For the utmoſt that can be ſuppoſed is, that Gods Providence is now the ſame Evidence of his Pleaſure to us, that his Revelation was to thoſe of former Ages; and therefore, if when God had declared that he did ſend ſuch Calamities as Judgments upon a Prince, this was no Argument to the People that they were releaſed from their Duty of Allegiance, it can be no Argument to us now, tho the Providence be never ſo ſignal and extraordinary. Secondly, We ſee in the Examples before-mentioned, that what befel thoſe Princes was from God, and that he had diſpoſſeſſed them of their Kingdoms, and yet their Right ſtill remained. King *David* was forced to fly in great haſt from his own Palace, he left his Capital City and the Ark of God itſelf in the Enemies Power, and when *Shimei* curſed him, he made this Reflection upon it, that God had bid him to do it, and to make the Judgment ſtill more ſignal, *Abſalom went in unto his Fathers Concubines in the ſight of all Iſrael*, which was directly the fulfilling of that Judgment, which *Nathan* had propheſied, ſhould come upon him: yet his Subjects all the while could be excuſed from no Duty of Allegiance to him, but were as much obliged to all inſtances of it, as if he had been ſtill at *Jeruſalem* and upon the Throne: tho *Abſalom*'s Followers interpreted it otherwiſe, as has been before obſerved, and as for the Promiſe made to *David*, they imagined that it might have been as punctually fulfilled to his ſeed, tho himſelf had been ſet aſide, as if he had been actually dead, and probably they ſuppoſed that this was the Evil that God had threatned; *viz.* to dethrone him, and ſet up his Son in his room; when he told him by his Prophet; *Behold, I will raiſe up Evil againſt thee out of thine own Houſe*, 2. Sam. 12. 11. *Manaſſes* and *Nebuchadnezzar* were as great Tyrants to their Subjects, as great Enemies to the true Religion, and as great Offenders in all reſpects againſt God as any Chriſtian King can be ſuppoſed to be: Yet when God cauſed *Manaſſes* to be carried away captive to *Babylon*, and *Nebuchadnezzar* to be driven from amongſt men to eat Graſs with the Beaſts of the Field; he brought theſe Afflictions upon them, not to deprive either of them of their Kingdoms, but only to humble them, and then to reſtore them to their Thrones. And his dealing with *Nebuchadnezzar* is moſt of all conſiderable in this matter, becauſe the Judgment upon him was purpoſely deſigned *to the intent that the living may know that the moſt high ruleth in the Kingdom of men, and giveth it to whomſoever he will, and ſetteth up over it the baſeſt of men*, Dan. 4. 17. and yet v. 26. it is told him, *Thy Kingdom ſhall be ſure unto thee, after that thou ſhalt have known that the Heavens do rule*: and in the 31. verſe. *There fell a Voice from Heaven ſaying, O King* Nebuchadnezzar, *to thee it is ſpoken the Kingdom is departed from thee*, which was taken from him for the ſpace of ſeven years, *until he ſhould know that the moſt higheſt ruleth in the Kingdom of men, and giveth it to whomſoever he will*, v. 32. This then being

ing an Example purpoſely ſet for the Admonition of Kings, and to acquaint the World that God raiſes them up, and depoſes them as he pleaſes; we may from hence conclude that tho they be diſpoſſeſſed by his Appointment whether ſecret or expreſs, yet we can have no certainty that he has utterly rejected them; but rather that upon their Repentance, he will again reſtore them to the Enjoyment of their Dominions, which they have ſtill a Right to, againſt any Uſurper or Poſſeſſour of them. Thirdly, What Danger ſoever Religion may ſeem to be in, yet it is manifeſt that throughout all Ages of the Church, Religion never flouriſhed more than in times of Perſecution; and Religion itſelf forbidding us to defend it by any Diſloyalty, if by any ſuch unſeaſonable and unwarrantable means Subjects undertake the Preſervation of Religion, they may expect for their Reward no better than *Uzzah*'s Fate, who put forth his hand to ſupport the Ark of God, when he ſaw it ſhaking, and like to fall. God can preſerve it without our help againſt all the Power and Stratagems of the greateſt *Kings*, or he can turn the hearts of *Kings*, and of Enemies make them become its Defenders. So he turned the hearts of *Nebuchadnezzar* and *Manaſſes*, and there is no Reaſon to ſuſpect, that God will not grant Princes ſpace for Repentance, now he rules the World by his Providence, as he did in thoſe Ages of Prophecy and Revelation.

It may be alledged that where there is an expreſs Revelation, men muſt follow the directions God is pleaſed to give, and proceed no further than he appoints: But when we have only his Providence to guide us, we muſt not neglect to make uſe of the preſent occaſion, but muſt take all the opportunities, which Providence puts into our hands, as ſo many indications of what God expects and requires of us.

I anſwer, this is a plain Argument that we ought not to make God's Providence the Rule of our Actions, but his Law: Becauſe this principle would have miſled thoſe of ancient times, contrary to Gods deſign and purpoſe in an immediate Revelation, as well as it may now make us tranſgreſs his revealed Will recorded in Scripture, and his Laws ingraved in our Nature, I mean the Laws of Juſtice, and of Obedience to Governors. For from hence it appears that his Providence is not a ſufficient Interpreter of his Will, in what he requires of us; if it were they might have rely'd upon it then, and ſince it is not, we muſt not depend upon it now. Becauſe the Scripture is our Guide as much as an immediate Revelation was theirs, and we have as little warrant to follow Providence, without a Revelation in Scripture for it, as they could have to follow it, without an immediate Revelation. For as Prophecys and Revelations are long ſince ceaſed, ſo we are no where told that God's Providence ſhall be inſtead of them to us, but the Scriptures are to us inſtead of all other Revelations, and we are to interpret God's Will by his Providence no further than they direct us to do.

And from the Scriptures we may be aſſured, that God by his Providence often offers men opportunities of doing things, only for their Tryal, and when he gives them no licenſe to do them. If ever any circumſtances of Providence could juſtifie an Action otherwiſe ſinful, they muſt have been thoſe, which *David* was in, when *Saul* was twice at his mercy: He was before by Gods appointment anointed to ſucceed in the Throne, and *Saul* the firſt time came unexpectedly into his Power, the ſecond time a deep ſleep from the Lord was faln upon *Saul* and his whole Army; God had promiſed *David* to deliver his Enemy into his Hand, and *David*'s Followers both

times

times did not fail to put him in mind of it: So that if Providence could be at any time a sufficient warrant, *David* must have had as full a Commission to have slain *Saul*, as *Ahud* had to kill *Eglon*, or *Jehu* to kill *Joram*, and *David* must have concluded, that God who had before *rejected Saul from being King*, had now actually devested him of all his Authority, and according to his Promise, had delivered *Saul* to him, to execute the divine Vengeance upon him: But because this would have been to act against a known Duty, he still owns *Saul* for his Master, and the Lords anointed, and repented of the cutting off but the Skirt of his Garment. All this probably was designed as a Tryal to *David*, as well as to propose him for an example of Fidelity to all Ages: and perhaps nothing can be more reasonably concluded from our late Revolution, than that we are now cal'd to the practice of that Loyalty, which we have made such high professions of.

I shall add no more, but only transcribe some Passages out of Dr *Sherlock's Case of Resistance* to shew that the Authority of that very great Man can signifie little in this Controversie, whatever his Arguments may do.

p. 29. "We know what use some men "have made of this Argument of "Providence to justifie all the Villa- "nies they had a mind to act: But "*David* it seems, did not think that "an Opportunity of doing evil, gave "him license and Authority to do it. "Opportunity we say, makes a Thief, "and it makes a *Rebel*, and it makes a "*Murtherer*: No man can do any "Wickedness which he has no op- "portunity of doing, and if the Pro- "vidence of God which puts such op- "portunities into mens hands, justi- "fies the wickedness they commit, "no man can be chargeable with any "guilt whatever he does; and cer- "tainly opportunity will as soon justi- "fie any other sin, as Rebellion and "the Murther of Princes. We are "to learn our Duty from the Law of "God, not from his Providence; "at least this must be a setled Prin- "ciple, that the Providence of God "will never justifie any Action which "his Law forbids.

"There is another Objection a- p. 27. "gainst what the Apostle affirms, that "*there is no Power but of God, the Pow-* "*ers that be are ordained of God.* For is "the Power of Victorious Rebels and "Usurpers from God? Did *Oliver* "*Cromwel* receive his Power from "God? then it seems it was unlawful "to resist him too, or to conspire a- "gainst him: Then all those Loyal "Subjects, who refused to submit, "when he had got the Power in his "hands were Rebels and Traitors.

"To this I answer that the most "prosperous Rebel is not the *Higher* "*Power* while our Natural Prince to "whom we owe Obedience and Sub- "jection, is in being. And there- "fore though such men may get the "*Power* into their hands by God's "Permission, yet not by God's Or- "dinance; and he who resists them "does not resist the Ordinance of "God, but the Usurpations of men. "In *Hereditary Kingdoms* the *King* ne- "ver dies, but the same Minute that "the Natural Person of one King "dies, the Crown descends upon the "next of Blood, and therefore he, "who rebelleth against the Father "and murthers him, continues a Re- "bel in the Reign of the Son, which "commences with his Fathers Death.

"It is otherwise indeed where "none can pretend a greater Right "to the Crown than the Usurper, "for there possession of Power seems "to give a right. Thus many of the "Roman Emperors came to the "Crown by very ill means, but "when they were possest of it they "were the *Higher Powers*; for the "Crown did not descend by Inheri- "tance, for the possession of Supreme "and Sovereign Power is Title e- "nough where there is no better "Title to oppose against it; *&c.*

But

P. 131. "But it was otherwiſe in the Kingdom of *Judah*, which God himſelf "had intailed on *David*'s Family, as "appears from the Example of *Joaſh*, "who was concealed by his Aunt *Jehoſheba*, and hid in the Houſe of the "Lord for ſix years. During this time "*Athaliah* Reigned, and had the whole "power of Government in her hands; "but yet this did not make her a Sovereign and irreſiſtable *Prince*, becauſe "*Joaſh*, the Son of *Ahaziah*, the right "Heir of the Crown, was yet alive. "And therefore in the Seventh "Year *Jehoiada* the Prieſt, ſet *Joaſh* "upon the Throne, and ſlew *Athaliah*, "and was guilty of no Treaſon or Re"bellion in doing ſo, 2 *Kings* 11. "Which ſhews, That no Uſurpations "can extinguiſh the Right and Title of "a Natural *Prince*. Such Uſurpers, "though they have the poſſeſſion of the "Supreme Power, yet they have no "Right to it; and though God, for "wiſe Reaſons, may ſometimes permit "ſuch Uſurpations, yet while his Pro"vidence ſecures the Perſons of ſuch "depoſed and baniſhed Princes from "Violence, he ſecures their Title too. "As it was in *Nebuchadnezzar*'s Viſion, "*The Tree is cut down, but the ſtump of "the Roots is left in the Earth. The "Kingdom ſhall be ſure to them, after "that they ſhall know that the Heavens "do rule*, Dan. 4. 26.

Hitherto I had written before Dr. *Sherlock*'s Book was publiſhed, and upon the moſt impartial conſideration of it, can now find no cauſe to change my Opinion; but having proceeded thus far, I ſhall, as exactly as I can, examine all that relates to this matter in his Book, which I could not foreſee, and have not already given an account of.

His Two firſt Sections, I cannot think my ſelf much concerned about, having already given both the full State of the Caſe, and the plain meaning of the Convocation. One thing indeed I omitted, which he remarks in the Second Section: He obſerves, That whereas in the 30*th* Chapter, it is ſaid, That *Jaddus* returned Anſwer to *Alexander*, That *he might not lawfully violate his Oath of true Allegiance to* Darius, *whilſt* Darius *lived*, the Convocation in the Canon following it, takes no notice that he owed Allegiance to *Darius*, during the Life of that King; *And it is plain*, ſays he, *that* Jaddus *himſelf could mean no more by it, than that he could not make a voluntary Dedition to* Alexander; not that he never could ſubmit to him till *Darius* was dead; for *when he was in* Alexander's *power, he made no ſcruple to ſubmit to him.* But I think it is not much material, whether they mention this in the *Canon* or no, ſince they ſet it down in the foregoing Chapter, and then approve of the Behaviour and Conduct of *Jaddus* in the Canon. For if this part of *Jaddus*'s Anſwer, which was the moſt conſiderable thing in it, had been diſliked by them, it muſt have been excepted; but when they give a general Approbation of what *Jaddus* did, and except againſt no Particulars, they muſt be ſuppoſed to approve of it in all its Circumſtances before ſet down in the Chapter; at leaſt they muſt approve of that, which was the principal thing in *Jaddus*'s Anſwer: for when the thing that *Alexander* required of him was to *bear Arms himſelf againſt* Darius, *or to ſolicite others thereunto*; and *Jaddus* anſwered, That he might not do it, *becauſe he had taken an Oath for his true Allegiance to* Darius, *which he might not lawfully violate whilſt* Darius *lived*: and the Convocation in their Canon determine, That if any man affirm, that *having ſo ſworn* he might have done it, *he doth greatly err*; they can mean no leſs in the Canon than they expreſſed in the Chapter, That *he might not lawfully violate his Oath of true Allegiance to* Darius, *whilſt* Darius *lived*. And P. 8.

the Doctor doth not deny, that they approved of these words in the sense in which *Jaddus* meant them; and that *Jaddus* meant them in the strictest sense, is evident; for the words will admit of no Latitude: and what *Jaddus* afterwards did, was by an immediate Direction from Heaven; and therefore it can be no Argument, that *Jaddus* had any thoughts of submitting to *Alexander*, whilst *Darius* lived, when he sent that Message; but on the contrary, That he was resolved not to have submitted, and ought not to have done it, unless a Revelation had warranted him to do it, and thereby absolved him from his Oath to *Darius*.

In his Third Section, the Doctor lays down some Propositions, upon which his whole Discourse depends; and indeed to grant him these Propositions, is to give up the Cause to him; for they plainly imply, and suppose the whole Question, without any more to do.

§ 10. His First Proposition is, *That all Civil Power and Authority is from God*: This he rightly observes, no man will deny him, but an *Atheist*. But then it ought to be proved, That it is so from God, as to exclude all Humane Rights and Titles; or that God now bestows and conveys this Authority, contrary to the Rules of Law and Justice amongst Men, and in opposition to the Constitutions of particular Governments, and the Agreement and Consent of the several Nations of the World. That God by his Providence doth set aside all Humane Law and Right, and doth give an extraordinary and immediate Right and Title to every Usurper, who is got into full Possession of any Kingdom, because *no Man can have any Authority but from God*, is no Consequence, unless there be no other way for God to rule the World but in this manner: for if God may govern the World agreeably to the Methods of Right and Justice, which Reason obliges men to observe towards their Sovereign, and which by an Authority derived from God himself, and settled and enacted in particular Countreys, then it cannot be known, but by Revelation, that God does ever interpose to the Prejudice of Legal Right, or absolve Subjects from their Allegiance to their Natural Sovereign, by transferring his Authority to an Usurper.

Prop. 2. *That Civil Power and Authority is no otherwise from God, than as he gives his Power and Authority to some particular Person or Persons to govern others.* Civil Power and Authority is from God in its Original Institution, as well as in its Application and Donation to particular Persons. But not to insist upon that: The Person or Persons, who are invested with it, are either qualified for the Reception of this Authority from God, by a just Accession to the Throne, according to the particular Form or Constitution of the Government; or they must be appointed by Divine Revelation, which may discharge the Subjects from adhering to the Legal Constitution, in performance of their Allegiance sworn to any other Person. But the Exercise of Power may be in him, who has properly no Authority, but only a Nominal one; that is, Men are forced to call it so, though it be really nothing less, for meer Force, and External Power, gives no Right, nor is any otherwise from God, than are the Natural Powers and Force of Wild Beasts, who devour Men, and other Creatures, not without the Permission and Concurrence of God's Providence; and to use the Doctor's Expression, they cannot devour a Man, *whether God will or no.*

But if he Governs without receiving his Perſonal Authority from God, he Governs without God's Authority. No doubt, of it, he Governs, when he has no Right, and ought not to Govern: for the Exerciſe of Authority may be uſurped, as well as the Enſigns of Authority, or the Jewels of the Crown; but the Right to Govern, which is beſtowed by God, is not always in him, who actually Governs, but in him, who ought to Govern, tho' perhaps he does not.

Prop. 3. *There are but three ways, whereby God gives this Power and Authority to any Perſons; either by Nature, or by an expreſs Nomination, or by the Diſpoſals of Providence.* This may be granted, and yet the Diſpoſals of Providence may be ſuch, as are agreeable to the Rules of humane Laws and Juſtice, and it remains to be proved, that there are any diſpoſals of Kingdoms by God's Providence contrary to theſe Rules. And whereas the Doctor ſays, that *by what bounds the Paternal and Patriarchal Authority was limitted, we cannot tell:* I can ſee no Reaſon to make any ſcruple or enquiry concerning that matter, according to his Principles; for Men always had juſt as much Authority, as they could by any means attain to the exerciſe of; if they could enlarge their Dominions, all they got by fraud, or violence, or by any way whatſoever of Injuſtice, was the gift of Providence; and if their Patriarchal Authority would not bear them out in it, yet the Divine Authority, which upon a full Poſſeſſion, they became inveſted with, would never fail to give them an undoubted Right and Title. If they could by any means deprive their Subjects of all the Priviledges they enjoyed, and take from them all their Liberty and Property, and reduce them to the vileſt Slavery, they were by God himſelf ſettled in an Abſolute and Arbitrary Government. And by the ſame Argument the King of *France* has a Divine Right not only to the Principality of *Orange*, but to all the Deſpotick Power, which his Adverſaries ſay he exerciſes over his own Subjects; ſince he is throughly ſettled in the Poſſeſſion of both.

That *God made Kings only in* Jewry *by a particular Nomination* is a miſtake. For he nominated *Nebuchadnezzar* and *Cyrus* as particularly, as he nominated *David* himſelf. Nor is it true, that God entailed no other Kingdom, but that of *Judah*; as the Doctor ſeems here to ſay. For as he entailed the Kingdom of *Judah* upon *David*'s Poſterity indefinitely, ſo he entailed the ſame Kingdom with many others upon *Nebuchadnezzar*, and his Son, and his Sons Son, *Jer.* 27. 7. And God entailed the Kingdom of *Iſrael* firſt upon *Jeroboam* and his Poſterity, promiſing him, that *if he would keep his Statutes and Commandments, as David did, he would be with him, and build him a ſure houſe, as he built for David, and would give Iſrael unto him*, 1 Kings 11. 38. And afterwards he entailed it upon *Jehu*, and his *Children of the fourth Generation*, 2 Kings 10. 30. Pag. 11.

There can be no doubt, but that *God ruled in all the other Kingdoms of the World, as well as in Jewry, and all other Kings ruled by Gods Authority, as well as the Kings of Judah and Iſrael, who were advanced by his command.* And therefore God ſometimes interpoſed his immediate Command, in the advancement of Kings in other Kingdoms as well as in thoſe of *Judah* and *Iſrael*; and he entailed other Kingdoms, and might do ſo now, if he pleaſed: but this is no argument, that he will do it, nor that we are now to expect it, ſince we are left to the guidance and protection of his Providence in the ordinary courſe of things, and in our obe-

dience to the Laws of that Conſtitution of Government under which we live, which are to determin when the Authority of Sovereigns ceaſes, and the Allegiance of Subjects; and we are not to think their Power and Authority transferred, unleſs it be transferred legally. For God now Rules the World by no expreſs Commands, or extraordinary Declarations of his Will, but Governs every People, by the juſt Laws and Conſtitutions of their Country: and whatever happens contrary to theſe, he permits for good and wiſe Reaſons, known only to himſelf. But Subjects are not to look upon themſelves, as diſcharged from their Duty and Oaths of Allegiance, unleſs the Laws themſelves, and the Nature of the Conſtitution diſcharge them: for we are not at liberty to have recourſe to Providence for a Diſpenſation or Releaſe from the moſt Solemn Obligations, that Nature and the Laws of the Land, and our own Oaths, and God himſelf by his Authority in his Vicegerents, by whom theſe Laws are enacted, laies upon us.

§. 12. But it is ſaid, That *it makes no difference in this caſe to diſtinguiſh between what God permits, and what he does; for this diſtinction does not relate to the events of things, but to the wickedneſs of Men; which is the only reaſon for this Diſtinction; for the Scripture never ſpeaks of God's bare permiſſion of any events, but makes him the Author of all the good or evil, which happens either to private Perſons or publick Societies. The events of all things are in his Hands, and are ordered and diſpoſed by his Will and Counſel, as they muſt be, if God governs the World: but God cannot be the Author of any wickedneſs, cannot inſpire Men with any wicked Counſels or Deſigns, nor incline their Wills to the commiſſion of it; and therefore this we ſay, God only permits; but when it comes to Action, he over-rules their wicked Deſigns to accompliſh his own Counſels and Decrees; and either diſappoints what they intended, or gives ſucceſs to them, when he can ſerve the ends of his Providence by their wickedneſs: and herein conſiſts the unſearchable Wiſdom of Providence, that God brings about his own Counſels by the free Miniſtries of Men: He permits Men to do wickedly, but all events, which are for the good or evil of private Men, or publick Societies, are ordered by him, as the Prophet declares,* Amos 3. 6. *Shall there be evil in a City and the Lord hath not done it?*

1. I anſwer, There is no Reaſon, why we ſhould diſtinguiſh in this caſe between the Counſels and Deſigns of wicked Men; and their Actions in the execution of them; for God concurs, as much to the Phyſical Operations of the Mind in purpoſing and contriving Evil; as he does to the corporal acts in the bringing it to effect: for the Mind is as little capable of thinking as the Body is of moving without God's continual concourſe, both having a neceſſary dependance upon him in the exerciſe of their proper Faculties. And the Reſolution and Contrivance to do Evil, is the event or reſult of Thought and Conſideration, as the ſucceſs in the performance and accompliſhment of the Evil deſigned and reſolved upon is the event of the ſeveral outward Actions, which are done in order to it: ſo that God concerns himſelf no more in the events, which proceed from the exerciſe of the bodily Powers in bringing about ill Deſigns, than in thoſe, which proceed from the Operations of the Mind in the projects and contrivances of Evil: he permits both, and concurs with both, as they are the acts of Natural Cauſes, in the production of their effects, but as they have a tendency to Evil, he concurs with neither. He leaves Men a Liberty of

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Acting and Thinking, and concurs with them accordingly; he suffers them to sin, and does not take from them the use of their Natural Faculties of Body or Mind, though they employ them to ill Purposes, and about wrong Objects.

2. *Evil*, whether considered Physically, or Morally, that is, as it signifies Affliction, or as it signifies Sin; is in the *Action* as well as in the *Event*, and therefore the words of the Prophet *Amos* are applicable to both alike. For not only *the Events of all things*, but the *Actions* of all Creatures *are in Gods hands, and are ordained and disposed by his Will and Counsel*; and by the Doctors arguing, in all Actions, as well as in all Events, there is no distinction *between what God permits, and what he does*, which, he says, relates only to the wickedness of Men, and therefore it does not relate to the Actions of Men, but only to *the wickedness* of humane Actions. For God *gives success*, he says, to wicked Designs; when they come to *Action* he *sets up Kings, he advances them to the Throne, he gives them the Throne*; that is, he goes along with them, and assists them in the attainment of the Supreme Power, and at last puts it into their hands. So that they have his concurrence, and assistance, as much before the settlement, as after it, and he that at last gives them the Plenitude of Power, gave them all along the opportunity and the means of attaining it. For God makes no immediate Donation of it, but bestows it upon them by his Providence, that is, by affording them ways and means to come by it. The plain consequence of which must be, that God not only suffers Men by wicked means to get into Power, and then bestows his Authority upon them, but he conducts them in every step they take, and at last when they arrive at the Throne, he places them in it. For what God gives by Providence, he does not give all at once, but by the several degrees of success, by which it is attained; and the success of every particular action must be his Gift as much as the event it self. And if every Event be of Gods *doing*, every Action must be so too, because Events proceed from Actions, and are no otherwise done or brought about, than by the performance of those Actions, which are requisite to produce them; and to say that God is the Author of the Event, but not of the Action, is to say, that he is the Author of the Effect but not of the Causes Acting, whereas he cannot appoint the Effect without appointing the Cause to act, unless the Effect could be produced without its Cause.

Pag. 12, 13.

3. *End* and *Event* are both but relative Terms, the end of one sort or series of Actions may be but the beginning of another, and the Event or Effect of one Enterprise the Cause of another. For that which is an Effect in respect of its Cause, is a Cause in respect of its Effect; and that, which in respect of the means is the Event, is the means in respect of another Event. If then the Event of all things is from God, and therefore gives a Right; a Rebel or Usurper would have a Right to every Fort or Castle he gets into his Possession in order to his *Thorough Settlement* in the whole Kingdom, for that in its kind is as truly an Event as a *Thorough Settlement* it self is in a different kind: for he that possesses himself of a Castle has gained his end as much for that time, and in that particular design, as he that is possessed of a Kingdom has gained his end, in the full accomplishment of his desires and designs. And when he has his wishes in this, perhaps he stops not here, but makes this End and Event only a step

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to another Enterprise upon a Neighbour Kingdom, and then the obtaining the first Kingdom is but a means to gain the latter, as the several degrees of success were the means of obtaining the first.

But all other Events whatsoever are as means in Gods Hands, and are made use of by him, for the bringing about the final Events of things. God therefore does not approve of every Event so as to command us to acquiess in it, any more than of every Means, but he approves, or disallows of them, as they are either just, or unjust, good, or evil; and because the last Events of things will be perfectly good, therefore they are approved of by him; and in the mean time he orders and disposes all lesser and precedent Events, whether they be good or evil, to the attainment of these. The evil Events God neither approves in themselves, nor gives any Right or Authority to the Persons, whom he suffers *to bring them about*, but whilst the Authors of them are disliked and disowned by him, he permits the Events for the sake of that good, which he has decreed to produce out of them, and for that relation and subserviency, which they have to the last Events of things, which he has determined and ordained from Eternity.

4. If there be no difference between what God permits, and what he does, as to the Events of things, this will justifie all Events whatsoever, as being of God's doing; and therefore Robberies, and all the Wickedness in the World besides, that is successful, and ends in the desired issue, must be ascribed to him: for these are as properly Events as any besides can be; and the successes of things respect not their Nature, but their End; and Actions attain their End, not as they are of less, or greater moment, of publick or private Concernment, but because they answer the Designs of the men that perform them.

And this will make it *impossible*, as the Doctor says expresly, *That there should be any King, who is not Rightful with respect to God*: which overthrows the Distinction he makes between the Kingdom of *Judah*, and other Kingdoms. For *Athaliah* must have been as Rightful Queen as *Joash* was Rightful King, and both must have had God's Authority alike; and so the Subjects must have been obliged to Contradictions; that is, to assist *Athaliah* against *Joash*, and *Joash* against *Athaliah*, at the same time; because she had God's Authority by Providence, and he by Promise; and therefore both must have been obeyed, and yet both resisted; and the Subjects must have owed Allegiance to both, and yet they must have owed Allegiance to neither of them. Thus it would have been likewise in the Case of *David* himself, to whom God first assigned the Kingdom of *Judah*; and *Ishbosheth*, who was possest of the greatest part of it for Two Years. For either *Ishbosheth* and *Athaliah*, had God's Authority, or they had not; if they had not, then it is possible there may be a King who has not God's Authority, and that there may be some Events which are only by his permission: If they had, then God must bestow Two Opposite Sovereign Authorities and Rights, at once, to Two several Princes over the same People, and to the same Kingdom; and both must be equally valid and obligatory upon the Subjects Consciences. For by what way soever God conveys the Authority, it is his Authority; and God's Authority is always the same, to whomsoever, and

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in what manner ſoever it be conveyed.

5. Since therefore God concurs with the Thoughts and Actions of Men, in the Means and Cauſes, as well as in the Ends and Events of Things; and diſpoſes all alike, it follows, that he can be no more the Author of Evil Events, than of Evil Means, or Actions, or Thoughts. But God may be ſaid to do all that is done in the world, becauſe nothing can be done without him; for his Providence concurs with Men in the performance of the worſt Actions, though not in the *Wickedneſs* of them. Men contrive, and practice Evil, and God concurs with them in their Actions, but only permits the Evil of them: for every Action being a poſitive thing, neceſſarily requires God's Concurrence, and could not be done without it; and every Action, as ſuch, is Good: But Evil is an Accident, it is a Defect, or a privation of Good; and therefore this proceeds from the Imperfection and Wickedneſs of Man only, and needs no Cauſe to produce it, ſince it has no other Being, but the want of Rectitude and Goodneſs in the depraved minds of men. Thus *to think* is always the ſame Action of the mind, whatever it be that we think about; And Evil Thoughts differ from Good ones, not in the Nature of the Act, but only in the Object, which employs the Thoughts; and therefore, though God never ſuggeſts Evil Thoughts, yet he leaves the Will free to determine it ſelf in the choice of the Evil Object, and ſuſtains the Mind in the Exerciſe of its Faculty of Thinking, whatever the Object be about which it is converſant. And ſo in all other Actions of the Body or Mind, God concurs to the Action, not as it has ſuch or ſuch an Object, but as it is produced by its proper Faculty; that is, he concurs to it, as it is a Natural, not as it is a Moral Action.

6. As God permits Wickedneſs to come to paſs, ſo he orders it for the Good or Evil, that is, for the Reward or Puniſhment of private Men, or publick Societies; yet ſtill he does not approve of the Event, but of the Conſequences and Effects, which his Infinite Wiſdom and Power produces out of it. And the Event gives no Right to the Perſons who are permitted to bring it about. For then a Thief would have a Right to ſtol'n Goods, becauſe it may be a juſt Puniſhment from God upon the Perſon from whom they are ſtol'n, to ſuffer him to have the poſſeſſion of them.

I ſhall not venture to ſay, That though God permits Wickedneſs in the Counſels or Deſigns of Men, yet *when it comes to Action, he either diſappoints what they intended, or gives Succeſs to them, when he can ſerve the Ends of his Providence by their Wickedneſs.* For I believe there is no wickedneſs either in Thought or Action, but God's Infinite Power and Wiſdom can *over-rule it to accompliſh his own Counſels and Decrees.*

And the difference between Evil in the Action, and in the Deſign, ſeems to be this, That whilſt it is deſigned and contrived in the minds of Men, it can have no ſuch Influence towards the Production of that Good, which God cauſes to proceed from Evil, as it certainly ſhall have one way or other, when it is reduced to practice. For though Evil Thoughts are overruled by God, as well as Evil Actions, and either ſuffered to proceed to Action, or hindred; and if ſuffered, then upon this or that Occaſion,

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at this or that Time, with respect to certain Persons and Accidents; yet Thoughts, as such, have no Effect, but upon the Mind it self; whereas Actions have a further Effect upon divers Objects, for the tryal of Good Men; for their Admonition or Amendment, or for the prevention of that Sin, which they would otherwise run into; or else perhaps for the Punishment and Correction of wicked men.

And therefore *there can be no Evil in a City, and the Lord hath not done it.* He concurs with wicked men by his Providence, but concurs with them, as if they were Natural, not as they are Moral Agents, by sustaining and enabling their Natural Faculties to produce their Effects; he never inclines their Minds, nor influences their Wills to Evil, but oftentimes over-rules their first Intentions, and diverts their Will, already determined and resolved upon Mischiefs, to certain Objects, that the Evil may most tend to his Glory, and the good of Mankind, in the Punishment of Sinners, or in the Exercise of the Patience, and other Vertues of Good Men.

P. 12. As to the distinction of Events, That *some God only permits, and some he orders and appoints*, it is grounded upon this, That he orders and appoints all that are good and just, and permits the contrary. But then this appointment is known to us, not by God's Providence, but by his Law. For Providence appoints us to do nothing, but only concurs with Men, and assists them in the performance of what God's Laws appoint or command: The most that can be said, is, That Providence may sometimes be an Indication to us, of God's Will and Command; but that can be only in Events that are miraculous and supernatural, when there is nothing repugnant in them to his Will already known and declared: For even Miracles wrought to carry on wicked Designs, are to be looked upon as false, and the Impostures and Delusions only of the Devil.

2. Of that particular Providence which watches over Kingdoms, and orders the Goverment of them, and the difference of it from that Providence, which guides and influences private Affairs, I have said enough already, and have shewn, That God, *with his own Hand, immediately directs the Motions of the great Wheels of Providence*, but *permits none to move as they please themselves.* For I take it to be a very wrong Notion of the Permission of God's Providence, that he leaves things to move, as they please themselves; No, he rules, and restrains, and limits what he only permits; and puts a check and stop to it, when he pleases: And by God's more immediate direction, I understand, not that God ever acts at a distance, or leaves any thing in the world to it self, but that he sometimes acts in a way to us more visible and remarkable; though the steddy and unobserved Influence of Providence has as much of God's immediate Presence in it, as have the most extraordinary and miraculous Events.

The other Propositions are but Consequences of these Three, and therefore need not to be particularly examined: and if these Three only were but well proved, and not laid down, as if they were *so very plain* to his purpose, *as to carry their own Evidence with them*, I should readily agree to all the rest, and indeed to the whole Book, as far as it concerns this matter, except some few P. 16.

Particulars less material to the merits of the Cause. But I despair of seeing these Propositions so effectually proved, as to induce me to think, that by what way soever that *can be thought of, a Prince is advanced to the Throne, he is as truly placed in it by God, as if he had been expresly nominated and anointed by a Prophet, at God's Command, as Saul and David were:* Or that *it is impossible there should be a wrong King, unless a Man could make himself King, whether God will or no.* I believe the Self-Evidence of these Propositions, can work in few men so much assurance as this amounts to.

P. 13.

P. 14.

The Fundamental Mistake, is, That the Doctor confounds the Exercise of Power or Authority with the Right of it; and supposes, that every one, who has the Administration of Power, has a Right to the Administration of it; which are plainly Two very different things: For the Administration or Exercise of Power, is a Natural Act, and may be without that Moral Qualification, which is implied in the Right of Power or Authority. Thus in his first Proposition, *That all Civil Power and Authority is from God*: If he mean the Exercise of all Civil Power, I deny it, because it may be exercised by him who ought not to exercise it: If he mean the Right to exercise Civil Power and Authority, the *Proposition* is true, but nothing to the purpose. So that either his *Proposition* supposes the thing in Dispute, and is false; or if it be true, it is to no purpose. And the same Mistake runs through the rest of these *Propositions*: For if by *Civil Power and Authority*, he understand only the Exercise and Administration of it, he supposes that which ought to be proved: if he understand the Right it self, though these *Propositions* were true, yet still they would prove nothing.

But the Doctor makes an Objection to himself, which has great weight in it; *If this be so* (that no Obedience is due to the Rightful King, when another is settled in the Throne) *what does a Legal Right signifie, if it do not command the Allegiance of Subjects?* P. 15.

He answers: *It bars all other Humane Claims: No other Prince can challenge the Throne of Right: and Subjects are bound to maintain the Rights of such a Prince, as far as they can; That is, against all Mankind; but not against God's disposal of Crowns: and therefore when God transfers the Kingdom, he transfers our Allegiance, which is due and annexed to his Authority, whether this Authority be conveyed by a Legal Succession, or by any other means.*

But notwithstanding all this, the Legal Right can signifie nothing, unless it be in that Interval of Time between the Dispossession of one Prince, and the Settlement of another. For if the Legal Possessor be in the Throne, his Legal Title can be of no advantage to him, because his Divine Authority would secure him, while he is in Possession, as well without it; and when an Usurper is once settled, it can then no longer be of any account to him; for though it be good against all Mankind, yet not against God in his disposal of Crowns; but when God has given away his Kingdom to another, the Rightful King must submit, unless he may plead his *Humane Claim* against God's Donation. Before a Settlement, indeed, he that has the Legal Right, has the Odds

on his ſide. But Men are ſo partial in their Judgments, in all things wherein their own Intereſt is ſo nearly concerned, that every one, who were expoſed to any great Danger from the Uſurper, would eaſily perſwade himſelf, that he might become his Subject, and that the Legal King had no longer any Right to his Allegiance, the Uſurper being, in his Opinion, ſettled enough to become inveſted with God's Authority: So that a Legal Title would upon theſe Grounds, be little more than an empty Word or Notion, and would either be of no uſe at all, or of little benefit, when there ſhould be moſt need of it.

P. 17. I ſhall not much trouble my ſelf about the ſeveral *Degrees of Settlement*, and of the Proportionable Submiſſion, which they require; ſince I am not yet ſatisfied, that any Settlement of an Uſurper, though it be in the *higheſt Degree*, can confer any Authority upon him, or cauſe any Obedience of the Subjects to become due to him merely upon that account. But if any Man can prove, That a *thorough Settlement* of an Uſurper, does of it ſelf, and upon its own Account, before the Deceaſe or Ceſſion of the Rightful King, and his Heirs, entitle him to the Crown, I will give him no Trouble to diſpute with me about the Degrees of Settlement. But ſince the Doctor ſuppoſes, That *the Generality of the Nation have ſubmitted to ſuch a Prince, and have placed him on the Throne, and put the whole Power of the Kingdom into his hands*; and ſays expreſly, That *he is indeed King, while he adminiſters the Regal Power*; And ſince he has told us before, That *it is impoſſible there ſhould be a wrong King*, I cannot ſee, why he ſhould be ſo ſolicitous to define the Degrees of Submiſſion, and not think him throughly enough ſettled to have Right to an intire Allegiance, *while the diſpoſſeſt Prince has ſuch a formidable Power, as makes the Event very doubtful*. For if God have once made him King, as by the Doctor's Suppoſition he has, then by the ſame Suppoſition, the Subjects owe him an intire Allegiance to day, though they were ſure that the diſpoſſeſt Prince would recover his Kingdom of him to morrow. For he that has once God's Authority, has a Right to our Allegiance from the firſt to the laſt hours he has it; why therefore may not Subjects obey him as their King now, who perhaps may not be their King a while hence? Nay, though they were certain that his Royal Authority were to be taken from him in never ſo ſhort a time, yet this could make him have never the leſs Right to their Obedience, while his Authority laſts. If he be *indeed King*, he muſt be *Rightful King with reſpect to God*; for *all Kings are equally rightful with reſpect to him*; *and it is impoſſible there ſhould be a wrong King, unleſs a Man could make himſelf King, whether God will or no.* So that if he be King, as the Doctor ſuppoſes, he is Rightful King, and may challenge the Allegiance of the Subjects by Vertue of God's Authority, whatever Forces the diſpoſſeſt Prince may yet have: and therefore either he is now thoroughly ſettled, or a thorough Settlement is not neceſſary to the obtaining God's Authority; and when he is once King, there can be no Reaſon, why the Allegiance of the Subjects ſhould in any meaſure be abated for any Apprehenſions of Danger he may be in from the late Legal Poſſeſſors Arms.

P. 17.

P. 8.

P. 14.

In the Fourth Section, the Doctor proceeds to confirm his Doctrine

crine by Arguments, and to answer Objections.

His Arguments are, 1. From Scripture. 2. From Reason.

Pag. 19. 1. From Scripture. His first Argument is from *Rom.* 13. 1, 2. *Let every Soul be subject to the higher Powers, for all Power is of God: The Powers that be, are ordained of God; and they that resist shall receive to themselves damnation.* He observes, that the word Ἐξουσία, *Power*, or *Authority*, which is opposed to δυνάμις, as it signifies *Force*, is sometimes used in the same sense with it, and that these two words are sometimes used promiscuously in Scripture, and that therefore unless there were some distinction set down by the Apostle *in express words*, whereby we might know that by it in this place are to be understood only Rightful Powers, we are to understand the word in its full Latitude, so as to comprehend Usurpers likewise. For the Scripture neither in this nor any other place distinguishing between Lawful Kings and Unlawful, we are not to limit the signification of the words, so as to exclude Usurpers from a Right to the Duties enjoyned in the Text, or to say, that they are not *ordained of God*.

1. But if the various signification of words necessarily require, that there be some express limitation added, to determine them to one particular sense, or if every word must be taken in the utmost Latitude of its signification, unless it be so limited, we shall be at a great loss to know how to make sense of most Authors, or to make them consistent with themselves. For the same words often have opposite and quite contrary significations, as they are differently used and applied by the same Authors, and yet they seldom give notice, when they use them in one sense and when in another, but think it sufficient, that the sense be limitted and determined by the subject to which they are applied, or by the coherence and connexion, which they have with the rest of the discourse. And if the Acceptation of a word be still doubtful, the most likely way to find it out, is to examine in what sense the Author most commonly uses the same word. But unless there be an evident Reason to the contrary, every word is to be taken in its proper, or in its usual sense, for there needs no Reason to be given, why a word should be understood properly, or, as it uses to be understood, but he that will understand a word in an improper, or unusual signification, is obliged to produce his Reason for it: because every word is supposed to retain its first and most genuine sense, unless it be most frequently used Metaphorically, and then it must be taken in its most usual signification, unless it can be shewn, that it is applied to another meaning, than is commonly intended by it. When we read in Scripture, * of the *Powers of darkness*, of the *God of this World*, † and of the *Power and Seat*, or Throne, *and great Authority*, which the Dragon gave the Beast in the Revelations; the words are intelligible, though taken very improperly, without any express limitation And when St. *Paul* says, *Let every Soul be subject to the higher powers*, &c. We are to understand only Rightful Powers, unless it can be shewn, that any other are *ordained of God*. For in its primary and natural signification, and in its common use, Ἐξουσία must be acknowledged to mean

* Ἡ Ἐξουσία τῦ σκότους, Luk. 22. 53.

† Καὶ ἔδωκεν αὐτῷ ὁ δράκων τ δύναμιν αὐτῦ, καὶ τ θρόνον αὐτῦ, καὶ Ἐξουσίαν μεγάλην, Rev. 13. 2.

only Juſt and Lawful Authority, and this every Man muſt underſtand by it, unleſs the context determin the contrary, which it cannot do here; for here is no mention of any Powers, but thoſe, which are *ordained of God*. In ſome other places of Scripture, it plainly appears from the Text it ſelf, that the word is uſed improperly, and contrary to its ordinary ſignification; but here the Doctor ſeems not to pretend any ſuch thing, but only argues, that becauſe it is uſed in an uncommon ſenſe in ſome other places of Scripture, it muſt be taken ſo in this, becauſe St. *Paul makes no exception againſt Kings who exerciſe Civil Government without a Legal Title to it*. Whereas we ought to conclude on the other ſide, that ſince the Apoſtle gives no intimation, that he uſes the word in an improper and unuſual ſenſe, therefore we are to underſtand it only of thoſe who have legal Titles, and the reſt are *excepted againſt* plainly enough, becauſe they are not mentioned, nor is the leaſt intimation given of them; when in the other places of Scripture it is manifeſt at firſt ſight, that the word is applied to a different ſenſe than that which it commonly has in Scripture, or in any other Book.

2. If the Scriptures make no diſtinction between Kings, who have a Right Title, and thoſe that are Uſurpers, who have only the Name and Title of Kings, it is becauſe there needs no other diſtinction, than the Reaſon of the thing, which ſufficiently declares the difference. The Scripture had never declared any diſtinction of Husbands, yet the Woman of *Samaria* well enough underſtood, that there muſt be one, and therefore replied, that ſhe had no Husband, though ſhe had one, who was called ſo; and our Saviour anſwers her, *Thou haſt well ſaid, I have no husband; for thou haſt had five husbands, and he, whom thou now haſt, is not thy husband: in that thou ſaidſt truly*, John 4. 17, 18. And if it ſhould now be asked any Man, who is not preposſeſſed with the Notion of a *thorough Settlement*, whether St. *Paul* by the *higher Powers*, *ordained of God*, meant Rightful Kings only, or Uſurpers likewiſe, he would ſcarce be able for ſome time to imagine what reaſon there could be to doubt, whether Rightful Kings only, were meant by thoſe expreſſions, or to conceive what intereſt Uſurpers could have in that Text. And this Dr. *Sherlock* ſeems to own, when he ſays, That *the Apprehenſions of novelty and ſingularity had cramped his freedom and liberty of thinking*, and *that his Scheme of Government may ſtartle ſome Men at firſt, before they have well conſider'd it*. So that it is evident, that this Interpretation is a Novelty and Singularity, which will ſtartle moſt Men, and that this Text in its moſt plain and obvious ſenſe is to be underſtood of Rightful Kings, and if others are to be comprehended in it, this muſt be proved not from the words themſelves but from other Reaſons; for the words do not naturally include them; the utmoſt that can be ſaid is, that they may poſſibly comprehend them, becauſe they are not always uſed in a ſtrict ſenſe; but that they are not ſo uſed here is the thing to be proved: if uſurped Powers *are ordained of God*, the Text plainly commands ſubjection to them, but if they be not ordained of him, it as plainly commands ſubjection to Rightful Kings in oppoſition to them. And it cannot be concluded from the different ſenſe of the word *Exuſia* upon different occaſions, that Uſurpers are ordained of God, but it muſt be

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be firſt proved, that they are ordained of him, and then and not before, it muſt be allowed, that the ſignification of that word is to be ſo extended in the Text, as to be underſtood of them as well as of other Kings.

3. Beſides, if this Argument from the Scriptures making no diſtinction between Kings, who have a Legal Title, and thoſe who have none, prove any thing, it muſt prove too much, to make at all to this purpoſe. For the Scripture makes no diſtinction between Kings, who have both a Legal and a Divine Right, and thoſe who have neither, but are Uſurpers both againſt God and Man. Thus *Abimelech* is ſtiled *King*, Judg. 9. without any manner diſtinction, or explication, though he was ſet up not only by the moſt wicked and bloody means, but in oppoſition to the Authority of God himſelf, who then governed the People of *Iſrael*, by raiſing them up Judges to Deliver and to Rule over them; and for this Reaſon, when they would have made *Gideon* King, he rejected it as a thing, which would be a great offence againſt God, and a notorious contempt of him. *Then the men of Iſrael ſaid unto Gideon, rule thou over us, both thou, and thy ſon, and thy ſons ſon alſo: for thou haſt delivered us from the hand of Midian. And Gideon ſaid unto them, I will not rule over you: the Lord ſhall rule over you*, Judg. 8. 22, 23. And ſince that God was afterwards ſo diſpleaſed with the Children of *Iſrael* for deſiring a King, and ſaid that in asking a King they had *rejected him, that he ſhould not reign over them*, 1 Sam. 8. 7. The People of *Shechem* in ſetting up a King of their own chuſing, without leave from God, or asking counſel of him, muſt be guilty of a much greater affront againſt God: for they rejected him in a more inſolent and provoking manner; not contenting themſelves with thoſe whom God uſed to raiſe up for them; and not regarding his choice, or expecting his pleaſure in it, they *preſumed to chuſe them a Prince of their own*. *Abimelech* therefore could be King by no Authority from God, but by his Permiſſion only; and yet the Scripture gives the Title of King to him as well as to *Saul* and *David*, becauſe he was in full Power, and exerciſed all outward Acts of Supreme Authority, though he had really no Authority, but by Force only, and ſucceſs in his wickedneſs; aſſumed to himſelf the name of King. *Iſhboſheth* likewiſe was ſet up by *Abner* againſt *David*, whom God had nominated, and cauſed to be anointed King, to reign over all *Sauls* Dominions, after his death: yet the Scripture ſays in the ſame words, in which it ſpeaks of all other Kings, that *Iſhboſheth* was made King over all *Iſrael*, and that he reigned two years, 2 Sam. 2. 9, 10. And *Athaliah* is ſaid to have *reigned over the Land* ſix years, 2 *Kings* 11. 3. tho' ſhe had no manner of Right either from God or Man, as the Doctor himſelf confeſſes and maintains, becauſe *Joaſh* was alive, on whom God had entailed the Crown, as being deſcended from *David*. She is notwithſtanding ſaid to have *reigned over the Land*, in the ſame terms that are uſed in Scripture, concerning the moſt Righteful Kings, nominated and appointed by God himſelf. The examples then of *Abimelech*, *Iſhboſheth*, and *Athaliah* abundantly ſhew, that Uſurpers, tho' they exerciſe the Supreme Authority, and are in full Poſſeſſion of it, are not therefore *the ordinance of God*, and that it is not impoſſible there ſhould be a wrong King, unleſs a Man could make

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make himself King, whether God will, or no: for *Abimelech*, and *Ishbosheth* were Kings, and *Athaliah* was Queen without any Authority at all, and yet not whether God would or no, but by his Permission. And from hence it is evident that the word *King* or *Queen* doth not always signifie in Scripture a Person invested with God's Authority, though it be used without distinction; and that the sense of the same words in particular places of Scripture must be known, not always from any distinction annexed to them, but from the Circumstances and Reasons of things; and that if this distinction between Usurpers and Rightful Kings be unknown to Scripture, yet if it be not unknown to Reason, that is sufficient to interpret this Text of St. *Paul*, to be meant only of lawful Powers; for the Scriptures always suppose and require that Men should bring their Reason along with them, when they read and explain them, or else they will make no more difference between Kings authorised by God, and those not authorised by him, than between Legal Kings and Illegal.

3. But I cannot think that the distinction between Rightful Kings and Kings by Usurpation is unknown to Scripture, but rather that St. *Peter* has expresly declared, that it is to Rightful Kings obedience is due, when he says, *submit your selves to every ordinance of Man for the Lord's sake, whether it be to the King, as supreme*, 1 Pet. 2. 13. εἴτε βασιλεῖ ὡς ὑπερέχοντι. He commands them to submit themselves to every humane Ordinance, or Constitution of Government under which they lived. Or, as the Convocation quote this Text, according to the old Translation, to submit themselves *unto all manner of ordinance of Man.* I know there are different Interpretations of this Text, but this seems the most probable: for the King is here called the Ordinance of Man, not because he is made King by Men; but because the Constitution, according to which he becomes King, is an humane Constitution or Ordinance, and not Divine, as was that of the *Jews*. St. *Peter* admonishes the Christians, that they ought not to over-value themselves upon the account of their Christian Liberty, so as to imagine themselves exempted from those Duties which are incumbent upon the rest of mankind, as Subjects to their Sovereigns, or as Servants to their Masters; but to behave themselves, *as free and not using their Liberty for a cloak of maliciousness*, verse 16. He had told them, *verse* 9. that they were *a chosen Generation, a Royal Priesthood, a holy Nation, a peculiar People*: which was the Character given of the *Jews*, and now applied by the Apostle to the *Jewish* converts, and lest they should have too high a conceit of themselves, and vainly think, as the *Jews* did, that because they were Gods peculiar People, they were bound to submit to no Government, but what was of God's own immediate appointment, (and this was the Opinion the *Gentiles* had of them, they spoke against them as *evil-doers*, v. 12, and accused them of disobedience to *Cæsar*, and of Preaching another King, *one Jesus*, Act. 17. 7.) St. *Peter* therefore acquaints the Christians, that *so was the will of God*, that by subjection to all in Authority they should *with well-doing put to silence the ignorance of foolish men*, verse 15. in as much as tho' the Frame of all Governments is not of God's appointment, yet the Authority in every Government is from him, and therefore whoever is King according to the Legal Constitution of each Government,

Exod. 19. 5, 6.

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Obedience becomes due to him for the *Lord's sake*, because God makes him King, and concurs with the Humane Act, in ratifying what is done according to *the Ordinance* or Constitution *of Man*. So that St. *Peter* calls particular Governments Man's Ordinance, because they are of Humane Contrivance and Institution; and he says, they are to be submitted to for the Lord's sake, because whoever is impowered to administer the Government according to the Constitution of it, has God's Authority, and in St. *Paul's* words, is *God's Ordinance*. St. *Peter* therefore speaking of Legal Powers, and St. *Paul* only mentioning the higher Powers in general terms, and both saying, Obedience is due to them for the Lord's sake, both must be understood of Legal Powers; and St. *Paul* writing his Epistle to the *Romans*, after this of St. *Peter*, his words could need no distinction, to be understood with that limitation, which St. *Peter* here uses, of *every Ordinance of Man*, or of those Powers which are Just and Right by the Laws of Men.

Ad Magistratum Serm. 1. p. 94. Edit. ult.

For as Bishop *Sanderson* has accurately expressed it, *the truth is, the Substance of the Power of every Magistrate, is the Ordinance of God; and that is St. Paul's Meaning: but the Specification of the Circumstances thereto belonging, as in regard of Places, Persons, Titles, Continuance, Jurisdiction, Sub-ordination, and the rest, is (as St. Peter termeth it) an Humane Ordinance, introduced by Custom, or Positive Law.*

5. But further, we find this Distinction in express words in the Old Testament: for according to the Doctor's Interpretation, it is impossible there should be any King, who is not Ordained of God; for he explains it of all the Powers, that at any time be, of all that are possessed of Supreme Power, however they came by it: Whereas, besides what has been said of *Abimilech*, and *Ishbosheth*, and *Athaliah*, God says expressly of the People of *Israel*, *They have set up Kings, but not by me; they have made Princes, and I knew it not*; that is, did not approve of it, *Hos.* 8. 4. To this the Doctor answers Three things, which I shall consider.

1. *This is not true, as to all the Kings of* Israel, *after their Separation from the Tribe of Judah: for some of the Kings were set up by God's own appointment, as* Jeroboam *and* Jehu, *and their Posterity: So that this can be true only of those Kings who reigned over* Israel *between the Posterity of* Jeroboam *and* Jehu, *and after the Kingdom was taken from the Line of* Jehu. P. 35.

2. *One of these Kings was* Baasha, *who slew* Nadab *the Son of* Jeroboam, *and made himself King without God's express Nomination and Appointment; and yet God tells him, I exalted thee out of the dust, and made thee Prince over my People* Israel; *and all the other Kings, who were not nominated by God, nor anointed by any Prophet, no more than* Baasha *was, were yet set up by God, as he was.* 1 *King.* 15. 27. 16. 2.

3. *The true Answer then is this:* Israel *was originally a Theocracy, as well as* Judah, *and though God allowed them at their request to have Kings, yet he reserved the appointment of them to himself; and therefore as in the Kingdom of* Judah *he entailed the Crown on* David's *Posterity; so he appointed* Jeroboam *to be the first King in* Israel; *and they ought, when that Line was cut off, to have consulted God, and received his Nomination by*

his

his Prophets of a New King, but in ſtead of that — they ſubmitted to any who could get themſelves over them; which was a great Fault in a People, who were under the immediate Government of God: For hereby they fell out of the State of Theocracy, into the common condition of the reſt of the World, where Kings are ſet up by the Providence of God, &c.

1. To this I reply, 1. It is not pretended that the words of the Prophet can be meant of all the Kings of *Iſrael*; nor of all neither who reigned either from *Nadab*, the Son of *Jeroboam* to *Jehu*; or after the Poſterity of *Jehu*.

2. For *Baaſha*, who ſlew *Nabab*, was ſet up by God himſelf, according as God had threatned *Jeroboam* by the Prophet *Ahijah*: *Moreover the Lord ſhall raiſe him up a King over* Iſrael, *who ſhall cut off the Houſe of* Jeroboam *that day*, 1 Kings 14. 14. The Lord ſhall raiſe up to himſelf a King, ἀναστήσει κύριος ἑαυτῷ βασιλέα, thereby entitleing him in a more eſpecial manner to his Authority, and ſtiling him his King, the King whom he would raiſe up to himſelf to vindicate his Honour, and to execute his Judgments upon *Jeroboam*: which Prophecy is expreſly ſaid to be fulfilled in *Baaſha*, when he killed *Nadab*, and deſtroyed all the Houſe of *Jeroboam*, 1 *Kings* 15. 29. So that though *Baaſha* were not directly *nominated*, yet he was immediately *appointed* by God himſelf; and the beginning of his Reign, in the deſtruction of *Jeroboam*'s Family, was exactly foretold; and therefore *God's exalting him out of the duſt, and making him Prince over his People* Iſrael, 1 *Kings* 16. 1. cannot be underſtood of his Providence, but of his Appointment.

It may be objected, That God did not authoriſe *Baaſha* to ſlay *Nadab*, becauſe this is alledged againſt him as the Cauſe of his own Deſtruction, 1 *Kings* 16. 7. *And alſo by the hand of the Prophet Jehu, the Son of Hanani, came the word of the Lord againſt Baaſha, and againſt his houſe, even for all the evil that he did in the ſight of the Lord, in provoking him to anger with the work of his hands, in being like the houſe of Jeroboam, and becauſe he killed him.*

To which I anſwer, That by *him* in this Verſe, cannot probably be meant *Nadab*, of whom there is no mention after the 31ſt Verſe of the foregoing Chapter: Nor can it be meant of *Jeroboam*, who was not killed by *Baaſha*, unleſs *Jeroboam* be ſaid to be ſlain by him, not in his own Perſon, but becauſe he had deſtroyed all the Family of *Jeroboam*: Which kind of Interpretation ſeems never to be admitted, where there is no evident Neceſſity for it, or not however when there is another more eaſie and natural. The words then are a Repetition of what had been before related in the firſt and ſecond Verſes: God had raiſed up *Baaſha*, and ſo bleſſed him, that he reigned Twenty Four Years; but he was guilty of great Ingratitude towards God, and did that which was evil in his ſight, which is expreſſed twice before by his *walking in the ways of Jeroboam* (1 Kings 15. 34. and 16. 2.) and here by his *being like the houſe of Jeroboam*: for this God threatens, That he *will take away the Poſterity of Baaſha, and the poſterity of his houſe, and will make his houſe like the houſe of Jeroboam, the Son of Nebat*, ver. 3. Which implies, That God deſigned to continue *Baaſha* and his Poſterity after him in the Throne of *Iſrael*, if he had not thus provoked

ked God with his ſins. But in neither of the Two other Verſes is there the leaſt intimation, that the killing of *Nadab* was imputed to *Baaſha* as a ſin; and here, after the Death of *Baaſha*, God's Meſſage formerly ſent to him by his Prophet, is again repeated, and the mention of *Jeroboam* is added, as it had been twice before, for the further aggravation of his Guilt: It is ſaid, the word of the Lord came againſt *Baaſha*, and againſt his houſe, *even for all the evil that he did in the ſight of the Lord, in provoking him to anger with the work of his hands——and becauſe he killed him*; or, as it may be tranſlated, *for which he ſmote him*; that is, God ſmote *Baaſha* for his ſins: The Prophet was ſent to denounce God's Judgments againſt him, and God at laſt took away his Life, and his ſins were the Cauſe of it: So that the words are not to be underſtood with relation to *Nadab*, as ſlain by *Baaſha*, but to *Baaſha* himſelf, as killed by God's juſt Judgment upon him for his ſins. And with this agrees the Verſion of the *Septuagint*, καὶ ἐλάλησεν κύριος——ἐπὶ Βαάσα, καὶ ἐπὶ τὸν οἶκον αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἐπὶ πᾶσαν τὴν κακίαν, ἣν ἐποίησεν ἐναντίον κυρίου, τοῦ παροργίσαι αὐτὸν ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις τῶν χειρῶν αὐτοῦ, τοῦ γενέσθαι αὐτὸν καθὼς ὁ οἶκος Ἱεροβοάμ, καὶ ὑπὲρ τοῦ πατάξαι αὐτόν, *and concerning the ſmiting him*: And thus *Malvenda* ſays, moſt underſtand this place of *Baaſha*'s being ſlain of God for his ſins. The Vulgar *Latin* renders it, *ob hanc cauſam occidit eum*; that is, God ſlew *Baaſha* for the Cauſe abovementioned, *viz.* for provoking God with his ſins, as *Jeroboam* had done; though there is a Clauſe added, which applies the words to the Prophet *Jehu*, as if *Baaſha* had killed him for delivering the Meſſage; but this is omitted in ſome Copies, and *Sixtus Senenſis* thinks that it was only an Annotation put by ſome body at firſt in the Margin, which afterwards got into the Text.

ועל אשר הכה אתו

Pleriq; eum, *Baaſam*, propter quod percuſſit eum *Dominus*, *id eſt*, *propter ſua prava opera*. Malvend. in loc.

Ob hanc cauſam occidit eum, hoc eſt, filium Hanani, Prophetam.

Sixt. Senenſ. *Biblioth. lib.* 2.

Cajetan ſays, the Prophet declared to *Baaſha* the Cauſe for which *Jeroboam*'s Houſe was deſtroyed, that *Baaſha* might take warning by his Example; *and for which he ſmote him*; that is, the Evil of the Houſe of *Jeroboam*, for which God deſtroyed it.

Ob hanc cauſam occidit eum *Juxta* Hebraeum *habetur*, & pro quo percuſſit eum. *Pronomen* eum *demonſtrat* Jeroboham, *cum domo ejus. Narratur enim quod* Jehu *Propheta manifeſtavit Regi* Bahaſæ, *pro quâ cauſâ percuſſit Deus Domum* Jeroboam, *ut vel ab exemplo diſceret recipiſcere.* Cajet. in loc.

But if we ſhould grant, that this Verſe is to be underſtood of *Baaſha*'s killing *Nadab*, the meaning ſeems then to be, not that he ſinned in killing *Nadab*, but that his having killed him proved the aggravation of all his other ſins; that when he had been raiſed up by God purpoſely to deſtroy the Houſe of *Jeroboam*, he ſhould notwithſtanding be guilty himſelf of the ſame ſins, for which it was deſtroyed; and therefore no mention is made of *Nadab*, but of *Jeroboam*, the Prophet having declared, That God's Anger was kindled againſt him, becauſe he walked in the way of *Jeroboam*, which yet he knew to be ſo abominable before God, that he was exalted out of the Duſt, and had the Kingdom given him, to reduce *Iſrael* from that ſin, which *Jeroboam* had led them into; and therefore this is added at laſt, as the moſt aggravating Circumſtance, that

he ſhould follow the Wickedneſs of that very Man whom he had by God's appointment ſlain: And the Word of the Lord came againſt him, for all the Evil that he did, *in being like the houſe of* Jeroboam, *and becauſe he killed him*; that is, becauſe he was the Man who had killed him for the ſame ſins which he now became guilty of himſelf.

But if we ſhould further grant, That *Baaſha* was raiſed up by God's Permiſſion only, and that he ſinned in killing *Nadab*; yet when he had deſtroyed the Houſe of *Jeroboam*, and there was none left who had a Right to the Kingdom, he then became Rightful King, *and God made him Prince over his People Iſrael:* So that he could not be of the Number of thoſe whom the Prophet *Hoſea* mentions, that were made *Kings*, but *not by God*; for in thoſe frequent Conſpiracies and Murthers of the Kings of *Iſrael*, which we read of, it might often happen, that the Right Heir was alive, and excluded, which alters the Caſe.

3. It is precarious to ſay, That God had reſerved to himſelf the Nomination and Appointment of the Kings of *Iſrael*. He gave indeed the Ten Tribes to *Jeroboam*, and entailed the Crown of *Iſrael* upon his Poſterity, in the ſame manner as he had entailed that of *Judah* upon the Line of *David*, on condition, That he ſhould ſerve God, as *David* did, 1 *Kings* 11. 38. And he ſettled the Kingdom upon *Jehu*'s Poſterity *to the Fourth Generation*, 2 *Kings* 10. 30. But theſe were extraordinary Caſes, and therefore can be no Evidence, That God did reſerve to himſelf the conſtant deſignation of their Kings, though he did ſometimes nominate and appoint them. God's Promiſe to *David*, and his Houſe, was ultimately and principally to be underſtood of the *Meſſiah*, who was to be the *Son of David*, and it was abſolute with reſpect only to him; *David* and *Solomon*, &c. were Types of Chriſt, and the Kingdom of *Judah* was Typical of Chriſt's Kingdom, and the Scepter was not to depart from *Judah* till the coming of Chriſt; So that God had a more immediate Care and Regard to the Kingdom of *Judah* than to that of *Iſrael*: and yet the Entail of the Kingdom of *Judah* is ſcarce ever mentioned, but with ſuch expreſs Conditions annexed, as ſhew, that upon the Violation of them, it might, by the very Terms of that Promiſe, whenever God had pleaſed, have been taken away from them in the ſame manner that other Kingdoms are alienated and transferred: And there is no intimation, That upon the Forfeiture of their ſpecial Favour and Privilege, either *Iſrael* or *Judah* were to expect that God would afterwards nominate their Kings. After the ſin of *Jeroboam*, wherewith *he made Iſrael to ſin*, and at once loſt God's Favour both to himſelf and his Poſterity, and forfeited the Hereditary Right to the Crown; God ſeems to have left the Succeſſion of the Kings of *Iſrael* to the Care of his ordinary Providence, excepting only when he interpoſed upon particular occaſions, to put down one King, and ſet up another. For if it had been ſinful for any King to aſcend the Throne, without God's expreſs Order, it is incredible that the reſt of the Prophets ſhould be ſo ſilent in a matter of ſo high a Nature, who reproved and rebuked their Kings ſo freely, and ſo ſeverely too upon all other occaſions. A ſin ſo notorious, and ſo long continued in, would probably have been taken notice of by all the other

other Prophets as well as by *Hoſea*. The Kings then, whom this Prophet mentions, that were *ſet up, but not by God*, muſt be ſuch as were ſet up not only without God's appointment, but without his Approbation, or Authority.

And indeed, if God had reſerved to himſelf the Appointment of the Kings of *Iſrael*, his permitting them to Reign without his Appointment, and ſuffering them to ſettle themſelves in the Kingdom by his Providence, could be no evidence that he had beſtowed upon them any Authority; becauſe this had been contrary to that Order of Government, which God had inſtituted among them, and in derogation from that Prerogative, which he had determined to exerciſe over them; and when God has declared his Will in any Caſe, we muſt not conclude from any Events of Providence that he allows or authoriſes the contrary. This we are told in the Caſe of *Joaſh* and *Athaliah*, and there is the ſame reaſon in this; for God may as well be ſuppoſed by his Providence to ſet aſide the next Heir to the Crown of *Judah*, which was entailed by himſelf; as to forgo the *Theocracy*, which he had retained over the Kingdom of *Iſrael*: ſo that either we muſt ſay, that he confirmed *Athaliah* in the Throne by his Providence, or elſe, that the Kings of *Iſrael*, whom he did not appoint, could have no Authority from him, notwithſtanding any ſucceſs or continuance of their Reigns.

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It appears therefore from the Prophet *Hoſea*, that the People of *Iſrael* did ſet up Kings, who had no Authority from God, and made Princes, when God *knew it not*, or did not approve of it, and who by conſequence could be none of his Ordinance. And how many or how few ſoever theſe Kings were, it cannot be ſaid, that there was no Diſtinction to be found in Scripture between Kings, who are inveſted with God's Authority, and thoſe, who are not: and therefore St. *Paul* could not be underſtood to mean all Kings whatſoever, under the Denomination of *the higher Powers, ordained of God*; and ſince all are not ſet up by him, there needed no diſtinction *in expreſs words*, to inform us, that he meant only Lawful Kings; for if he had intended by this Precept ſubjection to unlawful Kings too, there would have needed a further diſtinction to know, what unlawful Kings we were to obey, ſince the Scripture ſpeaks of ſome unlawful Kings, whom we are not to obey, unleſs we muſt obey ſuch as are not ſet up by God, or thoſe Kings can be God's Ordinance, whom he does not ſet up: wherefore it would have been neceſſary for him to have diſtinguiſhed between Uſurpers, that are ſet up by God, and thoſe, who are not, if he had not ſpoken only of Rightful Kings.

But it is urged that this ſence of the Text would involve Mens Conſciences in great perplexities; for the Titles to Crowns being oftentimes very uncertain, great skill in Hiſtory and Law is required to find out the Right Title; and after all their ſearch the moſt learned Men cannot agree about it, and it is not to be imagined that all Mens Conſciences ſhould be concerned in ſuch niceties, which wiſe and learned Men are not able to decide: eſpecially the Titles of the *Roman* Emperours at that time, and afterwards for many Ages together, being either *ſtark naught, or the very beſt of them very doubtful*, the Apoſtle cannot be imagined to oblige every Chriſtian of that and of ſucceeding Ages to examine the Titles of Princes: *and this the Doctor takes to be little leſs than a demonſtration, that this Precept of St.* Paul

Pag. 30.

cannot be underſtood only of ſubjection to Powers, that had a Legal Right.

I anſwer, 1. I have proved that there may be Kings, who are not God's Ordinance, and the only way we have now to diſtinguiſh Kings, that are ſet up by him, from thoſe, who are not, is to enquire into the Juſtice of their Cauſe, and the Legality of their Titles. And St. *Peter* ſpeaks of the *Ordinance of Man*, or of human Eſtabliſhment, according to which Kings are advanced to the Throne.

2. If the Title be doubtful, yet the Conſciences of Subjects will not be ſo enſnared and perplext with niceties and difficulties, as it is objected: for in ſuch caſes the Subjects may lawfully ſwear to the Poſſeſſor; and are obliged to pay all Allegiance to him, unleſs his Competitor can make it appear, that the Right is his, and not the Poſſeſſor's; and then, the Subjects not knowing this before, are guilty of no breach of Allegiance to him, but are bound, as ſoon as his Right becomes known to them, to yield him their Allegiance, having taken an Oath, or given any other aſſurance or proof of Obedience to the Poſſeſſor, only out of ignorance, that any other Perſon could make out a clear and certain Title.

3. But granting that St. *Paul* had meant Uſurpers as well as Lawful Powers in this Text; yet the perplexities of Conſcience would not have been much leſs, than it is ſaid they muſt neceſſarily be according to the contrary expoſition. For ſo learned a Man as Dr. *Sherlock* could not find out the true ſenſe of the Text, it ſeems, till now, upon this occaſion, and very few perhaps beſides have been able to diſcover it, ſince the Epiſtle was written. * The Doctor acknowledges, that St. *Chryſoſtom* is againſt him, and produces no Father, nor any other Author ancient or modern for his Opinion, except the Convocation, which I have ſhewn, ſays nothing to his purpoſe: And St. *Baſil* ſays expreſly, that *the higher Powers* mentioned by St. *Paul*, are ſuch as attain to the Government, according to Humane Laws: and this appears to have been the ſence of the Church in his time; for he ſets it down as a thing certain, That the Civil Powers must receive their Authority in a Legal way; and from thence proves, that if they, that reſiſt thoſe, who receive their Power according to humane Laws, reſiſt *the Ordinance of God*, then much rather muſt thoſe reſiſt his Ordinance, who reſiſt the Eccleſiaſtical Powers, which are, by Gods own more immediate Inſtitution, inveſted with his Authority, according to the Divine Laws. So that if Dr. *Sherlock*'s Interpretation were true, yet it would not much have eaſed Mens Conſciences, ſince it has been ſo little known and ſo lately diſcovered, and by his own Confeſſion was by himſelf ſo lately ſuſpected of *Novelty* and *Singularity*.

Ἐι τοίνυν τοῖς τῆ χθὲς τότε ἀρχυσι, τοῖς κτ' νόμον ἀνθρώπινον ἢ ἀρχὴν ἐλληφόσι ποσήτλω ὑποτηγὼ φθὰ ἢ ἐυσεβέντων ὁ θεῖ νόμ ἀπίνεμε, &c. Baſil. Tom. 2. Conſtitut. Monaſt. c 22. p. 715.

4. The Titles of the *Roman* Emperours were then neither *ſtark nought*, nor *very doubtful*. The Titles of *Claudius*, and of *Nero* were not at all doubtful, and under one of them this Epiſtle was written: *Claudius* was ſaluted Emperour by the Soldiery, and approved of by the Senate; and *Nero* was adopted by *Claudius*, and choſen by the Army, and the choice confirmed by the Senate, and they were both owned, and ſubmitted to by the whole Empire; which is all that could be requiſite to make them Lawful

* *Caſe of Reſiſtance*, p. 122.

Lawful Emperours: for it is evident beyond all diſpute, that the *Roman* Empire was not Hereditary. And, when at any time the Title was doubtful, they might have ſubmitted with a ſafe Conſcience to the Poſſeſſor, as I before obſerved. And thus much may ſerve in anſwer to his firſt Argument from Scripture, out of *Rom.* 13.

Jovian. c. 1.

2. He urges, That *we have no example in Scripture, that any People were ever blamed for ſubmitting to the preſent Powers, whatever the Uſurpation were, tho' we have examples of their being condemned for refuſing to ſubmit to them.* This he proves from the Prophecies of *Jeremiah*, and from our Saviour's Argument in his diſcourſe with the *Scribes*, and *Phariſees*, which *relies wholly on the Poſſeſſion of Power; Whoſe Image and Superſcription hath it?*

P. 21.

I anſwer, that the ſilence of Scripture is no Argument, unleſs it can be ſhewn that the Prophets at the ſame time that they reproved the People for their other Crimes, did not blame them for ſubmitting to an Uſurper, while the Lawful King himſelf had not ſubmitted, nor was commanded by God to ſubmit, but had a Right to their Allegiance. For in matters of Hiſtory the Scriptures often give a bare Narrative, without any remark or cenſure at all upon it. We read of *Lot*'s Inceſt, and that both *Noah* and he were drunken: but no Man, I ſuppoſe, will conclude that either Inceſt or Drunkenneſs is Lawful, becauſe the Scripture relates only the matter of Fact, and ſays nothing more of it: for they are Vices notorious enough in themſelves, and it was not the deſign of the Sacred Hiſtory to inveigh againſt Vices, but only to declare by whom, and with what circumſtances they were committed: in like manner if there be any inſtance in Scripture, where the Subjects abandoned their natural Sovereign, and betook themſelves to the Uſurper, and fought againſt him; a bare Narrative of this can no more prove that it is lawful, than that it is unlawful: for an Hiſtorical Relation can prove nothing, but that ſuch a thing was done, and in ſuch a manner; but the nature of the action it ſelf with the circumſtances of it; or ſome command in Scripture muſt diſcover the goodneſs or the wickedneſs of it.

But in the preſent caſe the Scriptures are not ſilent, but plainly enough declare, that Allegiance is only due to the lawful King, tho' an Uſurper be never ſo well ſettled. For St. *Peter* and St. *Paul* both declare this, as it has been juſt now ſhewn, unleſs we *can ſerve two Maſters*; for they teach ſubjection to the Rightful King, which implies that it cannot be due to his mortal Enemy. And when *Jehoiada* charged the People by their duty to God and to the King, to ſubmit to *Joaſh*, and to depoſe *Athaliah*; this was a ſufficient Declaration againſt Allegiance to an Uſurper in prejudice to the Lawful King's Right.

But the caſe of the *Jews* under the King's of *Babylon* was ſuch, as made their Obedience to them a neceſſary Duty according to thoſe Principles, which are moſt contrary to the Doctor's Opinion. For, 1. God had commanded both King and People to ſubmit to theſe Kings. 2. They did ſubmit, and take Oaths to them accordingly. 3. Therefore, the Kings ſubmitting, as well as the People, there was none who could claim their Allegiance in competition with the Kings of *Babylon*. And under theſe Circumſtances, either of a Divine command, or of a joint conſent and ſubmiſſion both of King and People, no Man, who maintains the Right of an Hereditary Succeſſion and a Legal Title, can with any Reaſon ſcruple to ſubmit to a Foreign Conqueror. But I ſhall ſpeak more particularly

ticularly to the Texts, which the Doctor has produced.

P. 21. 1. He acknowledges that *the Prophet* Jeremy's *Argument is Prophecy, or an expreſs command from God to ſubmit to the King of* Babylon, which he ſays, becauſe of the Entail, that God himſelf had made of the Kingdom of *Judah* upon *David*'s Poſterity, was neceſſary, though other Kingdoms which are governed only by God's Providence, ought to ſubmit to any Conquerour, or Invader in the ſame manner, as the *Jews* did to *Nebuchadnezzar*, without any Revelation to require it of them, or to warrant them in ſo doing. I ſhall not repeat what has been already ſaid in Anſwer to this; but ſhall conſider here only what he further urges, *viz.* That this

P. 22. Prophecy was, *at the beginning of the four Monarchies*, and that *the Prophecy of the four Monarchies is not yet at an end; for under the fourth Monarchy the Kingdom of Chriſt was to be ſet up, and Antichriſt was to appear, and the encreaſe and deſtruction of the Kingdom of Antichriſt is to be accompliſhed by great Changes and Revolutions in humane Governments; and when God has declared, that he will change Times and Seaſons, remove Kings, and ſet up Kings, to accompliſh his own wiſe Counſels, it juſtifies our neceſſary, and therefore innocent, compliances with ſuch Revolutions, as much as if we were expreſly commanded to do ſo, as the* Jews *were by the Prophet* Jeremiah.

To ſay that the Prophecy of *Jeremiah* was at the beginning of the four Monarchies, is a thing I confeſs, that I can reconcile to no account of Chronology; it had been a much leſs miſtake to have ſaid, that it was at the end of the firſt Monarchy, or at the beginning of the ſecond: for there were but two Kings that ſucceeded *Nebuchadnezzar*, in the *Aſſyrian* Monarchy, as God had declared by the ſame Prophet, that *all Nations ſhould ſerve him, and his Son, and his Son's Son, until the very time of his land came, and then many Nations ſhould ſerve themſelves of him*, Jer. 27. 7.

And the Prophecy of *Daniel* is only a Prediction of what ſhould come to paſs, and therefore implies no Authority from God, as has been ſhewn before: for if all Kingdoms, that are foretold of in Scripture, have Authority from God, then the Kingdom of Antichriſt himſelf (as that ſignifies either Temporal or Spiritual Power) muſt be founded by God's Authority. For if either Prophecy, in declaring what ſhall come to paſs, or Providence, in ordering and appointing all Events, as the Doctor argues, or only in permitting thoſe that are Evil, as the general Opinion is, does imply, That all things propheſied of, and accompliſhed accordingly, are of God, the Kingdom of Antichriſt muſt be of God's Erection, as much as any other Kingdom whatſoever. For Antichriſt is in Scripture ſtiled King, and *he could not make himſelf* P. 14. *King whether God will or no*; and therefore he muſt be conſtituted King by God himſelf, becauſe all Events are in his hands, and *the diſtinction between what God permits, and what he does, does* P. 12. *not relate to the Events of things.* So that the Power of Antichriſt muſt be *the Ordinance of God*, if the Four Monarchies were ſo meerly for this Reaſon, becauſe they were propheſied of in Scripture, and ſet up by God's Providence in the World, eſpecially ſince it is ſaid, That *Power was given unto the Beaſt to continue Forty and Two Months*, Rev. 13. 5. and that *Power was given him over all Kindreds, and Tongues, and Nations*, v. 7. which is as much as is ſaid of the Four Monarchies; and yet it was the *Dragon* that *gave him his Power, and his Seat, and great Authority*, v. 2. In ſhort, if a Prediction in Scripture, and Providence in the diſpoſal of the event, neceſſarily implies, that God authoriſes and approves of the thing foretold,

told and brought to paſs, then every thing that is prophefied of, and comes to paſs, muſt be approved of by God; or, which is at leaſt the ſame thing, it muſt be authoriſed by him; for whatever God gives Authority to, ſo far he certainly approves of it: But as God foreſees all things, ſo the moſt wicked Actions that have been in the World, have been foretold by him; and therefore his Prediction of Events can no more imply his Authority, or Approbation, than his Fore-knowledge does, and by conſequence, the Four Monarchies could derive no Authority from the Prophecies of *Daniel*, and could be no further authoriſed by God, than they were juſt, and were erected upon the ſame Foundations of Righteouſneſs, that other lawful Governments are ſetled upon.

P. 20. The Doctor ſays, That *the Four Monarchies were all as manifeſt Uſurpations as ever were in the World.* From whence I perceive that he is not of the Opinion of ſome Learned Men, who think, that *Cyrus*, the Founder of the Second Monarchy, was well acquainted with the Prophecy of *Iſaiah*, in which he is expreſly named, and that *Daniel* had explained it to him. However, I do not ſee how conſiſtent this is with the Account, which, as has been obſerved, the Scripture gives of him.

Chron. Carion.

But the Doctor ſeems to have particular Exceptions againſt the *Roman* Empire; for he ſays, That *if we muſt obey ſuch Powers as the* Roman *Power was, he knows very few Powers that we may not obey; for whatever Legal Right the* Roman Emperors *had, who by Fear, or Flattery, or other Arts, extorted ſome kind of Conſent from the Senate, it is plain the* Romans *themſelves were great uſurpers, and had no other Right to the greateſt part of their Empire, but Conqueſt and Uſurpation.*

P. 21.

This is ſoon ſaid; and it does not concern the matter in hand, in the leaſt, to juſtifie the *Romans* in their Wars, though very great things have been ſaid by ſome Authors in their Praiſe upon that Account. But whatever their *Conqueſts*, or their *Uſurpations* were, their Uſurpations could give them no Right, but were only an accidental means, whereby, after the Submiſſion, or Deceaſe of thoſe in whom the Right was, they became inveſted with it. And if this be not enough to give a Legal Right and Claim, there can be no ſuch thing now in the world: which takes away the Subject of the Queſtion; and when we are enquiring whether the Legal Right, and the Divine, may be in different Perſons, the Doctor muſt deny, that there is any ſuch thing as a Legal Right. For if there be any ſuch thing, let any Man ſhew that the *Romans* had not ſuch a Right, and to what Provinces they had no Legal Title, or that they had none to any Province at all.

What Power the *Roman* Emperors had, and how it was conveyed to them, appears from the *Lex Regia*, and from an Inſcription in *Gruter*, where we find the Power deſcrib'd that was renewed to *Veſpaſian*, and had belonged to the Emperors his Predeceſſors. And by the way we may obſerve, that *Judea* was more immediately under the Emperors themſelves. For when the *Romans* had given up the Sovereign Power to *Auguſtus*, he made a Diviſion of the whole Empire, reſerving one part of it to himſelf, to be governed by Deputies ſent by him; and giving the other to the People, who ſent either Prætors or Conſuls into the ſeveral Provinces aſſigned them: but all the Kingdoms and Principalities were reſerved to the Emperors ſhare; and thus they continued, *Strabo* ſays, at the time of his

Sed & quod Principi placuit, Legis habet vigorem: quum Lege Regiâ, quæ de ejus imperio lata eſt, populus ei & in eum omne imperium ſuum, & poteſtatem concedat. Juſtin. *Inſtit. lib* 1. *Tit.* 2. Jani Gruteri *Inſcript. Antiq. p.* 242.

Strabo lib. ult. in fin.

his Writing, which was in the Reign of *Tiberius*.

2. As to the Objection of the *Phariſees* againſt Submiſſion to the *Roman* Powers, it did not reſpect the Title of the Emperor, but their own Privileges and Immunities For they pretended, That becauſe they might not voluntarily make choice of *a Stranger to ſet over them*, Deut. 17. 15. for that Reaſon they might not ſubmit to Strangers who had conquered them, and to whom they had been in ſubjection near an hundred years; which was a moſt unreaſonable and abſurd way of arguing, and fit only for *Scribes* and *Phariſees* to uſe: for what could be more ridiculous than to conclude, That becauſe they might not chuſe a Stranger their King, therefore ſo many years after the whole Nation had ſubmitted and ſworn to Strangers, they might not pay Tribute to them? Our Saviour then, when they propoſed that enſnaring Queſtion to him, whether they might pay Tribute or no, gives them ſuch an Anſwer as determines nothing indeed concerning the Title of *Tiberius* to the Empire, which was not the thing in Queſtion, but was owned by all as good and lawful; but he ſhews them, they ought to pay Tribute to the lawful Emperors, for ſuch *Tiberius* was acknowledged to be; and this he did by requiring them to ſhew him a peice of that Money, in which the Tribute was wont to be paid; and ſeeing that that had *Cæſar*'s Image and Superſcription upon it, he tells them, they ought to *render to Cæſar the things which are Cæſar's, and unto God the things which are God's*, Mat. 22. 21. Whereby he aſſures them, that they were forbid by no Law of God to pay Tribute, or perform any other Inſtances of Obedience to the Princes, under whom they lived, but were in this left under the common Obligations of all other Subjects; and that which they were bound to above others, concerned not things of this Nature, but their Obedience to God, and the Obſervation of his Laws, ſo as to keep themſelves from the falſe Worſhip and Idolatry of the Heathens, whilſt they obeyed their Edicts, and ſubmitted to their Government: They were obliged both to *render unto Cæſar the things that are Cæſar's, and unto God the things that are God's*; to ſubmit to *Cæſar* in Civil Affairs, and to reſerve for God his own Honour and Worſhip. The Title of the Emperor was not the Queſtion, but ſuppoſing him to have a Rightful Title, the *Phariſees* denied that Tribute ought to be paid him by the *Jews*, who they pretended were to be Subjects to no Strangers whatſoever, but were exempt from his Juriſdiction, how juſt and lawful ſoever it might be over all the reſt of his Subjects: Our Saviour anſwers, That the Privilege and Duty which was peculiar to the Jewiſh Nation, was not ſuch, as to require them to ſubmit to no Foreign Power; but it conſiſted in the Worſhip of the True and Only God; and that all other Subjection to *Cæſar* was lawful, but that which was repugnant to their Duty to God: They might not pollute themſelves with Idolatry, nor worſhip the Heathen Gods, nor pay Divine Honours to the Emperors themſelves, nor do any other ſinful thing at their command: This was not *Cæſar*'s due, and therefore he could not require it of them; nor muſt they obey him, if he ſhould; They muſt not render to *Cæſar* that which is due only to God, nor deny him that which is his own; but muſt *render unto Cæſar that which is Cæſar's, and unto God that which is God's*. Our Saviour ſpeaks not of the Legal Authority of the Emperor's, but ſuppoſes it, as the *Phariſees* themſelves did, who put that inſidious Queſtion to him; he only determines what was the Duty of the *Jews* under a Prince who was not of their own Nation.

II. The

II. The Doctor now comes to produce his Arguments from Reason; by which he endeavours to shew, that hereby is given the only true Account of the Original of Government, and that upon any other Principles there can be no such thing as a Divine Right of Kings, nor can they be irresistible, but their Authority will be precarious and uncertain, so that upon his Principles only the Doctrin of Passive Obedience can be maintained. I shall first shew, That Kings are irresistible, according to the Principles contrary to his, and then consider his Objections.

1. Kings are irresistible upon the contrary Principles. That Government was originally in the Fathers of Families, who by Nature and by God's Institution had supreme Authority over their own Children and Servants, is evident from Scripture; and how this Paternal and Patriarchal Authority was preserved among God's own People, but degenerated into other Forms, among the rest of the World, has been sufficiently explained from the Convocation; which determines, That when these other Forms are so setl'd, as that there is none who can claim any Right to the Paternal or Patriarchal Authority; then, however Irregular or Degenerate they may be, they are throughly setled, and require our Submission; it being evident that God has ratified them, when there must be either such kinds of Government or none at all over us; because it cannot be imagined, that he will place Societies of Men in such a condition, as to have no Lawful Government, or that none should have a Right to Rule over them: So that it is not the Consent of the People, nor Length of Time, or Prescription and Continuance of Usurpation, that gives a Right; but these are either only accidental Means of attaining to a rightful Title, as in continued Usurpations, upon the Failure of the Royal Blood; or Conditions and Qualifications, which prepare and capacitate Men for it, as in other Cases. For when the Throne becomes vacant either by Death or Cession in an Elective Monarchy, or by the Extinction of the whole Royal Line, in an Hereditary Kingdom, the People may, and, in most Cases, are obliged to submit to the present Possessor, by what means soever he got into Possession; and then it is not the Submission or Consent of the People, that gives the Right, but God himself, who concurs with their Act, and ratifies it. As in Matrimony, it is not the Consent of the Parties, which joyns them together, but God himself, upon their Consent, and the Contract is irrevocable, because *whom God hath joyned together, no Man may put asunder.* A mutual Consent cannot separate them, much less can either Party revoke their Consent, when they please; but *whosoever shall put away his Wife, except it be for Fornication, and shall marry another, committeth Adultery*, Matth. 19. 9. And if the Consent of the Parties in Matrimony be so firmly ratified by God, there is no reason to doubt but that God may so confirm the Agreement or Compact between a King and People, as that nothing but a mutual Relaxation shall be able to disingage them from the Terms of it; And he may invest the King with his own Authority, and make him as irresistible, as if he had himself nominated him, and not conferred upon him his Authority by any intervention of Subordinate Means. I need not mention that in Ordination, and in the Sacraments, and in all the Dispensations of God's Grace and Authority under the Gospel, Human Acts intervene; from whence it is obvious to conclude, That since in things of the highest and most Spiritual Nature God requires Human Acts, and does by them confer his Grace and Power, the irresistible Authority of Kings, can be never the more doubtful or questionable, because the People's Consent and Submission is ordinarily required to the conveiance of it in the first Erections of Kingdoms; for God acts as powerfully and effectually by the Ministeries of Men, as by an immediate Command or Designation.

2. The Absurdities then which he would prove to arise from the asserting a Necessity of a Legal Right in them who are now invested with God's Authority, are all upon a false Supposition.

1. He argues, *If the Authority be wholly derived from the People, who shall hinder them from the taking it away, when they see fit? Upon these Principles there can be no Hereditary Monarchy; one Generation can only choose for themselves, their Posterity having as much Right to choose, as they had. And what Right had my Ancestors, three or four hundred Years ago, to choose a King for me?* These are the Absurdities he would bring all Men to, who are not of his Opinion: And upon the same wrong Supposition would afterwards prove that Passive Obedience is altogether inconsistent with any but his present Principles, though he has effectually proved it upon other Principles in his *Case of Resistance*. And if he will now suppose that by his former Principles nothing more can go to the making of a King, whether he comes in by Conquest, or Usurpation, upon Defect of a better Claim by any other, or by Compact, or an Hereditary Right, than the bare Choice and Consent of the People, this is a litttle too much to be granted; and yet if this be denyed, all his Inferences fall of themselves to the Ground. The thing to be proved is, That Kings have not their Authority from God, unless they be set up only by the Divine Providence, without any respect to Human Law and Right; which can never be proved, unless it be shewn, That God cannot or will not set up Kings in a way consistent with the Laws of Kingdoms, and with the Consent and voluntary Submission of Subjects. The Bond of Matrimony is never the sooner dissolved, because Marriages are not made in Heaven, as they say, but Men and Women are at their Liberty, and have a Power of choosing, whether they will marry this or that Person, or will not marry at all. God may appoint the Persons, and prevent or over-rule the Consent of the Parties, and he has sometimes done it: He can appoint Kings, and set aside the ordinary Forms and Laws of Government; but this doth not prove, That he will always do it, nor that we are ever to expect it now; much less may we conclude, That he cannot or will not concur with Human Acts intervening, and give them his own Sanction. God certainly can, and ordinarily does convey Power and Authority as effectually by concurring with Men, and ratifying what they do, as if he did it immediately himself; unless we will say, That God does nothing but Miracles, and that subordinate Causes do every thing else without him. Gen. 24.

But to use the Doctor's own Words, *God not only places a single Person in the Throne, but entails it on his Family by Human Laws, and makes the Throne a Legal Inheritance.* And after all, the only difference between the Doctor and his Adversaries is, That he says, God's Providence makes Kings by *Conquest*, or *by Submission*, and *long successive Continuance of Power*, or by *Human Laws*, or against *Human Laws*; because if Providence did not make Kings he could not prove that it unmakes them. But those of the contrary Opinion deny neither the absolute Power of God, nor the Effects of his Providence in setting up and putting down Kings: But they suppose, that unless it be, when God declares that it is his Will to act by an Absolute Power, without any regard to the Laws of Men, he does not raise up and depose Kings in a way that is contrary to the Constitution of their Kingdoms, so as to absolve Subjects from the Allegiance, which the Laws of their Country require; but so orders and disposes things, that Kings shall as long remain invested with his Authority, as they have a Legal Right. P. 14.

2. The Notion of a Legal Right, he says, *must ultimately resolve itself into the Authority of the People to make Kings, which it is unjust for God himself to over-* P. 25.

rule

rule and alter: For a legal Entail is nothing more than the Authority of the People; and if the People have such an uncontroulable Authority in making Kings, he doubts they will challeng as much Authority to unmake them too: That is, as we were told before, no Man is bound by his Ancestors Act, and every Man too may undo what he has done himself, when he thinks fit.

It has been already shewn, that tho' the Prerogatives of Kings, and the Constitutions of Kingdoms may be contrived and agreed upon by Men; yet God gives Kings a Right to govern according to them, and supreme and irresistible Authority to enable and secure them in the Administration of
P. 14. their Kingdoms, and *entails the Thrones on their Families by Human Laws.* And though God may over-rule and alter the Rights of Princes, yet his Providence is no sufficient Evidence that he intends to do it: If we once knew, it were his Will, all Human Laws must forthwith give Place to it; but since his Providence is not a Declaration of his Will in this Matter, we must keep to the Observation of Human Laws, and of our Oaths grounded upon them.

But to suppose the most and the worst that can be said: If the People did set up Kings by Consent and Compact, this is no Argument that they may depose them. For a People, who consent to the setting a King over them, must consent to set one over them with Supreme Authority; and the Supreme Authority is that, which hath no Superiour, and therefore cannot be resisted: For if the Supreme Authority may be resisted, then to be sure all Inferiour Authority may be resisted too, and so all Government must be dissolved, for want of any sufficient Authority to manage it. It follows then, That there must be a Supreme Authority somewhere in all Governments; and in a Kingdom this Supreme Authority must be in the King; and a People, who upon this Supposition, should make a King, must choose one, in whom they place the Supreme Authority, that is, who is irresistible; at least, unless they reserve to themselves a Liberty of Resistance in certain Cases, by express Agreement, which has been the Custom in Kingdoms where Resistance is allowed. Or however let us suppose, That the People declare their King irresistible upon their Choice of him, and establish that as the Fundamental Law of their Government; suppose they oblige all in any Office Military or Civil, to swear, That it is unlawful upon any Pretence whatsoever to take up Arms against him, and oblige all the Clergy solemnly and frequently to declare it, would it be lawful for the People to recal this Power, because they gave it? Or is it not rather of the very Essence of this Power that it can never be recalled, because never resisted? Are other Contracts revocable by either of the Parties at pleasure, because they are entred into by Consent? Might Marriage be dissolved, when either Party pleased, if no more were required to it than the Consent of both Parties? Or is there any greater Reason, why he that has consented to be governed by an irresistible power, may recal his own Act, and resist when he thinks fit?

I do not dispute whether it be possible for the People to convey a Power of Life and Death, and to establish a Sovereign Power among them; nay, I grant it is impossible for any Rightful Government to be erected by mere Consent and Compact without God's Establishment and Confirmation of it; I only shew, That though this were true, yet the Conclusion would be false, and though the People might make Kings by mutual Agreement and Contract, yet they could not unmake them.

But tho' the same Persons might not play fast and loose, as they please; yet what obligation could their Chil-

dren ly under to obey that Race of Kings which they had set up? *For what Rights*, says the Dr. *had my Ancestors three or four hundred years ago, to choose a King for me?* I answer, they had a Paternal Right, in vertue of which Children are obliged by all the lawful Acts of their Fathers in their behalf, or by the Acts of others, which are for their advantage, when they act as Parents for them. Thus Children promise by their Godfathers and Godmothers in Baptism, and when they come to Age, would be guilty of Apostacy, and of the breach of the most solemn Vow and Promise made in their name, if they should renounce their Baptism. In the Covenants which God has made with mankind, the Children were always obliged by their Fathers Act; thus it was in his Covenant with *Adam*, with *Noah*, with *Abraham*, and with *Moses* and the Children of *Israel*. There is nothing more plain in Scripture, than that the Children had an Interest in the Covenant made with their Fathers, and were obliged to perform the Conditions of it. And there is no difference between a Covenant made with God, and one made with Man in this respect; for it is essential to a Covenant that there should be the Consent of the Parties, that enter into it; and tho' God has a Right over his Creatures to require what Acts of Duty and Obedience he pleases from them, yet when he is pleased to deal with them by way of Covenant, it is necessary, they should consent to the Terms of it either by themselves, or by others that represent them, and have Power to act for them, otherwise, what were breach of a voluntary Covenant, as well as of natural Duty in the Parents, would be only breach of Duty in the Children.

And no distance of time can make any alteration in this obligation, which Parents lay upon their Children, as it appears by those Covenants, which God has entred into with Mankind. But if this could make any difference, every Father renews his obligation to the Government for himself and his Children: For if the Person immediately consenting to the setting up a King oblige his Sons to pay Allegiance to him, then for the same reason, they by their Consent and Submission in living under his Government, oblige their Children, and so on for four hundred Years, or as long as the Government continues.

There is no need further to mention the Obligation all men are under to their Country for their Protection and Education from their Infancy, and for the many Benefits they receive from the Government; it is manifest that the Act of their Parents is obligation enough, if there were no other, and they must be obliged by their Parents Choice, as well as by their own, and are not left at liberty to deny their own Consent, if they think their Ancestors have made an ill Bargain. But when we add to this God's Authority, which is conferred upon all, that are duly advanced to Sovereignty, we have the surest grounds for the Doctrin of Passive Obedience, tho' God do not give his Authority in such a manner as to null or frustrate Legal Rights and Claims.

He next proceeds to consider the Objections, that may be made against his Assertion. The first is, that the dispossessed Prince *ought not to attempt the Recovery of his Throne (nor any other Prince to assist him in it) which is to oppose God, and to challenge that, which he has no longer any Right to.* p. 25.

He answers; *By no means: The Providence of God removes Kings, and sets up Kings, but alters no Legal Rights, nor forbids those, who are dispossessed of them, to recover their Rights when they can. While such a Prince is in the Throne it is a Declaration of God's Will, that he shall reign for some time, longer or shorter, as God pleases; and that is an obligation to Subjects to submit and obey; for Submission*

miſſion is owing only to God's Authority: But that one Prince is at preſent placed in the Throne, and the other removed out of it, does not prove that it is God's Will, it ſhould always be ſo; and therefore does not deveſt the diſpoſſeſt Prince of his Legal Right and Claim, nor forbid him to endeavour to recover his Throne, nor forbid thoſe, who are under no obligation to the Prince in Poſſeſſion, to aſſiſt the diſpoſſeſt Prince to recover his Legal Right.

This Anſwer ſeems to ſuppoſe, that, tho' the Prince in Poſſeſſion have the Exerciſe of the Supreme Power, and do adminiſter God's Authority for a time; or rather, tho' God governs by him as his Inſtrument, while he is in Poſſeſſion; yet he has no Authority inherent in himſelf, but acts as wickedly, all along in withholding from the Rightful Prince his due, as he did at firſt in depriving him of it, and therefore may be thruſt out by the Legal Prince himſelf, or by any others, who have made no Submiſſion to him. But this is ſo directly contrary to all the reſt of his Diſcourſe, that it cannot be the Dr's meaning in this place. For he, that

P. 13. is *ſet up by God*, that *is made King by him*, that *is inveſted with his Authority*, and *receives his Authority from him*; he, to whom *God gives the Throne, and does not only permit him to take it*; he, *who is as truly placed in the Throne by God, as if he had been expreſly nominated and anointed by a Prophet at God's Command, as* Saul *and*

P. 14. David *were*; he, who is *rightful King with reſpect to God*, and *has the True and Rightful Authority of a King*, who

P. 15: is *God's Miniſter and Lieutenant*, to whom God has *transferred the Kingdom*, and the Subjects *Allegiance*; this King has as full Right to his Crown as the lawful King himſelf could ever have; he has a Divine Right, and then the human Right, when it comes in Competition with the Divine, is nothing but a meer Formality, an empty and inſignificant Word, and the want of it can never in the leaſt weaken his Title. And the Doctor thus plainly and frequently aſſerting almoſt in every Page, that God has placed the Uſurper in the Throne, I am not able to underſtand how it can be lawful for the diſpoſſeſt Prince to endeavour to recover it from him, which is to endeavour to bring down whom *God has exalted*, and placed there *with his own Right Hand*. For the late Legal Poſſeſſor can have no more real Right than if he had never been King; only perhaps he may have the Honour to be called *late King* for diſtinction's ſake, and to acquaint the World that he is now no longer ſo: But the Legal Right, which it is acknowledged he once had, muſt now be extinguiſhed, and abſorpt in the Divine Right of the preſent Poſſeſſor.

To juſtifie the King, who is ſuppoſed to retain a Legal Right in oppoſition to the Divine, in his waging War for the regaining of his Throne from him, who is in poſſeſſion of it by a Divine Right, is plainly to maintain, that he may fight againſt God, and may inſiſt upon the Validity of an human Claim, againſt the Divine Will and Command; it is to ſay, that God may diſpoſe of Kingdoms as he pleaſes, but the Rights introduced by human Laws are ſtill in force, notwithſtanding his diſpoſal. For though it be uncertain how long an Uſurper ſhall continue in the Throne, this alters not the Caſe, ſince it is certain according to theſe Principles, that how long or how ſhort a Time ſoever he is in Poſſeſſion, for all that time, he has God's Authority. Suppoſe then it were certain that the Uſurper were to be diſpoſſeſſed at ſuch a Time, it would nevertheleſs be as unjuſt to raiſe War againſt him, till that time, as if he were to remain in the Throne for his Life. For God may make Annual Kings, if he pleaſes, and yet their Authority will be as

ſacred and inviolable, as any Kings whatſoever: It would be no excuſe for a Man, that ſhould affront my Lord Mayor, to ſay that his Lordſhip was almoſt out of his Office; nor any excuſe to Domeſtick Rebels, or Foreign Invaders, to alledge that the King was ſick of a Mortal Diſeaſe; and yet there is no difference in theſe Caſes. For a King placed in the Throne by God himſelf, and acting by his Authority, can have no juſt Competitor, all the while he enjoys it, be it a longer or a ſhorter Time.

The reſt that follows to Page 33. is a Digreſſion, in which whatever concerns the preſent Queſtion is grounded upon this Suppoſition, that a legal Claim is good againſt God's Authority, with which the King in Poſſeſſion is inveſted, and ſo muſt either ſtand or fall with it. And therefore though there be ſeveral things, which granting this to be true, are unconcluding, yet I ſhall paſs them over.

P. 33. Another Objection is, that his Opinion would give great Encouragement to daring and ambitious Men to invade their Neighbours.

He anſwers, that ſuch Men *need no other Encouragement, but Power to graſp at Crowns*: And therefore 'tis great pity they ſhould have any other. But he ſays further, that *if the Kingdoms of the World be diſpoſed of by God, and no Art or Power can place any Prince on the Throne but by God's Appointment; unleſs they can flatter themſelves, that God has ordained them to be Kings, it will check all their ambitious Attempts, which God can ſo eaſily defeat.*

But they cannot be ignorant, how eaſily God can defeat their Attempts, whether they know of this Doctrin, or no: They obſerve that Kingdoms are loſt, and Kings dethroned in all Ages of the World; and when they have Power in their hands, they are apt to promiſe themſelves Succeſs, without the hopes of any Authority, but what they can gain by the Sword. And when they are informed, that if they have but ſucceſs, God will give them a Right, which will oblige all the Subjects in their Defence againſt all oppoſition, they will be much more forward and deſirous to try their Fortunes, and ſee what ſucceſs they can meet with; and Crowns will be looked upon by bold and aſpiring Men as ſo many Prizes propoſed for the reward of Victory. And to this there will be need of *no great Doſe of Enthuſiaſm*, tho' Enthuſiaſm is no unuſual thing in ſuch Caſes: For moſt of the *ambitious Spirits* have either flattered themſelves, or at leaſt made their Followers believe, that God would proſper their undertakings; that they were doing God's Work, and that he had ordained them Succeſs in their Attempts: Or, if they ſhould not be ſo Enthuſiaſtick, yet this would be too great Encouragement to them, that if God would permit them to have that Succeſs, which ſo many others have had before them in as wicked Deſigns, he would be ſure to crown it with his own Authority.

But to what may be alledged of this Doctrin's being inconvenient, and dangerous to Princes, he ſays that *the contrary Doctrin is much more dangerous to Subjects, when ſuch Revolutions happen.* But beſide that a Doctrin, which is dangerous to Princes, can be no ſecurity to Subjects, this is not to the Point: For if this Doctrin promote Wars, and occaſion frequent Revolutions, it will be of worſe Conſequence, though the other ſhould expoſe Subjects to greater dangers, under the Revolutions, which would more rarely happen. For Revolutions cannot be brought about without the Expence of much Treaſure, and the loſs of many Lives; and it were better for Subjects to ſuffer more, ſo it were but ſeldom, than to be continually ſuffering, though not

not altogether in ſo great a degree.

P. 34. But *the Objectors do not think it a ſufficient Confutation of the Doctrin of Non-reſiſtance and Paſſive Obedience, to ſay, That this puts it into the King's Power to invade the Laws and Liberties, the Lives and Fortunes of his Subjects at pleaſure.*

And the Reaſon why they think it no Confutation is, becauſe though Paſſive Obedience can give no abſolute Security, yet it is more for the Good and Intereſt of the People than the contrary Doctrin. For it is evident from all Experience, that Civil Wars ſpill more Blood, and waſte more Treaſure, and deſtroy more Liberty and Property, and are every way of worſe Conſequence to the Subject, than the Reign of the worſt King can be. But the preſent Doctrin, which the Doctor maintains, brings Miſchiefs upon both King and People, which the contrary to it would prevent, and ſo is worſe than that in its Effects and Conſequences. There is no Doctrin that can ſecure Kingdoms from all Dangers and Calamities; but Paſſive Obedience is as effectual to that end, as the State of Human Affairs will admit, and *the Divine Providence takes care of all extraordinary Caſes.* And when it is proved that a Doctrin is delivered in the Scriptures, and has been taught by the Catholick Church from the Apoſtles Times, and is the beſt and moſt beneficial to Societies, that can be taught, no good Man will diſpute the Truth of it, though great Inconveniences may ſometimes happen, which neither that nor any other Doctrin can prevent.

But if the Doctrin of Paſſive Obedience ſhould expoſe Subjects to never ſo many and great Inconveniences, the Doctor's Notion muſt expoſe Men to the ſame, and much greater. For Paſſive Obedience teaches only, That Kings may not be reſiſted by their Subjects: But the Doctor goes further, and muſt ſay, That if Kings can once get fully poſſeſſed of the Properties of their Subjects, and throughly ſetled in their Encroachments upon their Rights and Liberties, they have from thenceforth a Divine Right to them, and their Authority over their Subjects is increaſed and extended with their Power and Uſurpations; for all is the Gift of God by his Providence, after *a through Settlement.*

Again he objects; *But have not Pyrates and Robbers as good a Title to my Purſe, as an Uſurper has to the Crown, which he ſeizes by a manifeſt Force and Violence? Does not the Providence of God order and diſpoſe all theſe Events? And are we not bound then as much to ſubmit to Pyrates as to Uſurpers?* To which he anſwers, That *the diſpute is not about Human and Legal Right in either Caſe, but about Authority.* But neither is the Objection concerning Human and Legal Right, but Divine Right; for the Conveyance of Authority by God's Providence ſuppoſes a Right to enjoy and exerciſe it, and that Objection is, That Pyrates and Robbers have as good a Right to their Booty, as an Uſurper's Right and Title can be to his Crown; and that the Divine Providence may as well be ſaid to diſpoſe of the Properties of Subjects, as of the authority of Kings. For though an Indictment, may be brought againſt Robbers in Human Courts, yet by being in full Poſſeſſion, they may by the ſame Reaſon be ſaid to have a Divine Right to the Goods they have taken, and that they are not obliged in Conſcience to make Reſtitution; by which, Uſurpers are ſaid to have a Divine Right and Authority from God to Rule the Dominions in which they have unjuſtly ſetled themſelves. And this, I think, I have already proved; or if I had not, the Doctor himſel has granted it. Has he forgot that he told us before, That *the Scripture never ſpeaks of God's bare Permiſſion of any Events,* P. 34. P. 12.

Events, but makes him the Author of all the Good or Evil, which happens, either to private Persons, or Publick Societies? What then can his Distinction between *Human and Legal Right and Authority* signifie? I cannot but think, notwithstanding this Distinction, that a *Purse* may rather be transferred by Providence, than a *Kingdom*; for a Purse may be lost and found, as a Kingdom can hardly be: Yet if a Man should find a Purse of Gold, I suppose it would be no Excuse for him to say that Providence had given it him, if he should refuse to restore it to the right owner; though, in this Case, he came by it without any Fault of his, without any Expectation or Fore-sight, it was his good Luck or Fortune, or in other Words, it was the pure Act of Providence; and if Providence dispose of any Rights, it must be in such Cases where only Providence without any Human Act or Endeavour takes away from one, and gives to another. But if the Right to a thing can remain after it is lost, it must surely remain, after a Man is by Fraud or Violence deprived of it; unless it be not the Possession, but the Sin in acquiring it, which transfers the Right.

That, which he observes of *Athaliah*, that she was not killed nor deposed before *Joash* was proclaimed King, and placed in the Throne, is only a Circumstance of Time, not at all material. I shall not enquire, Whether *Joash* had the whole Power of the Kingdom in his Hands, or whether he could on the sudden be throughly setled in his Government, when *Athaliah* yet appeared as Queen, and cryed out *Treason*, not apprehending herself totally divested of all Power, as the Argument supposes. But if it be lawful to dispossess an Usurper, it must be lawful to pay Allegiance to the Rightful Prince, before the Dispossession of the Usurper; for it is lawful to dispossess the Usurper for the sake of the Rightful King, and the very Act of Dispossession is the most considerable Act of Allegiance. And for this Reason the Doctor maintains, That in all other Kingdoms it is unlawful for the Subjects, who live under the Usurper, to dispossess him, in behalf of the Rightful King, because there is no Allegiance due to him, till he gets into Possession: But in the Case of *Joash* he acknowledges it was otherwise, and the Convocation justifie the whole Process of that Action: So that by the Doctor's own Principles in that *Peculiar Case*, where God himself had entailed the Kingdom, they might as well have deposed, and slain her first, and then have set up *Joash*, if it had been as convenient and easie to be done: But when the Right Heir had been six Years concealed, it could not be Safe for them, to depose the Usurper, till he had been proclaimed and shewn to the People to give them full Satisfaction, that he was yet alive; and this way was taken, as the most Safe and Easie; not that it was upon any other Account of the least Consequence, which was done first. What he says besides, in answer to this Objection, and of the Kingdoms of *Israel* and *Judah*, has been spoken to already.

There is nothing till we come to his Sixth Argument, which has not been considered in answer to the foregoing Parts of his Discourse. For if God does not confer Sovereign Authority upon Usurpers; if he does not remove Kings, and set up Kings against Human Laws; if he limits his own Providence so as not to absolve Subjects from their Allegiance, during their Rightful King's Life, then it is in vain to say, That *those who refuse to comply, must renounce the only Principle, whereon Passive Obedience is reasonably grounded, and consequently renounce the Doctrin it self*; That *those are bold Men, who will venture to say, in plain Contradiction to Scripture, That God cannot remove or set up Kings*, and that *this limits the Providence of God in governing*

p. 37.

governing Kings, and protecting Innocent and injured Subjects. All this proves nothing, but is only the Conſequence of what is ſuppoſed to be already proved.

p. 38. His Sixth Argument is from the Neceſſity of Government, to preſerve

p. 39. Human Societies: For *if God will preſerve Human Societies, we muſt conclude, That when he removes one King out of the Throne, he gives his Authority to him, whom he places there; for without Authority Human Societies muſt diſband.*

He ſuppoſes here, that every thing is juſt, which is neceſſary to the preſervation of Human Societies; nay, that God empowers and requires Men to do every thing, that is neceſſary in order to that End. Which is true, if it be meant of Society in General, becauſe nothing that is ſinful, and derogatory from Authority, can really tend to the Peace and Preſervation of Mankind. For though ſuch Practices may give ſome ſort of Eaſe and Protection to particular Societies for ſome Time, in a particular Caſe; yet this is accidental, and proceeds not from the Nature of Things; and theſe Practices uſually end in the Deſtruction or great Calamity of ſuch Societies: Or, however the Examples and the Effects are miſchievous, and of pernicious Conſequence to Societies in general. The Laws therefore of God and of Nature are, in General Terms, and we have no Liberty to interpret them ſo as to fit them to ſome particular Occaſions, and to determin, that they do not oblige, when they ſeem in ſome particulars, not to ſerve the Ends, which they were deſigned for; becauſe God foreſaw all Inconveniencies and Emmergencies whatſoever, and yet he appointed them. We are not to meaſure our Duty from the Uſefulneſs of the Practice of it, in particular Caſes, but from its General Uſefulneſs, and God can provide for extraordinary Exigencies.

But though God has appointed Society, and will always preſerve Societies of Men and Government in the World, yet we have no Aſſurance that he will preſerve any particular Society. How many Nations do we read of in Scripture, which God did quite root out and deſtroy for their Sins? and how many other Nations of the World have there been beſides, whoſe Memories are quite loſt to us? The Sins of a Nation may provoke God to deſtroy it; and therefore it can be no good Argument that God gives Authority to every Uſurper, and commands obedience to him, leſt a particular Society ſhould be deſtroyed. For God may deſign its Deſtruction, and then no ſubmiſſion can avail to preſerve it; or he may by other Means, unthought of by us, deliver it from Deſtruction though we do not ſubmit.

God having inſtituted Society, commands, by conſequence, every thing that is neceſſary to Society; but it is not neceſſary, becauſe Man is a ſociable Creature, and muſt live under Government, that any particular Society muſt always continue, and that whatever is done to maintain it, is for that reaſon lawful. Self-preſervation is a neceſſary Duty, implanted in our Nature; but it does not from thence follow, that all neceſſary Means of Self-preſervation is lawful; For a Man may be obliged not to preſerve himſelf, but to ſacrifice his Life, when the Glory of God, or the Wellfare of his Country requires it. Societies in lik manner are eſtabliſhed by God himſelf in the World, and we are obliged to the Pœſervation of them; but we muſt preſerve particular Societies only by ſuch Means, as are agreeable to the Laws of God, deſigned for the Benefit of Society in general. To endeavour to preſerve any particular Society in ſuch a way, as naturally tends to the Deſtruction of Society in general, is to act againſt the Nature and Inſtitution of Society, and by conſequence ſinful, though the imme-

diate Act ſhould be never ſo beneficial to a particular Government.

Now for Subjects to pay Allegiance to Kings, and for both Prince and Subjects to perform their mutual Duties to each other, as far as they are able, is the only Security of Human Society; and to ſay that we owe no Allegiance to an abſent Prince, becauſe God will have Human Societies preſerved, is to ſay, That God will have particular Societies preſerved by the Violation of that, which is the alone Support and Security of Society in general, when yet we cannot be ſure, whether God will have this or that particular Society preſerved, or no. We muſt diſtinguiſh between the Reaſon of Obedience to Governours, and the end of it; The formal Reaſon of Obedience is the *Ordinance of God*, or the Divine Authority in him, to whom it is due; but the End of it is the Good of Societies. If the Reaſon of Obedience were to be reſolved into the End of it, the End would juſtifie any means whatſoever by which it could be attained; but ſince God, who has propoſed the End to us, has likewiſe directed us to the Means, we muſt make uſe only of ſuch means, as he has appointed; and if at any Time they ſhould fail of their End, as to any particular Society, we muſt conclude, That God has ſome further End to ſerve, and that is always beſt which he has commanded, not that which for the preſent may ſeem more beneficial or expedient. For we have an Eye only upon one Time, or Place, or Government; but he has an Univerſal Care and Regard for all Times, Places, Perſons and Governments in the World, and ſees their ſeveral Relations, and Dependences, and Effects upon one another, and has provided for all Mankind by ſtanding Laws, and has not propoſed an End only to them, and then left them to come at it as they can themſelves.

The Prince's Right and the Subjects Allegiance being reciprocal and neceſſarily ſuppoſing each other (for if the Prince have a Right to any thing, it muſt be to the Subjects Allegiance) it is difficult to determine, what may be done by Subjects for the Preſervation of Government, in Caſes of Neceſſity, when both King and People are reduced to theſe Circumſtances, that they lye under an Incapacity of actually performing thoſe mutual Obligations; and what Obedience to an Uſurper may be conſiſtent with the Allegiance due to a Rightful Prince? There is ſome Difficulty, I ſay, in determining preciſely in ſuch Caſes, juſt how far Subjects may comply, and no further. But this is nothing to the preſent purpoſe, and ſo I paſs by all that the Doctor has ſaid of it. It is enough for me, that the Neceſſity of Human Society does not imply, That God has transferred the Allegiance of the Subjects to an Uſurper. And when all lawful Compliances have been made, if the Government be ruined, the Fault muſt lye only upon the Uſurper and his Party.

His next Argument is, that theſe Principles *anſwer all the Ends of Government, both for the Security of the Prince and Subjects*, becauſe they ſecure the Prince in Poſſeſſion by *putting an end to all Diſputes of Right and Title, and binding his Subjects to him by Duty and Conſcience, and a Reverence of God's Authority.* And they ſecure the Subjects by obliging them not to hazard and Ruin themſelves in behalf of the Rightful King, when he is out of the Throne. p. 43.

To which it may be replyed, That there are perhaps no Principles ſo ill, but they may at ſome Times, and upon ſome Occaſions, give ſome Accidental Advantage and Security for a while; nor any ſo good as to afford a perfect and abſolute Security againſt all Events: But thoſe are the beſt and trueſt, which give the moſt conſtant and laſting Security. Now the Doctor's Principles ſeem to be fitted only for Revolutions, and then they teach men to ſubmit

ſubmit to the uppermoſt Party, as having God's Authority; but there are many Inconveniences ariſing from them, which more than over-ballance this Advantage. For they encourage Attempts upon the Crowns of Princes, and expoſe Subjects to all the Miſeries which uſually follow from ſuch Attempts, before a thorough Settlement, which commonly is a long Time; And after ſuch a Settlement, they ſet up a Divine Authority againſt a Legal Right, to encounter and fight each other, and engage a Nation in a War, perhaps for many Ages; for the Rightful King may wage War for the Recovery of his Legal Right, and the Uſurper, in Defence of his Poſſeſſory Right, which he holds in Donation from God; and both may do this with a good Conſcience, and the War muſt be juſt on both ſides, ſo that nothing of Law or Equity, but the Sword only can decide it. And becauſe all that abide in their own Country, muſt joyn and aſſiſt the Uſurper againſt their Lawful King, he is put upon a Neceſſity of relying wholly upon Foreign Forces, and upon ſome few Subjects perhaps, That *are out of their Wits, and will follow him into Baniſhment, or venture being hanged at Home*; and upon theſe Terms, if ever the Lawful King return, it muſt be by conquering his own Kingdom, for he can have no aſſiſtance from his Subjects, who muſt all withſtand and oppoſe him to the utmoſt, till he is again ſetled in his Government, which cannot be but by Conqueſt or Miracle.

p. 29.

Now theſe Inconveniences are too great to be incurred for the ſake of that little Eaſe and Quiet, which may happen from theſe Principles juſt upon the Settlement of an Uſurper, before the Rightful King can recruit his Forces, and make a vigorous Attempt to recover his Throne; for 'tis only during that Interval, between the lawful King's Defeat, and his Reinforcement, that theſe Principles can be of any uſe to the Subjects; afterwards they expoſe them to all the Dangers and Miſeries of a long War, of frequent Invaſions, and of a foreign Conqueſt; and it muſt be remembred, that theſe Principles give no ſecurity to any Princes but Uſurpers; for lawful Kings when they are in their Thrones, are as ſafe without them; and when they are diſpoſſeſſed, they are not much beholding to ſuch Principles, as will never ſuffer them to regain it, but upon the moſt unequal and moſt improbable Terms in the World.

Whereas, though that *immoveable and unalterable Allegiance due only to a Legal Right and Title* may expoſe Men to Hardſhips and coſt ſome Lives, in Times of Rebellion, and Revolutions, yet this is abundantly recompenſed, in that it is a conſtant Security at all other Times, and will, as much as it is poſſible, prevent Revolutions and Rebellions, and will make them leſs hurtful and miſchievous, when they do happen. It is not pretended that this Doctrin can give a full and infallible Security againſt all accidental Calamities; but it gives all the Security that the State of this World is capable of, and all the Security we can have, beſides that of God's Providence, to rely on. And we have no Reaſon to think that God by his Providence transfers the Allegiance of Subjects, but that he will protect them in the performance of it.

It is objected, 1. That *if this Principle* of adhering to Legal Right *would prevent all Revolutions of Government, it is a Demonſtration againſt it*, that it is a bad Principle, becauſe it is againſt *God's Prerogative of removing Kings and ſetting up Kings.* p. 44.

2. *It is evident that this Principle was either unknown to the World before, or elſe that it cannot prevent the Revolutions of Government.*

3. *Since then ſuch Revolutions will happen, ſuch Principles as muſt diſſolve Human Societies, when ſuch Revolutions happen, or expoſe the moſt innocent and conſcientious Men to the greateſt Sufferings, without ſerving any good End, cannot be true*

1. *I anſwer.* Though it be God's Prerogative to ſet up, and to remove Kings; yet we can at no time know without a Revelation that it is his Pleaſure to do it, as to this or that King in particular: And therefore while the Legal Right remains, we may not conclude that he has transferred our Allegiance. And thoſe who are of Opinion, that God is now pleaſed to depoſe and ſet up Kings in ſuch a manner only, as is conſiſtent with human Right and Juſtice, derogate no more from God's *Sovereign Prerogative*, than thoſe, who believe, that he has no reſpect to human Laws in the diſpoſal of Kingdoms. For the difference between them is not concerning God's Power; which both equally acknowledge, but concerning his Will only, whether he is now pleaſed to act according to the Abſoluteneſs of his Power, and not rather with regard to the Laws of Men; ſince we have no way to know, when he has transferred any Kingdom, but by the Conſtitution of it, or by Revelation.

2. That this Principle was, and is ſtill known to the World, is evident, elſe why ſhould the Doctor ſay, That *his Scheme of Governments may ſtartle ſome Men at firſt, before they have well conſidered it*? His Notion could ſtartle no Body, if the contrary to it were unknown; it is indeed ſo well known, that the Doctor's Principle is new to himſelf, and he informs us, that he could not have got over the Difficulties, that lie againſt it, if the Convocation had not freed him from his Prejudices, and given him a Liberty of thinking. But it does not follow that every Duty, which is known, is practiſed. Nor is it pretended, That this Principle will prevent all Revolutions; it is ſufficient that it will prevent them as far as it is poſſible for them to be prevented. And this Dilemma will do as good Execution againſt any other Opinion that can be named, as againſt this; for all pretend that their own Notions are the beſt Security againſt the Miſchiefs, which they charge upon others, and therefore all may argue in the ſame manner againſt any Opinion whatſoever that is contrary to their own; *This Principle was unknown to the World before, or elſe this Principle cannot prevent* Rebellion; it was unknown, or it cannot prevent Hereſies, or Schiſms, *&c.* And the Conſequence of this is, That either this way of arguing is to no purpoſe, becauſe it will ſerve all Cauſes alike, tho' they be Contradictions to each other; or that there is no true Principle in the World. But the plain Truth is, no Man ever pretended to an Infallible Remedy to prevent all the Miſchiefs of any kind; the Quack, in Phyſick, and of the Church of *Rome* itſelf, never pretend that their Directions will work infallible Cures, unleſs they be followed as well as known. This Principle would go very far towards the hindring of all Revolutions (but ſuch as God by his Appointment and Command would have ſubmitted to) if it were practiſed, and, as things are now, it is the beſt Remedy againſt them.

p. 3.

3. But if the bare Knowledg of this Principle will not prevent Revolutions, or if Revolutions cannot be prevented at all; it does not from thence follow, That *ſuch an immoveable and unalterable Allegiance, as is due only to a Legal Right and Title* will diſſolve Human Societies, when ſuch Revolutions happen. Our preſent Experience teaches the contrary; for the Diſtinction between the Divine Authority and the Legal Right of Kings in Oppoſition to each other, is news

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to almoſt the whole Nation, ſome acting upon one Principle and ſome upon another, but all generally ſuppoſing God's Authority, and the Legal Right to be in the ſame Perſon. Beſides, the Government muſt be, at leaſt in ſome Meaſure, ſetled, before the Doctor's Principle can take Place, or be of any uſe; and if the Government may be ſetled without it, I ſee no Reaſon, why it may not continue without it. For how comes that to be neceſſary to the being of Human Society, which is not neceſſary to the eſtabliſhment of Government, but exerts itſelf by ſeveral Steps and Degrees in Proportion to the Degrees of its Settlement, and never is of full Force and Efficacy till a thorough Settlement?

But our Principle *expoſes the moſt Innocent and Conſcientious Men to Sufferings, without ſerving any good End by them.* It muſt be confeſſed, That thoſe Men muſt be expoſed to Sufferings, who can neither be ſatisfied that the Legal Right is transferred, nor be perſuaded that they may ſubject themſelves to the Poſſeſſor of the Crown, unleſs he had a Legal Right: But then this is not without ſerving any good End; for they ſerve the Ends of Juſtice and Fidelity to the Rightful King, and act upon ſuch Principles as are the ſupport and preſervation of Human Society, tho the Practice of them may ſometimes bring Accidental Inconveniences upon particular Perſons and Governments, which can never fall out but in extraordinary Caſes, that no Principles can effectually provide againſt: And God can ſupport Men under their Sufferings, or deliver them out of them, without their Infringement of Legal Rights, or acting againſt the Nature and Order of Society in General, to ſerve ſome particular occaſions and Exigencies.

P. 45. The Doctor's Argument from the Nature of Human Society, by which he would prove, That the Safety and Preſervation of a Nation is to be preferred before the King's Right, is grounded upon the Suppoſition above mentioned; That any thing is lawful which is neceſſary for the Preſervation of particular Societies; which proving a falſe Principle, his Argument can be of no Force. For that Allegiance is due to all Rightful Kings, is a Maxim which concerns Society in general, without which no Government can long ſubſiſt; and therefore if the Good of Society in General be to be preferred before the Good of any particular Government, tho this ſhould be preferable to the King's Right, the Conſequence would fail, becauſe the neceſſary Relation and Connection between Allegiance and Sovereignty is founded in the Nature of Sovereignty itſelf, not in the Being or Conſtitution of any particular Kingdom; and the Obedience of Subjects muſt be fixed and permanent, not variable with the Changes and Intereſts in the State of Affairs, which could make all Government uncertain and precarious, and would leave every Subject at Liberty to pay or with-hold his Allegiance, when he thought fit, if the Intereſt of the Government, and not the Laws of it were to be the Rule of his Obedience. And where ſhould we ſtop? Or whither would not this Argument carry us? For if we may withdraw our Allegiance from the King, becauſe his Right is not of equal Value with the Safety of all his Subjects, then for the ſame Reaſon we may rebel againſt him, or we may kill him, whenever we will ſuppoſe, That this ſingle Life and Fortunes come into competition with thoſe of the whole Nation. But this Argument has been often brought againſt the Doctrin of Non-Reſiſtance, and as often confuted. And if it were true, it would not prove that Uſurpers are ſet up by God, but by the People: For if God ſets them up, Obedience is due to them for the Sake of his Authority, not upon theſe Conſiderations, which can only ſerve for Motives to the People to ſet them up, and are no Proof that God has done it. For we

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may ſuppoſe the Uſurper, in poſſeſſion of the Throne, to be ſo cruel and tyrannical, that the People have no way to provide for their own Safety, but by depoſing him, which, if God have given him his Authority, it is ſinful for them to do; but, if this Argument be true, it is a Duty: So that this Argument, if it prove any thing, muſt prove either that Kings are not God's Ordinance, or that God's Ordinance may be reſiſted for the Publick Good; but Evil is never to be done, tho the greateſt Good may come by it; and Obedience is due not to Conveniency but to Law; and the Laws of God and Nature have reſpect not to any Society in particular, but to Society in General, and to particular Societies only ſo far as their Preſervation may be conſiſtent with the Welfare of Society in general.

The Objection which he makes againſt his own Doctrin is much more to the purpoſe, and deſerves to be conſidered. He objects to himſelf, That
P. 45. *This will equally ſerve all Revolutions of Government, whatever they be, and upon theſe Principles we might ſubmit and ſwear to a Rump Parliament, or to another Protector, or to a Committee of Safety, or whatever elſe you pleaſe.*

The Doctor is pleaſed to ſay, That *this is a great Prejudice, but no Argument*; but it is very ſtrange that a Man who has built his whole Doctrin upon the Authority of a Convocation, and durſt never have aſſerted it, if it had not been for *that Venerable Authority*, ſhould now reject the Practice of the whole Church of *England* at that time, and the Judgment of it both then, and ever ſince, as *no Argument, no Objection*, but only *a great Prejudice*; I muſt take Leave to ſay, as the Doctor does of the
P. 9. Senſe of the Convocation, that *this is a good Argument from Authority, and as good Authority as can be urged to the Members of the Church of* England; for if ſo many Years Suffering, and the great Veneration, all Good Men have for ſo excellent Examples to this very Day, *cannot declare the Judgment of the Church of* England, *I know not whence we ſhall learn it.*

But he anſwers, *There is a vaſt Difference between theſe two Caſes*; which is granted, or elſe the Objection would be needleſs, or none at all: But if notwithſtanding the circumſtantial Difference between them, they be both through Settlements, it is unanſwerable, for we are concerned to conſider none of thoſe other Differences, which he reckons up, but only this of the Settlement of that Uſurpation, the Queſtion being not about any particular manner of Settlement, but in general of a *thorough Settlement*. And the Doctor muſt ſay, according to his Principles, and the whole Tenour of all the reſt of his Book, that the moſt illegal and unnatural Uſurpers, who have murthered the beſt of Kings, and excluded the right Heir, who have overthrown both Church and State, and have neither National Conſent nor any other Pretence of Right but the Sword, yet if they can once ſettle themſelves in their Injuſtice and Violence to the utter Ruine of Church and State, notwithſtanding all this, have God's Authority as much as *Saul* or *David* ever had: And if the ancient Government be deſtroyed, and another erected in its Room, this is ſtill the greater Evidence, that they have God's Authority, becauſe it is the fuller Proof of a thorough Settlement. But if all thoſe Terms and Conditions are required, which the Doctor remarks were wanting in the late Uſurpations, the Providence of God will be confined and limited almoſt as much, as he complains it will be, by maintaining a Legal Right. For, how can God ſet over Kingdoms the baſeſt, the moſt unworthy and wicked Men, who will have no regard to Forms of Law and Government, if the Fundamental Laws of a Nation can put any Bar to his Power? and if they can, is not the Legal Right of the King a Fundamental Law, and the principal too of thoſe Laws? Nothing

thing then can make a difference between one Uſurper and an other, as to this matter; if both have a Thorough Settlement, their Authority muſt be the ſame, and the Duty of Subjects the ſame, to yield an entire Allegiance to them.

The only thing therefore to be conſidered is, whether there were ſuch a *Thorough Settlement*, as the Doctor maintains, does infer Gods Authority, in thoſe Uſurpations. And the Doctor himſelf has determined the point:

P. 33. For, ſays he, *no Man could have foreſeen how King* Charles II. *ſhould have returned, who had a powerful Army againſt him; all the Plots and Conſpiracies of the Royal Party were vain, and had no other effect but to bring ſome worthy and gallant Men to an unhappy end; but what they could not do, God did without them.* And when it was impoſſible to foreſee, that King *Charles* could ever return, when all human endeavours proved in vain and to his diſadvantage, when God alone could by his Providence reſtore him, this certainly was as full a Settlement of the Party, which kept him out of his Kingdom, as can be imagined: For if that be not ſetled, which God only can diſplace, there can be no ſuch thing as a Settlement in the World.

P. 47. But there were many alterations and changes of Government in thoſe times: *It is plain that their Government was never ſetled; it was frequently changed and modelled, which was no Argument of Settlement, and which was more than that, they had not a National Conſent and Submiſſion. Men who were forced ſubmitted to force, but the Nation did not by any National Act ever own them.* Yet when all thoſe changes conduced nothing at all to the Kings Intereſt, but on the contrary were all fixed and centred in this, that he ſhould not be ſuffered to return, this might be interpreted rather to ſignifie, that God had determined, he ſhould never be reſtored; becauſe tho' they quarrelled amongſt themſelves, and their Frames of Government ſo often fell to pieces, yet ſtill new Models were erected againſt him, to ſet him at a further diſtance from the Throne.

And *Oliver Cromwel* at leaſt was ſetled; for he was made *Protector* in the year, 1653. and from that time till his Death exerciſed all the Power of a King: He had brough the Three Kingdoms to an entire ſubjection ſo as to be *able to cruſh thoſe who would not ſubmit, whenever he pleaſed*, which is the P. 9. deſcription the Doctor gives of a *Thorough Setlement*; all the Bordering Nations feared his Power, or ſought his Friendſhip, and he had a full and uninterrupted Poſſeſſion for the ſpace of five years. It was the common Theme of his Flatterers and of all the *Enthuſiaſts* of thoſe times, That God had raiſed him up, and they had certainly been in the Right, if any Uſurper, from a bare Poſſeſſion of Power, can claim by Authority from God in prejudice of the Rightful King.

As for what he adds to make this Caſe Parallel with that of the Jews under *Antiochus Epiphanes*, it has been already ſhewn that that was a quite contrary Caſe. For if the Jews had made a *National Submiſſion* to *Antiochus*, they had injured no Body, nor excluded any Right Heir by it: But a National Conſent in this caſe could have been of no force whilſt King *Charles* the Second, or any of the Royal Family had been alive. And by the Doctors Principles the Authority of Kings depends not upon any Conſent of Men whatſoever, but ſolely and purely upon the will of God, who puts an Uſurper in full Power and Poſſeſſion of any Kingdom. If therefore God's Authority remained in King *Charles*, a National Conſent could not have taken it away; if it did not remain, it muſt be in *Cromwel* without any National Conſent.

But a National Conſent would have been an Evidence of a Thorough Settlement: It would ſo; but this does not infer that no other evidence but

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that could ſuffice. The Doctor often ſays, that by what way or means ſoever an Uſurper becomes fully poſſeſſed of the Supreme Power, he has God's Authority. So that a National Conſent and Submiſſion may be the more regular and orderly way; but if an Uſurper come to the Throne againſt the Conſent both of King and Subjects and ſettle himſelf upon the Ruins both of the Kings Rights and the Subjects Liberties, this is no prejudice to the Title he receives from God. For if the Sovereign Authority be obtained tho' by the deſtruction of the Government and the deſolation of the whole Kingdom, againſt all Laws both of God and Man, when it is once acquired, it is by theſe Principles as much the Ordinance of God, as if he had ſucceeded as next Heir, or had been nominated by God himſelf, and were the beſt and moſt Rightful King, for all Kings are *Rightful with reſpect to God.*

I have now conſidered all that concerns the point in Queſtion in the Doctor's Book, the reſt concerns the Obedience to a King *de Facto* by the Laws of *England*, not as he is Gods Vicegerent, and inveſted with his Authority. But before I diſmiſs this Queſtion, I ſhall ſhew that it was the conſtant Practice of the Primitive Chriſtians to adhere to that Emperour, who had the Legal Title; and that they did not look upon the Uſurpers, or, in the language of thoſe times the Tyrants, who were ſet up againſt them, to have any Authority or Approbation from God, tho' ſometimes their Power and the extent of their Dominions equalled, if not exceeded that of the Rightful Emperour.

The firſt Inſtance, I give, ſhall be that of the Chriſtians, that lived under the Jews before they were ſubdued by *Adrian*. The Jews had made one *Cochebas* their King, who, it is ſaid, reigned above thirty years over them; this is certain they were a moſt dangerous Enemy to the Romans for about twenty years in the Emperours Reign. Their numbers were ſo great and their fury ſo deſperate that they became formidable to the whole Empire: *Adrian* therefore choſe out his beſt Captains to ſend againſt them, of whom *Julius Severus*, who was ſent for out of *Britain*, was the chief, and he durſt not engage with them in a pitcht Battel, but waited fit opportunities to take them at advantage, and ſet upon them apart; and ſo in time deſtroyed them by degrees. But at laſt the victory coſt *Adrian* very dear, and loſt him great part of his Army, which made him in his Letter to the Senate omit the uſual ſtile, *Si vos liberiq; veſtri valetis, bene eſt: Ego quidem & exercitus valemus*, (a) The Chriſtians all this while refuſed to give any Aſſiſtance to the Jews, under whoſe uſurped Government they lived, againſt *Adrian* the lawful Emperour; and becauſe they would neither aſſiſt them in the War, nor acknowledge the Juſtice of it, they were put to exceſſive Torments by *Cochebas*, and the Emperour in reward of their Loyalty, granted the Chriſtians liberty to inhabit *Jeruſalem*, after he had forbid the Jews, under the greateſt Penalties to come ſo much as in ſight of it, above once a year to lament their calamity.

Dio. lib. 69.

(a) Cochebas *dux Judaicæ factionis nolentes ſi. bi Chriſtia. nos adver. ſum Roma. num mili. tem ferre ſubſidium omnimodis cruciatibus necat.* Euſeb. Chron.

——*Ultuſq; eſt Chriſtianos* (Hadrianos) *quos illi* Cocheba *duce, quod ſibi adverſus Romanos non aſſentarentur, excruciabant, præcepitq; necui Judæe introeundi Hieroſolymam eſſet licentia, Chriſtianis tantum civitate permiſſa.* Oroſ. lib. 7. c. 13.

It will be objected here, that *Cochebas* pretended to be the *Meſſias* or that Star (as his name denotes) in *Balaam's* Prophecy, *Numb.* 24. 17. And that beſides the Jews were to be no more a People, their deſtruction being decreed by God, and foretold in the Scriptures.

But this could be no reaſon, why the Chriſtians ſhould deny obedience to *Cochebas*, if his being, as he was, in full Poſſeſſion of the Government had made him the Ordinance of God. For tho'

tho' he had assumed to himself more than belonged to him, yet this had been no prejudice to that Right, which was truly his, and which must depend upon his Possession of the Supreme Power, not upon his behaviour, or pretensions in matters of Religion. And as long as God continued his Power and Authority, which he had committed to him, they would have been obliged to obey him, as God's Ordinance. For if his blasphemous pretensions did not provoke God to deny him his Authority, what could justifie the Christians in with-holding their Allegiance? Gods Authority must challenge the same Duty and Reverence, in whomsoever it is placed, in a *Herod*, or a *Pontius Pilate*, or a *Cochebas*: And if he had had God's Authority by usurping the Power and Title of a King, they would have submitted to his Authority at the same time, that they had confuted his Blasphemies with the Peril of their lives.

Jo. 19.11.

And tho' the Jews were to be utterly destroyed, and to be no more a Nation, the time of this was uncertain; but it was certain that the time was not yet come, because they had as yet a Powerful Government, and so, by these Principles, had Gods Authority; and therefore the Christians would have acknowledged their Authority, as the Apostles did that of the Governours of *Judea* in their times, if these Principles were true, and there had not been this difference, that they were lawful Powers in the time of the Apostles, being set over them by the Roman Emperors, who had the Supreme Authority in *Judea*, as well as in other Provinces: But *Chochebas* was set up in opposition to the Lawful Powers, which only are ordained of God, and for that reason no Obedience could be due to him; but the Christians chose to endure any Torments, rather than they would oppose their Lawful Sovereign in behalf of this Usurper, tho' his Power were never so great.

(b) The next Example, I shall bring of the Primitive Christians, shall be from these famous Passages of *Tertullian*, one in his Apology, and the other in his Book *ad Scapulam*: He in both those places declares, and defies any Man to shew the contrary, that the Christians never sided with *Avidius Cassius* against *Marcus Antoninus*, or with *Piscennius Niger* Governor of *Syria*, or *Clodius Albinus* Governor of *Britain*, who set themselves up as Emperors in the Provinces over which they presided; and upon enquiry it will be found, that these two last had as full Possession of their respective Dominions, as *Septimius Severus* the Lawful Emperour had in his part of the Empire.

(b) *Unde* Cassij, & Nigri, & Albini? — *de Romanis* (*nisi faller*) *id est, de non Christianis.* — *Sed & qui nunc Scelestarum Partium* Socij *aut plausores quotidie revelantur, post vindemiam Patricidarum racematio Superstes*, &c. Tertul. Apolog. c. 35. *Sic & circa Majestatem Imperatoris infamamur tamen nunquam* Albiniani, *nec* Nigriani, *vel* Cassiani *inveniri potuerunt Christiani. Sed ijdem ipsi, qui per Genios eorum impridie usq; juraverant*, &c. id. ad Scapulam c. 2.

(c) *Avidius Cassius* was soon taken off; for *M. Antoninus* was so well beloved, and so highly esteemed, that *Cassius* had never been proclaimed Emperour, if it had not been given out, that *Antoninus* was dead; And no City of note but *Antioch* took part with him, so that his Rebellion had little danger in it, being considerable neither for the Strength, nor for the continuance of it.

(c) *Vulcat. Gallican.* in *Avid. Cassio.*

(d) But *Niger* was in Possession of all the Eastern part of the Empire a year and some Months besides odd days; and *Albinus* reigned as Emperour in the West between three and four years.

(d) *Onuph. Panvin. Fast. lib.* 2.

(e) When the Pretorian Bands had murthered *Pertinax*, they set the Empire to Sale, making open Proclamation, that he should be Emperour who would give most, and *Didius Julianus* outbidding *Sulpicianus*, was accordingly declared Emperour by them, and the Senate was forced to confirm their

(e) *Herodian. lib.* 2. *c.* 22.

choice. But *Julianus* disappointed the expectations of the Soldiers in not being able to make full payment for his Purchase, and was curſed by the People, and abhorred by the Senate for ſo baſe an act. (*f*) And as both Senate and People had him in the higheſt degree of Deteſtation, ſo they likewiſe hated *Severus*, and all their hopes were placed in *Piſcennius Niger*. He was renowned for all the vertues requiſite to make an excellent Emperour; of great Conduct and Experience, of exact Diſcipline in Military Affairs, and of ſuch admirable Prudence in Civil, that by his advice ſeveral Rules and Orders were firſt introduced, ſome by *M. Antoninus* and ſome by *Commodus*, and continued by ſucceeding Emperours, concerning the Government of the Provinces, and the Courts of Judicature. But *Severus* came behind him in theſe Qualifications, and was beſides of a cruel diſpoſition, which afterwards ſhew'd it ſelf upon all occaſions. Theſe Vertues exceedingly recommended *Niger* to the Eſteem and Love both of the Senate, and of the People, and there could have been no Competition between him and *Severus*, if they had had the Diciſion entirely in their own Power: For the Senate openly favoured him, and the People ſcarce ever mentioned him, but with Applauſes and Acclamations, calling him *Princeps* and *Auguſtus*.

(*f*) *Æl. Spart.* in *Did. Juliano.*

(*g*) And he could not be leſs beloved in *Syria*, which was a Province of vaſt extent, taking in *Phœnicia*, and all the Countries on this ſide *Euphrates*. He was there ſaluted Emperour by his Legions, who put the Royal Purple on him, and with all the State and Solemnity, which was uſed on ſuch occaſions, conducted him to the Temples at *Antioch*, to ratifie their own choice by the approbation of their Gods. Embaſſadors were ſent to him from all *Aſia*, and from beyond *Euphrates* and *Tigris* to congratulate his Acceſſion to the Empire, and with Proffers of Aſſiſtance, if that were needful: But he diſmiſſed them with Thanks and Rewards, ſaying, (*b*) he had no occaſion for help, he was already *Throughly Seiſed* in the Empire, and would reign without Blood.

(*g*) *Herodian. lib.* 2. *c.* 27. &c.

(*b*) Ἔλεγε δὲ πάντα σὺν μάχῃ, τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀνὰ χεῖρας ἔχειν, καὶ ἀνευ βιαίου φόνου βεβαίως κατασχήσειν τε ἄρξειν. *Herodian. lib.* 2. *c.* 31.

Thinking himſelf therefore ſecure in the Affections of the Senate and People of *Rome*, and in the full Poſſeſſion of all the eaſtern part of the Empire, having all *Aſia*, (*i*) beſides *Greece*, and *Thrace* and *Macedon* in his Power, he delayed his going to *Rome*, and by that means gave an opportunity to *Severus* then Governor of both *Pannonia's* to be before-hand with him. For *Severus* being proclaimed Emperour by his Soldiers, haſtned immediately to *Rome*, and was declared Emperour by the Senate; and *Julianus* was put to death. And afterwards getting together all the Force he could, *Severus* marched into *Aſia* againſt *Niger*, who joyned Battel with him at *Cyzicum*; but was overcome after a ſharp Fight by the Treachery, as it was thought, of *Æmilianus*, who had the chief command in his Army: *Niger* making his way to *Antioch*, got together a vaſt Army, but was overthrown near the *Sinus Iſſicus*, after a long and doubtful Battel, in which as the (*k*) Hiſtorian relates, ſo much Blood was ſpilt, that the Rivers thereabouts ran with more Blood than Water: And then flying again to *Antioch*, he was taken and beheaded. And for this victory *Severus* had the Titles given him of *Arabicus*, *Adiabenicus*, *Parthicus*, from the Principal Nations, that were intereſted in *Niger's* cauſe; and to overcome him, was eſteemed a Conqueſt over all thoſe Nations.

(*i*) *Æl. Spart.* in *Severo*, *Piſcen. Nig.*

(*k*) *Herodian. lib.* 3. *c.* 13.

(*l*) *Æl. Spart.* in *Severo*,

(*m*) But the People of *Byzantium* were the moſt conſiderable; for they made a moſt reſolute defence for three years together againſt the Roman Forces; And the Siege of that City in all its circumſtances is the moſt memorable

(*m*) *Dio. lib.* 74.

morable of any that we meet with in History.

(n) *Jul. Capitolin. in Clod. Albino.*

(n) But tho *Niger* were thus taken out of his way, *Severus* could not but think himself in great Danger, as long as *Clodius Albinus* had so formidable an Army, and the Provinces of *Britain* and *Gaul* at his Command; and being not willing to try Battle with him, he first endeavours to ensnare him by fair Words and treacherous Promises, and sends some with Letters to him in very affectionate and insinuating Expressions, desiring him to govern as Partner with him in the Empire, that by this means they might have an Opportunity to murder him, under the Pretence of communicating some Secret of State to him; but *Albinus* was aware of the Design, and this Plot not taking, they proceeded on both sides to open Hostility.

Albinus had taken upon him the Name of Emperour at the same Time that *Niger* and *Severus* did; but *Severus* satisfied him with giving him the Title of *Cæsar*, till he had overcome *Niger*, and then grew jealous of him. For *Albinus* ruled as a Sovereign Prince in *Britain*, erecting his Statues, and stamping Coyns with his Effigies on them. And no Prince was ever more beloved by the Senate of *Rome* than he, of which the Hatred they bare *Severus* was one chief Cause. And as *Albinus* had so much the advantage of him in this respect, so he was no way inferiour in the Strength of his Army, but at *Lyons* gave him Battle, with that Success, that *Severus* fled, and fell from his Horse, and casting off his Robe was forced to hide himself, and had left *Albinus* an entire Victory, if *Lætus* had not come in with fresh Forces, and over-powered him. For *Lætus* stood by, expecting the Event, and had reserved himself, till he was told, That *Severus* was fled, hoping that the Empire might fall at last to his own share; for which *Severus* afterwards ordered him to be put to Death. The Issue was, that after abundance (o) of Blood shed on both sides, *Albinus* had his Head struck off, which *Severus* commanded to be carried to *Rome* with a Letter to the Senate, upbraiding them with the Love they had for *Albinus*, whose Brother and other Relations they had bestowed great Honours upon.

(o) *Dio. lib. 75.*

(p) *Herodian* esteems it the greatest thing in the Roman Story, for *Severus* at last to get himself the sole Possession of the Empire; and comparing it with the Victory of *Cæsar* over *Pompey*, of *Augustus* over *Anthony* and *Pompey*'s Sons, and of *Sylla* over *Marius*, he prefers this as the greater atchievment. (p) *Herod. lib.* 3. *c.* 23.

It is evident that *Piscennius Niger* was fully possest of all the Eastern Part of the Empire, and had all in his Power to the Borders of *Illyricum*; and that *Clodius Albinus* had the entire Possession of *Britain* and *Gaul*; that they both exercised all Acts of Sovereignty; that in *Rome* it self first *Niger*, and afterwards *Albinus* was the Darling both of the People and of the Senate, and had their Hearts and their Wishes, tho not their Votes: Yet because *Severus* had prevented them, and had the Formal and Legal Consent and Choice of the Senate, and so was the only Lawful Emperour, the Christians refused to become Parties to either of the other two; which they could not have done, if they had look'd upon either of them, as invested with God's Authority; and yet this they must have been invested with, if full Possession could obtain it: For they were as fully setled in their Provinces, as *Severus* was at *Rome*; nay, more fully, because the Senate and People of *Rome* were zealous for their Interest, and hated *Severus*, and would have taken the first Opportunity of joyning with either of them against him. But *Severus* was the Lawful Emperour, and therefore the Christians knew, That their Allegiance was due only to him, in whatever part of the Empire they lived: And they never acted against

him, nor sided with *Niger* or *Albinus*, tho they were under their Power, and lived in the Territories which they had possessed themselves of; which were those where Christianity most flourish-ed: For *Greece* and all the Eastern part of the Empire were under the Dominion of *Niger*, as *Britain* and *Gaul* were under *Albinus*; and besides *Polycrates* and many famous Men in *Greece*, it is enough to say, That *Irenæus*, the Disciple of S. *Polycarp*, was Bishop of *Lyons* at that Time.

But it is needless to mention Particulars; this was the Doctrin and Practice of the Catholick Church in that Age, to submit to him as Emperour, who was chosen by the Senate, and therefore Lawful Emperour; not to those, who had set up, and strengthened themselves in their Usurpations, tho otherwise, their Government most desirable. For we must give *Tertullian* leave, at least, to understand a Matter of Fact of his own Time, in a case so notorious as this; since the Correspondence was so great between all Churches in those Days by their Communicatory Letters, and other ways of Intelligence, that if any one Church had acted differently from the rest in a thing of so general, and so mighty concernment, so considerable a Man, as *Tertullian*, could not have been ignorant of it, especially after he had informed himself in all Particulars necessary, in order to write an Apology for the whole Christian Church: And it was not in his Temper to have dissembled it, at least he would never have said so peremptorily, That the Christians alwaies kept themselves true to their Allegiance, which they acknowledged due only to the Rightful Emperours, upbraiding at the same Time the Heathens for a contrary Practice. The Heathens were of themselves too violent Enemies to need any such Advantage as this must have given them, if it could have been disproved; and *Tertullian*, instead of making their Apology, must have exposed the Christians to further Contempt and Hatred by such a Defence as must have been notoriously false in the most Tender and Important Part of it. To have told the World that the Christians never owned any other Emperour than *Severus* but a few Years after, while there were yet some Remains of these Factions, which he taxes the Heathens withal, had been a strange Apology, when the whole Empire could have witnessed against him, if it had been false. The Persecutors of that Time were too cunning and too cruel to be thus perswaded, or affronted rather, by what they must needs have known to be false, if it had been so. And not content to have said this in a General Apology, to repeat it again in his Book written to *Scapula*, Governour of the Province of *Africk*, upon the same Subject, had been to expose the Christians to the utmost Reproach and Infamy, as well as Torments. And what Credit could he expect in any thing he had said besides, if he had plainly lyed in a thing, which was fresh in every Man's Memory? This had been not to defend, but to betray the Christian Religion. *Tertullian* could not be guilty of so much Folly as to think to impose upon the World at this Rate; or of so much Baseness as to attempt it, if it had been possible: It is pretty well agreed among Learned Men, That he was no Natural; and a little Acquaintance with his Practice and his Writings would easily make one believe, That he would sooner have excepted all those Churches by Name that had acted otherwise, and have renounced their Communion; or that he would rather have separated from all the Churches in the World, than have made such an Apology as his must be, if this part of it were false.

This I have insisted upon the more, because some Men, when they have nothing else to say to those ample Testimonies for the Passive Obedience of the Primitive Christians out of *Tertul-*

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Nay in this and some other Particulars, make no Scruple to deny the Matter of Fact: Which must suppose, either that he was mistaken, or that he wrote what he knew to be false: But Mistaken he could not be in a thing so visible and notorious, especially in that Age, when the Church acted unanimously as one Body and Society of Men: And to say he falsified in things of this Nature, that his Enemies, to whom he directed his Apology, and all the World besides, must needs know to be false, is to take away the Credit of all History, unless *Tertullian* be the only Man that must not be believed, when he writes of things of his own Time, and of his own Knowledg, and with all possible Circumstances of Credibility.

The last Instance shall be that of the Christians under the Tyrants or Usurpers, *Maximus* and *Eugenius*. (*a*) *Maximus* held his Usurpations five Years and two Daies; and *Eugenius* near two Years. (*b*) And both were much superior to *Theodosius* in every thing, but the Goodness of his Cause; and it was by a wonderful Providence, that they were vanquished by him.

(*a*) *Onuph. Panvin. lib. Fast.* 3.

(*b*) *Paul. Diacon. l.* 13.

(*c*) *Zozom. l.* 7. *c.* 13. *Socrat. l.* 5. *c.* 11. *Theod. l.* 5. *c.* 12.

(*c*) *Maximus*, after the Murder of *Gratian*, was in full Possession of the Western Empire. For *Valentinian* left *Italy*, and fled to *Thessalonica* with his Mother, and *Probus* the *Praefectus Praetorii*: So that *Maximus* had the Government of all the West in his Power. S. *Ambrose* was at that very time persecuted by the Empress *Justina*, she being an *Arian*; and *Maximus* pretended to make War upon her Son *Valentinian* in his behalf; yet no (*d*) Man was more against the Proceedings of *Maximus* than S. *Ambrose*; and in the Negotiations he twice had with him, he maintained *Valentinian*'s Cause with all the Freedom and Courage that became a Christian Bishop. (*e*) I know we have been told, That *all the Bishops of the West, not excepting the Great* S. Martin, *who was called the Apostle of* France, *made their Applications to* Maximus, *and followed his Court, as much, if not more than they did any Princes of this Age.* But it is worth taking notice of, That these Bishops are much blamed for it by *Sulpicius Severus*; he says, they were notorious for their base and servile Flattery; (*f*) and he gives such a Character of *Ithacius*, one of the chief of them, as I wish no other Bishop may ever deserve. But S. *Martin* was of another (*g*) Temper, he frequently refused to accept of his Invitations to his Table, *because he had deprived one Emperour of his Life, and another of his Kingdom*, till at last, when *Maximus* had made the best Excuse he could, casting all the Blame upon the Soldiers, who had forced him to take upon him the Empire, and pretending that there was something more than Human in it, S. *Martin* did condescend to sit at his Table with him, and he at all times (*h*) hindred him, as much as he could, from doing Mischief, and from breaking in upon the Priviledges of the Church; which was not owning his Authority: For, as *Sulpicius Severus* informs us, (*i*) He rather demanded than petitioned for what he asked of him. But, as the same Author represents him, (*k*) *Maximus* made a Good Title to make an excellent Emperour, and S. *Martin* was willing to make the best Use of him, he could, for the Benefit of the Church.

(*d*) *Ambros. epist. l.* 7. *ep.* 56.

(*e*) Bishop of *Sarum*'s Pastoral Letter, p. 13.

(*f*) *Certe nihil pensi, nihil sancti habuisse denique invitationis. Fuit enim auctor, lator Regni, quax, immo pudens, ventri & gulae plurimum imperitare.* *Sulpic. Severus* c. 22.

(*g*) *Id. vit. Martin.*

(*h*) *Id. hist.* l. 2. c. 64.

(*i*) *Nam* Maximus *esse pro aliquo cuncta nihil quibus supplicandum rogavit. Id. vit. Mart. c.* 23.

(*k*) *Vir omni vitae merito praedicandus, si ei vel Diadema non legitime, tumultuante milite, impositum repudiare, vel armis civilibus abstinere licuisset. Id. Dialog. c.* 7.

I shall not conceal, that, upon the like Occasion, S. *Ambrose* wrote a Letter to *Eugenius*, who had invaded the Empire after the Death of *Valentinian*, in which he gives him the Title of Emperour. The Design of it was to perswade him not to maintain the Charge of the Heathen Idolatrous Worship; for the Expences for the Publick Sacrifices were wont to be paid out of the Emperour's Exchequer, till *Theodosius* had

had forbid it: and this Cuſtom was again revived by *Eugenius*. He wrote to him upon this Occaſion, but would not do it before, tho *Eugenius* had written to him, and required an Anſwer.

(*l*) *In his vero in quibus vos rogari decet, etiam me exhibere ſedulitatem poteſtati debitam, ſicut & ſcriptum eſt: cui honorem, honorem, cui tributum, tributum. Nam cum privato detulerim cor de intimo, quomodo non deferrem Imperatori? ſed, qui vobis deferre vultis, patimini, ut defendamus ei, quem imperii veſtri vultis auctorem probari.*

(*k*) In this Epiſtle he uſes him with Reſpect, and owns that he ought to make his Suit to him in ſuch a Manner, as became the Place he then held, if he would have his Requeſt granted, and ſays, That *ſince we muſt render Honour to whom Honour is due, and Tribute to whom Tribute; he, who with all his Heart rendred him what was his Due, as a Private Man, would not deny it him, now he was Emperour*; or rather now he aſſumed to himſelf that Power and Authority; for he immediately adds, That *if he required this Regard to be had to himſelf, he ought much rather to ſuffer it towards God, whom he would have thought to be the Author of his Empire*; and he had before told him, (*m*) That *if he were an Emperour, he ought ſo much the rather to be ſubject to God.* Which Expreſſions could not fall from him careleſly, but muſt be purpoſely deſigned, plainly enough to intimate, That he had no real Authority, or Right to the Empire. For ſince after the Death of *Eugenius*, S. *Ambroſe* does ſo manifeſtly declare, That he never had any juſt Authority, we muſt either accuſe him of Inſincerity and Flattery, in this Epiſtle, or we muſt underſtand him ſo as to make this Epiſtle conſiſtent with what he has ſaid much more clearly in other places.

Ambroſ. Epiſt. lib. 2. epiſt. 15. (*m*) *Et ſi es Imperator, Deo ſubditus magis eſſe debes. Ib.*

(*n*) —*Quo Romanum Imperium a Barbari Latronis immanitate & ab Uſurpatoris in-*

He calls *Eugenius*, after his death, *Barbarous Robber, and baſe Uſurper*; and ſaies that both Maximus *and* Eugenius *are in Hell, teaching by their Miſerable Examples how ſad a thing it is for Subjects to take up Arms againſt their Prince*; *of whom it is truly ſaid, I have ſeen the wicked exalted, and lifted up above the Cedars of* Libanus, *and I paſſed by and behold, he was not for the wicked Man* (meaning *Theodoſius* and *Gratian*, whom he juſt before mentioned) *paſſed from the Darkneſs of this World into Light Eternal, and the wicked —Contra was not, who hath ceaſed to be unjuſt. autem Maximus & both Maximus* and *Eugenius* were as *Eugenius* Guilty in the retaining, as in the acquiring their Unjuſt Poſſeſſions, and that they ceaſed not to be unjuſt till they died, and were no more in this World. It had been ſtrangly uncharitable to have ſaid, that they were both certainly damned, becauſe thay had reſerved ſome Years before their Deaths, if afterwards they became Lawful Emperours, and had ſo long ſpace for Repentance: But he ſuppoſed them to live and die in continual Uſurpation, and therefore to be tormented in Hell after Death, as Uſurpers and Rebels.

ſed digni ſolio eſſe videantur. Ambr. ep. 70. Gratian. exhortat. ad Valentin. Vidi impium ſuperexaltatum. Super Cedros Libani & tranſivi, & ecce non erat. Tranſivit enim pius de caligine ſeculari ad lumen æternum, & non erat impius, qui eſſe deſivit iniquus. Id de obitu Theodoſ.

(*o*) Our Countrey-man *Gildas* too gives ſuch a Deſcription of *Maximus*, as makes him no better than an Uſurper from the beginning to the end of his Government; he ſays, he was advanced againſt Law, without any Title, or in a Tyranical manner, that he

(*o*) *Item, tandem tyrannorum per virgultis creſcentibus in ſimplicitatem, manem ſylvam jam jamque erumpentibus, Inſula nomen Romanum, nec tamen morem legemque tenens, quin potius abjiciens germen ſuæ plantationis amariſſimæ ad Gallias, magna comitante ſatellitum caterva, Maximum Imperatoriis inſignibus, quæ nec decenter uſquam geſſit, non legitime, ſed vitii tyrannici initiatum mittit. Ille callida primum arte potius quam virtute finitimos quoſque pagos vel provincias contra Romanum ſtatum retia perjurii, mendacii ſui facinoroſo Regno adnectens, & unam alarum ad Hiſpaniam, alteram ad Italiam extendens, & Thronum iniquiſſimi Imperii apud Treveros ſtatuens, tanta inſania in Dominos debacchatus eſt, ut duos Imperatores legitimos, unum Roma, alterum religioſiſſima vita pelleret; nec mora, tam feralibus vallatus audaciis apud Aquileiam urbem capite nefando cæditur, qui decorata totius orbis capita regno quodammodo dejecerat. Gild. de excid. Brit.*

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strengthned himself by Lies and Perjury, and continued his Usurpation by the Murder of *Gratian*, and the banishment of *Valentinian*, and was the same unjust Usurper till his death.

(p) *Zos. lib.* 4.

(p) *Zosimus* indeed says, that *Theodosius* had consented, that *Maximus* should be acknowledged Emperour, and commanded his Statues to be set up, that he might under a shew of Kindness and Friendship have the better opportunity to ruin him; but this is against the Authority of all other Historians, and *Zosimus* never omits any occasion to defame the Christian Emperours, and particularly *Theodosius*. And besides his hatred to Christianty, which he exactly copyed from *Eunapius*, whose History he is is said to abridg; he is singular in other circumstances relating to this very Story.

(q) *Omne judicium quod vafra mente conceptum, injuria, non jura reddendo* Maximus *infandissimus Tyrannorum credidit promulgandum damnabimus nullus; igitur sibi lege ejus, nullus judicio blandiatur. Theodos. cod. lib.* 15. *Tit.* 14. *De infirmandis his, quæ sub Tyrannis aut Barbaris gesta sunt.*

(q) But it is more material to observe, that *Theodosius* declared all the Laws and Edicts of *Maximus* to be of no Force or Authority, and that this was no more than the Christian Emperours used to do in such cases. Which implies that the Christians did not think Tyrants or Usurpers received any Authotity from God; for if they had, all their Acts, which had been according to natural Right and Justice, must have been valid, as being made by such as had God's Authority to enact Laws, and decree Justice, and it would have been sinful to declare them void *ab initio* and of no effect. For if God had empowered them to act as Emperours against the standing Laws and Constitutions of the Empire, he had authorized them to give out Edicts and Decrees, which must have been as obligatory in Conscience, as those of the Lawful Emperours themselves, and whatever they wanted of the Formality of Law, ought to have been supplyed by the Lawful Emperours, and not all their Acts to have been declared invalid, and never to have been of any Authority or Obligation. St. *Ambrose* was not the Bishop, that would tamely have seen Gods Authority in his Vicegerents thus despised, but *Theodosius* would have found him the same Man that he did upon some other occasions, if this had been the Doctrin of the Church.

But it may not be unfit to observe a little more particularly of *Eugenius*, how well setled he was in this Usurped Power. (r) The Historians relate that the disproportion and inequality was so great between his Forces and the Forces of *Theodosius*, that nothing less than that Miracle, which was wrought for him, could have delivered *Theodosius* out of his hands. *Eugenius* was so confident, and so secure of success, that he said *Theodosius* had a mind to be destroyed; and indeed if he had not been encouraged by a Revelation, he would never have ventured a Battel at that disadvantage, but must have been forced to protract the War, till he could have got together a much greater strength, which the Commanders of his Army all advised him to, but he was resolved to come to a Battel. *Eugenius* retired and stayed at a distance, expecting the news of the Victory, and gave Order to have *Theodosius* brought alive, bound, to him: And the overthrow of his Army was so unexpected to him and so incredible, that when some of his own Soldiers, who upon a conviction that God fought against them, had gone over to *Theodosius*, were sent to fetch *Eugenius* before him, he asked them whether they had brought *Theodosius* along with them, not suspecting but that they came to acquaint him with the Victory, they had gained him.

(r) *Theod. lib.* 5. *c.* 24. *Niceph. lib.* 12. *c.* 39.

(s) *Eugenius* had caused *Valentinian* to be strangled, as *Socrates* relates, tho' St. *Augustine* leaves it doubtful, whether he was murthered, or died by some other Accident; (u) but in *Theo-*

(s) *Socrat. lib.* 5. *c.* 25. *Aug. Civ. Dei. lib.* 5. *c.* 26.

(u) Ὁ δὲ βασιλεὺς τῶν τε εἰς Οὐαλεντινιανὸν πλημμεθέντων ἀνέμνησε, καὶ τῆς παρανόμου τυραννίδος, καὶ τῶν κατὰ τῆς ἐννόμου βασιλείας πολέμων. *Theod. lib.* 5. *c.* 24.

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doret, the Emperour *Theodosius*, when *Eugenius* was brought to him, puts him in mind both of his Treason against *Valentinian*, and of his Rebellion and continued Usurpation afterwards, till his defeat. And not he alone, but St. *Ambrose*, as I have shewn, after the death of *Eugenius*, and, I think I may say, all Authors that have given any account of him, have esteemed him no better from the beginning to the end of his pretended Reign, than an Usurper, who never had any Right either from God or Man.

I know of but one example in Antiquity, that may seem to suit with the Doctors Notion, and it is that of *Theophilus* of (w) *Alexandria*, who at the Battel between *Theodosius* and *Maximus* had sent *Isidorus* with Presents and with Letters to both of them, to be delivered to him that should come off Conquerour. This some censure him for very highly, and others think it a Calumny invented by his Enemies to defame him; but it had been so far from any Aspersion, if *Maximus* had been immediately to commence God's Vicegerent, if he could, but have subdued *Theodosius*, that it had been no more than what all the other Bishops must soon after have done; and he ought to have been commended rather for his zeal in attending the first Designations of Providence, to pay a ready and early Obedience to the new Emperour, and his Enemies had been strangly mistaken in reporting this as one of the worst Marks of Infamy they could fasten upon him.

(w) *Socrat. lib. 6. c. 2.*

I shall conclude all in Doctor *Sherlock's* own Words; *That we must obey and submit to our Prince, is a Duty, which the Laws of God and Nature enjoyn: And we must not suffer any Man, be he Lawyer or Divine, to perswade us that this is not our Duty: But what Prince we must obey, and to what particular Prince we must pay our Allegiance, the Law of God does not tell us, but this we must learn from the Laws of the Land.* p. 54.

FINIS.

An Appendix to The Title of an Usurper after a Thorough Settlement examined, *containing some Remarks on Dr.* Sherlock's *Vindication of his Case of Allegeance.*

THe *Vindication* has little new in it, as to the main Controversy; and, notwithstanding there be some variations, I believe, the Doctor will give me leave to say, that if his *Case of Allegiance* be answered, the Vindication of it will need no Confutation. But because there are some things in it, that may seem to obviate several Arguments, that I have brought, I shall briefly endeavour to remove those Objections, and leave the rest to his learned Adversary.

Ch. 28. The Convocation teaches, that when changes of Government are brought about either by the Rebellion of Subjects, or the Invasion of Foreign Princes, and the *degenerate Formes* of Government are established, *the Authority either so unjustly gotten, or wrung by Force from the true and lawful Possessor, being always Gods Authority (and therefore receiving no impeachment by the wickedness of those that have it) is ever (when any such Alterations are throughly settled) to be reverenced and obeyed.*

P. 8. From whence the *Dr.* argues, that *it is plain, it is not a legal Authority, by the Death or Cession of the Rightful King; for we are to obey it as Gods Authority, though it be wrung by Force from the true and lawful Possessor: and though the present Possessor should have no other visible Title to it, but such unjust Force.*

But why may not the Authority be said to be wrung by Force from the true and lawful Possessor, when he is forced to resign his Right, or quit his Claim? May not Consent be extorted, and Oaths extorted? and may not a Prince be reduced to that condition, as at last to resolve for ever to relinquish his Right when he has no hopes left of recovering it? and does not History furnish us with such examples? However, that which is wrung from a lawful Possessor by Death, is to be sure wrung by Force from him: and the words do not import that the Possessor is supposed to be living after this injustice and violence. And by these ways Authority may be said to be *unjustly gotten*, or *wrung by Force from the true and lawful Possessor*, though the Authority it self properly and strictly speaking cannot be so obtained. For in the Doctor's opinion, it is conferred by God, upon a Thorough Settlement, and in the opinion of others it is conferred by him, upon the Death, or Cession of the Person, in whom it before was: but whensoever it is transferred, it is certainly given by God, and cannot be torn or forced from the true and lawful Possessor; but the external Power and Exercise of Authority may; and when it is thus gotten, it may afterwards be an accidental means of attaining to the Authority it self. And this is that the Convocation speakes of, that men by wicked Arts and Practices may arrive at Power, and at last, when there is no

better Pretence or Claim, may become invested with the Authority it self, as well as exercise the outward Acts of it. This the Instances subjoined of the Authority of the Egyptian, and Babylonian Kings over the Jews shew to be the meaning of the Convocation: for it would be absurd to take their words in such a sense, as all the examples immediately added for the explication of them doe not explain, but rather confute and contradict: and if the literal Sense, and Grammatical Construction, as the Doctor urges, seem to import this, we must certainly reject it, or else we shall make the Convocation argue, as wise and learned men never did, and then it will be to little purpose to enquire after their meaning, be it what it will. But indeed no Grammar nor Logick, I think, can prove from their words, that the *true and lawful Possessor*, is supposed to be alive, and to assert his Right.

P. 10. The Doctor's observation concerning the mention of *a King* de Facto in the Convocation Book, I cannot think, will prove of any service to him; and I believe, he thought so himself too, when he wrote his *Case of Allegiance*, or else he would never have omitted it; though now he makes great use of it. But the plain meaning of *a King de Facto* there is no more than any Rightful King, *under whom* a man *lives*, whether he be his natural Sovereign, or any Foreign Prince, to whom he is become Subject, justly and lawfully, but not with prejudice to the Right of his own Sovereign. For, as the Doctor observes, this *is spoke with reference to* Ahud's *killing King* Eglon, to whom the Israelites had been in Subjection eighteen years, without any Competition of another Prince to their Allegiance. Now *Ahud* was not their natural Prince, but only the King *under* whom they then *lived*, and who had then a Right to their Obedience; so that if here is not the least intimation, that *a King de Facto* is opposed to *a King de Jure*, but *the King de Facto under whom he lived*, is no more than the King under whom he *de Facto* lived, that is, whose Subject he actually was, whether he were his Natural Sovereign, or a Foreign Prince.

But it must be observed that this is not spoken only with respect to *Ahud's killing Eglon*, but with respect likewise to *Adonijah's* Usurpation in the Reign of *David* his Father. Can. 17. For they say, that though a Subject should make never so specious and solemn pretences *that God had called him to murder the King* de Facto *under whom he lived, and should have first procured himself to be proclaimed and anointed King, as* Adonijah *did*, yet this would not justify him, nor his Adherents, if he *should afterwards have laid violent hands upon his Master*; which is just the same thing that was before expressed in other words, by *Murthering the King* de Facto *under whom he lived*. So that a King *de Facto* in this place cannot be opposed to a King *de Jure*, unless *David* himself were only a King *de Facto*.

The Doctor moves a Dispute, what P. 17. kind of Submission of the Rightful King may be sufficient to transfer his Right, and whether a King does not submit, *when he leaves his Country without any legal Authority of Government, and leaves his People in the hands of a prevailing Prince?* or whether *nothing be a submission but renouncing his Right, and making a Formal Resignation and Conveyance of Power?*

To this I answer, that it is of the Nature of Right, that it cannot be transferred without the consent of the Person, whose Right it is, unless it be by some person, who has a superior Right to the thing disposed of: for what is a mans own, cannot be given away from him against his will, but

but by one, who has a Superiour and better Right to it, than that which he holds it by. And it is sufficient, if any Submission or Consent of the Rightful King be necessary to transfer Allegiance; and if it cannot be proved, that God the Supream Lord and Proprietor of all things is pleased to dispose of the Right to Kingdoms otherwise, than he does of the Right, which private men have to their Estates, it must be necessary that such Acts intervene, as are required among men to convey a Right, which can be no other, than such as imply a Consent. But what kind of Consent is necessary, and how it ought to be expressed is quite another question, which depends upon particular Cases and Circumstances: and it is sufficient in the present case to say, that a forced Submission is a forced Consent, and that is some sort of Consent, and not an involuntary Act, though not so voluntary, as if there had been no Force. The Doctor cannot but acknowledge that *such a Submission* of men, *who resolved to themselves, gives a Right; for it is a voluntary Consent though extorted by force, as all Moralists allow such a mixt choyce and election to be.* But Flight is no Consent at all, but a declaration of the contrary, and therefore whether Forced Submission will transfer Allegiance or no, 'tis certain Flight cannot, and that is all we are now to enquire after.

P. 13.

He argues, that *Jaddus* begged God's Directions, not whether he should submit to *Alexander* or not, for he was already resolved to submit; but about the manner of his Submission, that he might do it so, as that *Alexander* would accept it, after the Provocation he had given him by his denyal before.

P. 20.

Josephus does indeed say, that *Jaddus* dreaded how he should meet Alexander, who was provoked by his former Answer, but what he means by his *meeting him*, and to what intent and purpose he designed to meet him, is not said, much less that he was resolved to make an entire surrender of himself, and the whole City unto his power; and *meeting* an Enemy is a very different thing from making such a Submission to him. He appointed publick Prayers and Sacrifices to be offered up for their Deliverance, but whether they should be delivered by their Submission, or by any other way, we must suppose, they left it wholly to God Almighty to determine. And whatever *Jaddus* might think with himself, it cannot be imagined he would come to a Resolution, and would openly declare it too, but since he sought to God for his direction and assistance in so extraordinary a way, he would in all humility and devotion refer the whole matter, and not only the manner and circumstance of it, to his Determination. Thus *Jaddus* ought to have done, and thus probably he did, and there is nothing in *Josephus*, that contradicts it. If *Jaddus* stood to his first Answer he could not be resolved to submit, and it is most unlikely that he would appoint solemn Supplications and Sacrifices to be made to God about the Circumstance only, and overlook the thing it self, resolving with himself, before he knew Gods pleasure in it, to submit, when he had so lately answered peremptorily that he might not do it so long as *Darius* lived: this must be a great and sudden, and a very improbable change, and very rash and unwarrantable, and not to be drawn into example, if true.

For suppose, that *Jaddus* was resolved to submit, suppose he was resolved to do the thing, which he but just before professed, he ought not to do, this makes no difference in the thing, nor in the Judgment of the Convocation about it, who men-

tion his first resolution, but take no notice of this new own, nor of his Submission it self neither; and perhaps for this Reason, because they might not give much credit to the Account in *Josephus* of the Revelation, and without this his Surrender could not be justified either by their Principles, or his own. But we are concerned only for the matter of Fact, and for the Authority he had to act upon, not for the opinion, with which he acted. He first refused Submission, and that the Convocation approves; he afterwards submitted, and this the Convocation takes not the least notice of: but if there were a Revelation for it, his Submission was lawful; if not, it was contrary to that Duty, which he so lately owned to *Darius*; and to the Judgment of the Convocation. The Doctor says, *if they believed any of* P. 19. *the story upon* Josephus's *Authority, they must believe all.* But why so? some of it may be probable, and that they might believe: and other parts of it so improbable, that his Authority might not be sufficient to give it Credit with them: and it is likely they rejected what they did not mention, when it was so very material to the Subject before them, that if they had believed it, they would scarce have omitted it.

P. 35. The Doctor is forced to own, that *Athaliah*, if she were throughly settled, had God's Authority, till the Right Heir was known to be alive: though if she had, it may be not only Lawful, but a Duty, to resist Gods Authority, since he maintains that *Jehoiada*, supposing her throughly settled, was nevertheless bound in Duty to *Joash*, to depose her, and set him up.

P. 35. But *assoon as the true Heir appeared, she fell from her Power, as much by the express Ordinance and Command of God, as* Joram *did, when* Jehu *was anointed; for a Divine Entail as the Convocation asserts, is equivalent to an express Nomination.*

I Answer, the Appearance of the true Heir respects only the Peoples Duty; but the Question is concerning *Jehoiada*, and what could the Appearance of *Joash* signify to him, who all the while knew, that he was alive, and acted all along for his Right and Interest, and was obliged at the first fit opportunity to make the true heir known? and if so, he must be found to do it by vertue of an Hereditary Right which was in *Joash*, and by consequence he could not be bound to obey *Athaliah*, though she were never so well settled: for it is a contradiction to say, that he was bound to obey her, at the same time, that he was bound to depose her; or which is all one, when he was bound to make the Right Heir known in order to depose her. It may perhaps be said, that *Jehoiada* was not bound in Duty to *Athaliah*, it was only lawful for him to submit, as the Doctor now distinguishes. But if so, then a Providential Right may oblige some Subjects to Obedience, and not others, which is as strange as any thing besides; for sure Gods Authority must oblige all Subjects alike, and if she were invested with Gods Authority, or to use the Doctors word, if she were God's *Providential Queen*, I cannot see how any Subject in her Dominions could be exempted from Gods Authority, nor consequently from Obedience to her, while it remained in her.

Besides, how did she *fall from her Power assoon as the true Heir appeared?* According to the Doctor's Principles, she could never have fallen from it, till she had fallen from her Actual Dominion; and her Authority was at an end, not because the Right Heir was known, but because she was dispossessed; for the Doctor tells us, that *Actual Dominion and Sovereign Power make a King*, that *it is certain* P. 36.

he

P. 38. *be who has the Exercise of the Regal*
P. 50. *Power and Authority, is King, and he*
P. 56. *is no King, who has no Regal Power, whatever his Title be,* and that *it is certain no Prince can have Gods Authority, who is not in Possession of the Throne, and then no Allegiance can be due to him:* and the Doctor cannot *guess how these Princes, who, whatever the Right be, have no Authority of Government, should have Gods Authority.* And if this be so very *certain* from the nature of the thing, that Sovereignty is founded in the *Actual Administration of Government,*
P. 37. or in the *Actual Possession of Power and Authority to govern,* if Possession of Power be of the very Essence of Sovereign Authority, so that no Prince can be possessed of actual Power without Gods Authority, and no Prince that is not actually possessed of Power can have his Authority, then how came the Nature of things to be changed so in the Case of *Joash* and *Athaliah*, that *Joash* upon his first Appearance had an immediate Right to the Allegiance of the Subjects, and *Athaliah* even without Dispossession lost all her Authority?

But she was dispossessed. I grant it: But the Argument proceeds not upon her Dispossession, but upon the first Appearance of the true Heir, and supposes, as the Doctor acknowledges, that immediately upon his Appearance she had no more Authority or Right to their Allegiance before her Dispossession, than she had after it; and that she must therefore have reigned, and must have been in the *Actual Administration of Government* without any Authority from God, if she could have kept Possession never so long a time, though he maintains, that this *Actual Administration* and nothing else is required to invest any Prince with Gods Authority. Suppose then that *Athaliah* had had a strong party, that she had not been surprised, as she was, and suddenly taken off, but that the generality of the Subjects had stood by her, and had not admitted *Joash* to reign over them; this is no impossible Supposition, for the same thing happened to *David* himself, when *Ishbosheth* was set up against him, and therefore might have happened to any of his Line: When then would the Authority have been? or what would the Divine Entail have signified to *Joash*, according to these Principles? Could *Joash* have had God's Authority, tho' he was out of Possession? Then other Kings, though they be dispossessed, may have it too, and Possession is not necessary to the being invested with God's Authority: Or did God by this Entail alter the Nature of things, and was Sovereignty quite another thing in the Kingdom of *Judah*, than it is in other Kingdoms? Then all the Examples the Convocation brings from that Kingdom are to no purpose.

We are told, that if *Joash* did but appear, or was known to be alive, it was enough to put *Athaliah* out of all her Providential Right, and therefore it could not be necessary, that he should be either accepted or recognized to make the Subjects Allegiance become due to him. And in other Kingdoms a thorough Settlement is necessary only for Usurpers: For *when there is a Right, nothing more is* P. 28.
necessary to give Possession, but that Subjects actually own and recognize that Right, and accept him for their King in whom the Right is: For his Right makes their Obedience a Duty, when he is in Possession, how weak and unsettled soever his Government is. But when a Prince has no legal Right to the Crown, nor consequently to the Obedience of his Subjects, it is only a thorough Settlement, which makes Obedience a necessary Duty.

But there is no ground for this Distinction, because if God have disposed of a Crown, all human Claims can be of no validity against his Disposal,

posal, and then Prince must be an Usurper upon Gods Authority, who will attempt to recover it. For, since both Legal Titles, and thorough Settlements are Acts of Gods Providence; since it is all but Providence still, as the Doctor says, the latter Act of Providence must stand good against the former, the effect whereof must be abolished by the latter: If God first gives a Kingdom to one, and afterwards takes it away to bestow it upon another, certainly the last Gift must take place. And therefore the Usurper is to be adhered to rather than the late Legal King, unless Providence advance him to a thorough Settlement, and so cancel the Usurpers Claim, making the Crown over again to the Legal Possessor by a new Gift.

P. 45.

P. 34. Jeroboam *was placed on the Throne of Israel by God's Nomination, and reigned as long as he lived, but for his sake God would not entail the Kingdom on his Family.*

At the same time that God nominated *Jeroboam* by his Prophet *Ahijah*, he made a conditional Entail of the Kingdom upon his Family, 1 *Kings* 11. but *Jeroboam* not performing the conditions, it was of no benefit to him.

And it is not certain that *Jeroboam* was placed on the Throne of *Israel* by Gods Nomination: For though he was so first nominated by God, yet very Learned Men understand *Hos.* 8. 4. to be meant particularly of him, expounding it, that *Jeroboam* is said to *reign but not by God*, because when God had promised to give him the Ten Tribes, he did not wait Gods Time, to receive the Kingdom from him, but was set up by the People, and strengthened himself by Idolatry, and the Israelites are said to have *rebelled against the House of* David *unto this Day*, that is, from the beginning of *Jeroboam's* Reign, to the time of the writing of that Book 1 *Kings* 12. 19.

As to the Arguments which prove, that Fraud and Violence may give a Right to an Estate, as well as Usurpation to a Crown, the Doctor says, P. 46. that *all private Injuries are referred by God himself to the Cognizance and Redress of publick Governments; and human Courts of Justice, and therefore his Providence has no effect as all on such personal Rights, but the very nature of the thing proves that such disputes, which are too big for a Legal Decision, or any humane Courts, for the Decision whereof God has erected no universal Tribunal on Earth, he has reserved to his own judgment, such as the Correction of Sovereign Princes, and the transferring Kingdoms and Empires, &c.*

But he says in his Case of Allegiance, that *the Scriptures never speaks of God's* P. 12. *having permission of any Events, but makes him the Author of all the Good or Evil, which happens either to private Persons or publick Societies, and that all Events which are for the good or evil of private Men or publick Societies are ordered by him.* Here he makes God the Author of all Events alike, whether they befal private Men or publick Societies, and if he will now argue that God disposes of Kingdoms otherwise than of private Estates, first this must be proved; and if it were proved, yet he must maintain the Consequence of his own Principles about Events, or else renounce them: For when he is charged with the Consequence of some of his Principles, it is not enough to say, that the same thing may be proved by another Argument; though this might be sufficient for his Cause, yet it would not be sufficient for his own Vindication.

Besides, the Dispute is neither concerning unjust Possessions of Kingdoms by Usurpation, nor of private Estates by Fraud, or any other Injustice, till both are throughly settled: Suppose then that by false Witnesses, or by false Deeds, or Bribery, or by whatever other wicked means a Man gets

gets into quiet Possession of another's Estate; suppose the Cause has gone against the lawful Possessor in all the Courts of Judicature: the Question is what Title this Man has to this Estate, who has thus unjustly got it? Providence has given it him; he is fully possessed of it, the Courts of Judicature have all determined for him; there is no higher Appeal upon Earth, and God, if he be the *Author* of all Events, and does not only permit them, has bestowed it upon him. The Doctor says, that when a private P. 47. *Man has the Possession of his Estate given him by Law, tho' his right is wrong, he must not be violently dispossessed again:* But has he a Divine Right to this Estate or no? Providence has as evidently declared for him, as ever it did for any Usurper, and he wants nothing but human Rights: & that according to these Principles makes no difference: But he has the Colour and Formality of that too, having the Decision of the Law on his side. Suppose again, that a Man finds a Summ of Money, which he knows the Owner of, and that the Owner has no proof of his having found it, and the Laws of the Land cannot force him to restore it; must this Man restore this Mony, which is the Gift of Providence, or may he keep it? Or has the Owner lost his Right by losing the Possession, when it is beyond all possibility of Recovery? And is an Usurper after a thorough Settlement obliged to resign his Throne to the Rightful King? Or, is not he and his Party as much obliged in Conscience to make Restitution and Reparation to the Rightful King, as private Men are obliged to make Reparation for those Wrongs and Damages, which no human Courts may be able to take Cognizance of?

He says, that all, which he under- P. 62.
took to prove is, *that when a Rightful King is dispossessed, Subjects may vote and submit to the King, who is settled in the Possession of the Throne.* But when the Arguments from the late Usurpation come to be answered, he makes a Distinction between what is *lawful* P. 66.
to be done, and that which is a *necessary Duty*, confessing that it was lawful to submit to *Cromwell*, though he never was throughly settled, but asserting that it was not a Duty; and that he never was throughly settled he proves, because he never was settled by a National Submission and Consent, which he makes necessary to a thorough Settlement.

I answer 1. The Distinction was no Rule of Practice to the Loyalists of those times who never owned that they might lawfully comply, but always professed that they were bound in Conscience not to do it. And the Doctor himself sets it down in the Objection, *that the Loyal Nobility, Gen-* *Case of Al.*
try and Clergy thought themselves bound P. 46, 47.
in Conscience to oppose that Usurpation at their utmost Peril. And in his Answer says, that there was then *such an Invasion on the Rights and Liberties of their Country, which are as sacred as the Rights of the King, as required the utmost Opposition that could be made.*

2. They must have been obliged in Conscience to Submission by the Dr's Principles, though *Cromwell's* Government had been never throughly settled. For the Doctor lays down *several Duties, which in Reason we* Ib. P. 17.
ought to pay to an Usurper, before a thorough Settlement. *As to live quietly and peaceably under his Government, and to promise or swear, or give any other security, that we will do so, if it be demanded. And we must pay Taxes to him, for these were due to the Administration of Government, as St. Paul observes, For this Cause pay ye Tribute also, &c. We must give the Title of King to such a Prince, when we live in the Country, where he is owned for King. Nay we must pray for him, under the Title of King, for we are bound to pray for all who are in Authority.* All this

is

is as applicable to a *Protector* as to a
Ib. P. 18. *King*, and *thus far the Doctor thinks the doubtful Possession of the Throne obliges us*. He supposes indeed that the generality of the Nation have submitted to the Usurper, and that his Possession is doubtful upon the account of the formidable Power which the lawful King yet retains: but I would know, why all Settlements of Usurpers, if they be in the same Degree, do not oblige to the same Duties, since it is the Settlement in it self considered, and not the manner, or kind of it, which lays the Obligation upon the Subjects, and therefore if there may be the same Settlement in *Degree*, without the Consent of the generality of the People, when the Forces of the Rightful King is quite broken, that there may be with their Consent, when he has yet a formidable Power, the Subjects must in both cases stand obliged to pay the same Duties to an Usurper; and upon these grounds no Duty could be justly denyed to *Cromwel*, which is oweing where the Possession is doubtful, when by the Doctor's confession, *no man could have foreseen how King Charles*
Ib. P. 33. *2d. should have returned*, and God alone was able to effect it.

3. The Doctor is not consistent with himself in his account of a Thorough
Ib. P. 9. Settlement: *when the whole Administration of the Government, and the whole Power of the Nation is in the hands of the Prince, when every thing is done in his Name and by his Authority, when the Estates of the Realm, and the great body of the Nation has submitted to him, and those, who will not submit can be crushed by him, whenever he pleases, if this be not a settled Government, he despairs of every knowing what it is*. And in his
Vind. *Vindication* he says, that in this place
P. 22. he has stated what a Thorough Settlement is: yet here he has not determined, what is necessary to it, nor whether all these things must meet together, or whether some one or more of them may be sufficient. Soon *Case.*
after he observes *there are very different ways*, whereby Princes ascend the P. 13.
Throne, *sometimes by the Election of the People; sometimes by Conquest: but all these waies, or any other that can be thought of, are governed and determined by the Divine Providence, and the Prince thus advanced is as truly placed in the Throne by God, as if he had been expressly nominated and anointed by a Prophet at Gods command, as* Saul *and* David *were*. Here is all ascribed to Gods Providence in placing a King upon the Throne, and therefore the Submission of the People cannot be necessary, unless God cannot do it without their Submission, or unless *Saul* and *David* were not Kings upon Gods Nomination, till the People had accepted them, or would never have been Kings, if the People had refused to admit and acknowledge them. Upon Ib. P. 14.
these Grounds he asserts in his Fourth Proposition, that *it is impossible there should be a wrong King* &c. but it is very possible, there may be a King without a National Submission to him, and therefore either this Submission is not necessary to a thorough Settlement; or a thorough Settlement is not necessary to the constituting one of the *Providential* Kings. Afterwards Ib. P. 17.
the Doctor supposes, that though *the generality of the Nation submit to such a Prince, and place him on the Throne, and put the whole Power of the Kingdome into his hands, yet it may be, we cannot yet think the Providence of God has settled him in the Throne, while the dispossessed Prince has also such a formidable Power, as makes the event very doubtful*. But in the same Page, he says, *he is indeed King while he administers the legal Right Power, though we may not think him so well settled in his Government, as to all intents and purposes to own him for our King*. So that Submission may make a King even before a Thorough Settlement, though not perhaps to all intents and purposes. Again I

cannot

Ib. P. 24. *cannot see when to fix the foundation of Governments, but in the Providence of God, who rules by the Choice of the major or stronger part of the People, or by Conquest, or by Submission, and the long successive continuance of Power, or by humane Laws, gives a Prince and his Family Possession of the Throne*, &c. In this place he joyns *Submission* and *Continuance* of Government together, but makes Conquest as well as any of the rest to be *alone* sufficient; and the Providence of God makes Kings by the choice of the *stronger* though they be not the *major* part of the People.

Ib. P. 25. In the next Page; *if the sole Authority of Government be from God, and God gives this Authority only by placing a Prince in the Throne, then by whatsoever means he does it, is the same thing*, and therefore it he does it without the Submission or Consent of the People.

Ib. P. 48. In the case of *Antiochus Epiphanes* the Doctor determines, that *a long Continuance is requisite to settle a Government*; when there is no National Submission; And *when there is nothing but mere Force, it may admit some Dispute, when the Government is settled*. By this it seems that though it may perhaps admit of some dispute, whether *Cromwell's* Government was settled or no; yet a Government may sometimes be settled by mere *Force*, and Continuance may be sufficient without a National Consent. But in the Vindication, *the general Submission of the People is necessary to a thorough Settlement of such new Governments*; and *the principal part of it is* this, viz. *when the Estates of the Realm, and the great Body of the Nation has submitted to such a Prince*: though once more, either Submission or Continuance will suffice.

P. 51.

Vind. P. 32.

Ib. P. 22.

Ib. P. 67.

But it must not be omitted, that the Doctor now says, that *the Consent and Submission of the People, turn that which was originally no more but Force into a Civil and Legal Authority, by giving themselves up to the Government of the Prince*: this, if Submission be necessary to a thorough Settlement, takes away the subject of the question, which is whether a thorough Settlement without any Civil or Legal Authority, be of it self sufficient to entitle an Usurper to the Allegiance of the Subjects by vertue of Gods Authority, *notwithstanding any Claim, Right, Title, or Interest*, which the dispossessed Prince can *challenge to his Country, Kingdome or Empire*. And besides, this raises a new and a very nice dispute; Whether the legal Kings civil and legal Right, or the Usurpers civil and legal Authority make the better Claim, and ought to have the preference.

Ib. P. 16.

4. A National Submission and Consent is not necessary to a thorough Settlement by the Doctor's Principles. By his Principles the thorough Settlement is made by God himself, and the People are not necessarily supposed to have any thing to do in it, but only are obliged in conscience to submit, when it is once brought about by the Divine Providence. For if God be the Author of all events, if *all Kings by equally regular title respect to God*, by whatsoever way *that can be thought of*, they are advanced to the Throne, and settled in it, then a National Submission and Consent cannot be necessary to a thorough Settlement; because a Prince may by Foreign Force, or by an Army of his own Subjects attain to a thorough Settlement against the Consent of the People, and without any but a forced Submission, at most; and this the Doctor will not allow to be sufficient. For he cannot deny but that in the late times, *Men who were forced, submitted by Force*, and his only exception is that *the Nation did not by any National Act own* those Usurpations. And this is all, that, what he has now added in his *Vindication*, can amount to. So that *Cromwell* was throughly, that is, fully settled,

Case. P. 47.

because the whole Nation was forced to submit to him, and could never rescue themselves from that Force till his Death; he was not settled by any National Submission and Consent, but he was settled by a forced Submission, which is one way whereby a thorough Settlement may be attained, and a *National Act* of Submission and Consent is another; but by whatever way the thorough Settlement be obtained, God must certainly be the Author of it; if so he be the Author of all Events, and whatever kind of thorough Settlement *Cromwell* had, 'tis certain, he had the Supream Power fully in his own hands, and therefore by the Doctors Principles could not fail of having Gods Authority. *For since Power will govern, God so orders it, by his Providence, as never to entrust Sovereign Power in any mans hand, to whom he does not give the Sovereign Authority; Power does not give Right and Authority to govern, but is a certain sign to us, that where God has placed such great Power, he has given the Authority also.* No man can say that God never allows and settles Power without the Peoples Submission and Consent, or that *Cromwells* Power was not settled for five years together as much as it could be without a National Consent, and consequently he must have had Gods Authority by the Doctors Principles, though *the Nation did not by any National Act ever own him.*

Case. P. 15.

And it is the same thing, as to the extent of Power: for God cannot be confined to give just such a Measure of Power, as shall suit with the Model of this or that particular Government. Who will say, that God cannot turn a Civil into a Despotick Government, or can deny by the Doctors Principles, that he has constituted him an Arbitrary Monarch, whom he has entrusted with Arbitrary Power? The Question is not, whether God cannot make Kings by his Providence, who yet may be limited in the Administration of their Government by humane Laws? But, whether God does not invest them with an unlimited Sovereign Authority, who can by any means attain to a settled Possession of it, or even but to the Exercise of it? For I shall shew, that by the Doctors Principles the Exercise of Power is sufficient without the Settlement of it. God changes times and seasons, Governments, and Governours, and all this he does only by his Providence, that is, in the Doctors sense merely by the Events of things: and therefore when any Prince makes himself Arbitrary, God has changed the Government, as when an Usurper gets into the Throne he has changed the Governour. And according to the Dr. Authority is inseparable from the Possession of Power, and therefore the Exercise of Arbitrary Power, or the actual Possession of Power to Govern Arbitrarily implies an Authority from God to govern so. For *if Actual Dominion and Sovereign Power make a King*, then Actual Arbitrary Power makes an Arbitrary King.

Vind. P. 86.

4. But the necessity of a thorough Settlement, before the full and entire Allegiance of the Subjects can become due to an Usurper, is inconsistent with the Doctors Principles. For in his Account of the Relation between a King and a Subject he makes no mention of a thorough Settlement, nor supposes it in the least, but on the contrary places the *Relation in Actual Dominion and Sovereign Power, on the one hand, to make a King; and the Obligations to Subjection and Allegiance, on the other hand, to make a Subject.* Why there should not as well be actual Subjection and Allegiance to make a Subject, does not concern me now to enquire: it is enough to my present purpose, that Actual Dominion makes a King, and therefore

Ib. P. 38.

fore a Settled Diminion cannot be
Ib. necessary to make one. *If the Relation then of a King to his Subject be Dominion and Government, does he continue a King*, says the Doctor, *when he has lost his Dominion and Government?* And does he continue an Usurper, say I, who is actually possessed of Dominion and Government; till he is thoroughly settled in it? If he does, how can Actual Dominion and Sovereign Power make a King? How
Ibid. can it be true, that *where Actual Dominion and Government ceases, the Kingship is lost, and the Obligation to Subjection and Allegiance with it*; if it be not likewise true, that where-ever there is Actual Dominion and Government, there is Kingship, and the Obligations to Subjection and Allegiance with it? For *the Actual Possession of Power and Authority to govern, and Allegiance, or that Obedience and Subjection which is due to Govern-*
P. 37. *ment are Relations, and do* mutuò se ponere & tollere.

Thus all that he discourses about this matter wholly excludes the very Notion of a thorough Settlement as necessary to make Allegiance become due: The Substance of it all is, that there must of necessity be always some Government, some actual Power in every Nation, whom the People are bound in Conscience to obey, that therefore this is always from God, and that there can be no *Interregnum*, no time, wherein there is no visible Authority ordained by God in any Kingdom: For if there were, God could not be said to rule in such a Kingdom (of which more by and by.) Now how is this consistent with the Notion of a thorough Settlement, which supposes that there may be an Interval of Time, more or less, when there is none with Authority from God to govern? In short, if *Actual Dominion* make a King, what need can there be of a thorough Settlement to make Allegiance become due to him? If there be a necessity for a thorough Settlement, how can Actual Dominion make a King?

I am perswaded, the Distinction between Usurpers, that are settled, and those that are not settled, is, at least, as *unknown to Scripture*, as the Distinction between Usurpers and lawful Kings: And therefore, as the Doctor urges that if St. *Paul*, Rom. 13. *had intended any such Distinction, he ought to have said it in express words, or else no body could reasonably have understood him to intend this Precept of Subjection to the Higher Powers, only of Powers that had a Legal Right:* So I may with much greater Reason say, that if St. *Paul* had intended any Distinction between Usurpers before, and after a thorough Settlement, he ought to have said it in express words, or else no body would reasonably have understood him to intend this Precept of Subjection only to Usurpers who are throughly settled. *Αἱ δὲ οὖσαι ἐξουσίαι, &c. The Powers that be, are ordained of God*, not that are settled, but that are in being, that actually are: And if πᾶσα ἐξουσία be πᾶς ἐξουσιάζων, and do *evidently relate to the Exercise of Civil Authority, not to a Legal Right*, it is as evident, that it can as little relate to a thorough Settlement; for the *Exercise* of Civil Authority may be long before any Settlement, and continue as long after, and it may be wholly without it from first to last. Case P. 19.

5. If it be necessary there should be a thorough Settlement, before an Usurper can have Gods Authority, and from the Death of King *Charles* the First, to the Restauration of the Royal Family, we had no settled Government, then by the Doctors Principles we had none of Gods Authority amonst us. For Gods Authority is no longer in a dispossest Prince, and

and no Usurper can have it, till a thorough Settlement; and therefore I will put the Question, which the Doctor puts to his Adversary in the like Case. *I desire to know, whether God rules in a Kingdom, while an Usurper fills the Throne* (or while it is not throughly settled) *the Reason of the Question is plain, because the Prophet* Daniel *pronounces Universally, that God ruleth in the Kingdom of Men, and as a proof of it, adds, and giveth it to whomsoever he will, and then it should seem, that God does not rule in these Kingdoms, which he does not dispose of by his own Will and Counsel* (which are not yet throughly settled) *which he does not give to whom he will* (which he has yet given to no body) *but suffers Usurpers to take the Government of them* (but suffers Usurpers to Ordinize over them without coming to a full Settlement, or being invested with his Authority.) In the Case of the English Government, during the Exile of King *Charles* the Second, it is impossible for the Doctor to [illegible] the Force of his own Objection, though it really have no force [illegible] against any body, but himself. For God rules the [illegible] of Wickedness [illegible] Kingdoms, when [illegible] who have his Authority, to [illegible] it to the worst Purposes of Violence and Persecution, and when he permits Subjects to rebel, and throw off the Yoke. He does not always govern Kingdoms by a visible Authority, or by a Person authorized or ordinated by himself to act as his Vicegerent. But it is yet to be proved, that God cannot govern Kingdoms, if he suffer Men to exercise all the outward Acts of Power and Sovereignty without any Right and Authority to do it; it remains to be proved, that when God suffers Subjects to cast off that Authority, which he has appointed, to reject his Vicegerent, and to say, *We will not have this Man to rule over us*, they are then no longer under Gods Rule and Government. And when this is proved, it will still remain to be shewn, how by these Principles God could rule in these three Kingdoms, if there was no thorough Settlement, and consequently no Person invested with Gods Authority, for so many Years together.

Vindicat. P. 59.

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